

MEMOIR
OF
THE THREE CAMPAIGNS
OF
Major-General Sir Archibald Campbell.
ARMY IN AVA.

BY
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Rangoon Expedition.

SERAMPORE.

1828.

Λίσχον δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ ὕστερον ἐπιμε-
 ταπέμπεσθαι, τοπρωῶτον ἰσκέπτως βουλευσαμένους.
 αὐτόθεν δὲ παρασκευῇ ἀξιοχρέω ἐπιέναι, γνόντας ὅτι
 πολὺ τε ἀπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας αὐτῶν μέλλομεν πλεῖν,
 καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὁμοίῳ στρατευσόμενοι. καὶ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς
 τῆδε ὑπὲρ τοῖς ξύμμαχοι ἔλθετε ἐπὶ τινά, ὅθεν ῥάδιαι
 αἱ κομιδαὶ ἐκ τῆς φιλίας ὧν προσέδεε, ἀλλ' ἐς ἀλ-
 λοτριάν πᾶσαν ἀπαετήσαντες, ἐξ ἧς μηνῶν οὐδὲ τεσ-
 σάρων τῶν χειμερινῶν ἄγγελον ῥάδιον ἐλθεῖν. Ὅπλί-
 τας τε οὖν πολλούς μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡμᾶς ἄγειν—
 ναυσί τε καὶ πολὺ περιεῖναι, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια
 ῥᾶον ἐσκομιζήμεθα. τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν σῆτον ἐν
 ὑλκάσι πυρρὸς καὶ πεφυγμένος κριτὰς ἄγειν, καὶ
 σιτοποιούς, ἵνα ἔχη ἡ στρατιὰ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. τά τε
 ἄλλα ὅσον δυνατὸν ἐτοιμάσασθαι, καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ ἑτέροις
 γίγνεσθαι. Πόλιν τε νομίσαι χρὴ ἐν ἀλλοφύλοις
 καὶ πολεμίοις οἰκειοῦντας ἵεναι, οὓς πρέπει τῇ πρώτῃ
 ἡμέρᾳ ἢ ἂν κατὰσχωσιν, εὐθὺς κρατεῖν τῆς γῆς· ἢ
 εἰδέναι ὅτι ἢ σφάλωνται, πάντα πολέμια ἔξουσιν.

Thucydides, lib. vi. Cap. 11. 12.

Neither is the opinion of some of the school-
 men to be received; “That a war cannot just-
 ly be made, but upon a precedent injury, or
 “provocation.” For there is no question but a
 just fear of an imminent danger though there
 be no blow given, is a lawful cause of war.

Bacon's Essay “ of Empire.”

TO HIS EXCELLENCY
GENERAL THE RIGHT HONORABLE
THE LORD VISCOUNT COMBERMERE,
G. C. B., G. C. H., & G. C. T. S.,
COMMANDER IN CHIEF IN INDIA,
THE LEADER,

FOR WHOM PROVIDENCE RESERVED THE
GLORY OF SILENCING THE HAUGHTY REPROACH OF
OUR PAGAN ENEMIES, AND BREAKING THE LAST SPELL UPON
THE OPINION OF THE IGNORANT, AND THE TURBULENT,
WITHIN THE INDUS, BY THE DARING AND SCIENTIFIC
REDUCTION OF THAT FORTRESS VAINLY NAMED
THE INVIOLETE, THE IMPREGNABLE,

THIS FIRST ESSAY IN MILITARY HISTORY
IS INSCRIBED

WITH SENTIMENTS OF RESPECT AND GRATITUDE,

-BY THE AUTHOR.

King's Depôt, Chinsura, Bengal,
July 6th, 1827.

INTRODUCTION.

THE first war against the Burmans arose out of a singular, and audacious, but perfectly deliberate attempt on the part of the semi-barbarous court of Ava to deprive the British Government in India of a portion of its Eastern provinces.

The temerity of such an enterprise rendered it incredible in the eyes of many. But the history of the origin of the ridiculous, and criminal pretensions of the Burmans, of their developement in a series of aggressions upon states protected by the British; and finally, the organization of a combined plan of invasion by the barbarian armies, rests its claims to belief on the most circumstantial and irrefragable testimony.

These events will become matters of very considerable interest to the future historian of the dominion erected by the British on the ruins of Hindoo and Moohummedan misrule. He will revert with honest indignation to the period of the presentation of the hostile rescript to the Marquis of Hastings embattled against the last confederation of the Marhattas. He will offer his tribute of admiration to the cool statesman-

like dexterity, with which the blow was parried. It was Napoleon saying to Hagwitz on the eve of Austerlitz, "I shall beat them, I shall beat them; let me hear nothing from you to-day; I shall beat them to-morrow."

He will proceed to shew however that the Burman monarch had not lost sight of his ambitious projects. His court was sunk in a state of deplorable ignorance of its true situation in the scale of nations; indeed of every object of knowledge beyond the frontiers of its own dominions. The minds of the monarch and the courtiers were alike inflated by the recollection of a series of successes against Peguers, Chinese, Siamese, the people of Arracan, of Cassay, of Manipoor. They believed themselves irresistible. The grandson of Minderagee Praw, who now occupied the throne of Alompra, was like his predecessors enveloped in the delusions of judicial astrology, to which the Burmans are fondly addicted. The prey too of a disgraceful passion, he had allied himself to a woman of mean extraction, and the most turbulent disposition. She had been raised to the distinction of Namma-daw, or first of the Burman queens.

The low-born brother of this queen was one of the most active instigators of the mind of the Monarch to prosecute his claims on Bengal eastward of the Bhagaratee, which was called in the

language of barbarous ignorance “the antient territory of the conquered Mug Rajah of Arracan, whose pagodas and chowkees were there.”

A kind of war faction was formed in this barbarous capital. Amongst its leaders were Meinmya-boo, natural brother to the king and Menghee Maha Bundoola. The latter had acquired in his own nation some reputation for energy and talent as a military leader. Various measures of gradual encroachment on the territories, which lie between the western frontiers of Burma, and the North Eastern provinces of the Bengal Presidency, were planned, and executed by these evil counsellors of an irresolute monarch.

At length in the month of October, 1823, the question of the direct invasion of Bengal was debated in the hall of the Lotoo or Grand Council of State. The scruples of the king, who is a man of mild disposition, and somewhat indolent habits, were satisfied as regarded the justice of his claim. He sanctioned the attempt amidst the applauses of the war faction.

It was then that the Bundoola arose, and with vows and vehement gestures declared that from that moment Bengal was severed from the British dominion. “Henceforth it has become in fact, as it has ever been in right, a province of the golden king. Bundoola has said and sworn it.”

This scene, which is perfectly authenticated by the combined testimony of the British, and American subjects then resident at Ava, and these pretensions, certainly appear to the eye of reason more like the ravings of delirium, than the acts of men, to whose sagacity the happiness of millions was confided. But it was this extravagant ebullition of barbarian restlessness, which engaged the British in India in the most costly war, of which the annals of that government contain any record.

The politicians, who affected to speak of this war as a contest undertaken for the defence of Shapuree Deep, belong to the same class of reasoners, who believed in the days of Burke that the revolutionary war was waged for the opening of the Scheld, and their silly criticisms were demolished by the disclosures regarding Burman policy, which followed the treaty of Yandabo, as summarily as were those of the simple dupes of ostensible motives by the coarse, but pungent sarcasm of the great orator.

A war for Shapuree Deep? No. But a war for the vindication of the national honor, insulted, and compromised by the aggressions, and encroachments of a barbarous neighbour. A war for the security of the peaceable inhabitants of the districts of Chittagong, Moorsshedabad, Rungpore, Silhet, Tipperah, menaced with a

repetition of the atrocities perpetrated the year before in Assam. That would indeed have been a paternal government, that should have consented to have abandoned its subjects to the tender mercies of the Bundoola, and the Maha Silwa. Some traces of Burman humanity will be found in the succeeding pages. They may serve to enlighten those who could see no substantive ground for war against the Burmans in 1823-24.

The Government acted wisely in meeting the intolerable aggressions of these barbarians by a declaration of war. It exercised as sound a discretion in preferring to make offensive war; there being in fact no other judicious mode of defending a large frontier menaced in several points, but that of removing the assailants to a distance from the vulnerable quarters by offensive manœuvres. But it can hardly be contended that the time for commencing operations was chosen with equal sagacity. The campaign should have opened in October 1823, or in October 1824. Sound principles forbid all mention of any intermediate time. It is in vain to urge that the only native soldiers at the disposal of government were the Regiments of the Coast Army of Madras which volunteered to embark, and that it was necessary to collect them before the setting in of the Monsoon, which bars all ap-

proach to those shores. Transports might have sailed from Madras in October, and reached Rangoon in time to commence the march towards Prome, with the return of the dry weather. Subsequent experience proved this, which need never have been doubted. The intermediate rainy months need not have been lost. Much remained to be done. But this discussion will be pursued at length by him, who shall command leisure and sufficient confidence in his own judgment, and access to stores of information, to assume the character of the historian of the first war against the Burmans. They are foreign to the limits of this restricted narrative.

Four several corps in 1824-25-26, directed their efforts against the frontiers and resources of the Burmans. The first under Brigadier Richards reconquered Rungpore the capital of Assam, and menaced Ava from the north; the second under General Shuldham unable to penetrate a frontier of forests and mountains, yet secured from the horrors of invasion the provinces adjacent to Silhet. General Morrison's division was the third. It moved from the base of the Chittagong frontier fully equipped, crossed the boundary line of the Tek Naaf, compelled the barbarians by a scientific advance to concentrate for the defence of the capital of Arracan, fought a successful action under its walls,

seized, and occupied it. Hence the leader of these troops had hoped to commence a series of more important operations ; to open a passage to the mountains of Arracan, to seize the gorges of this territorial boundary, and debouch upon the right bank of the Irawaddy in co-operation with the fourth corps, which was then in the act of establishing itself on a point on the left bank three hundred miles from its mouth.

But within the walls of that city the progress of this division was arrested by the hand of pestilence. In a month General Morrison had no longer an army. The purposes of the war were left to be accomplished by the fourth of these corps, the first movements of which were antecedent to the formation of the other three.

This was the armament, of which the equipment and descent upon the Burman Coast at Rangoon has been familiarly known by the title of the Rangoon Expedition. It consisted of two divisions of troops, one from Bengal, and the other from Madras, united under the command of Brigadier General Sir Archibald Campbell. A shade was cast on its first operations by the melancholy sickness, which shortly seized upon its battalions ; and rapidly thinned their ranks, a mortality, partly the result of a contingent epidemic which operated simultaneously upon the coasts of the Bay of Bengal ; but chiefly

to be attributed to the original error in the plan of operations, which confined the force for six months within a circumference of seven miles employed in the severest duties, in a season of unprecedented inclemency, and destitute of supplies and magazines.

Yet it was on these divisions that the state mainly depended, for the termination of the war. It has publicly acknowledged that its hopes were not disappointed. These troops foiled every attempt made by their enemy to take advantage of their distress. No sooner were means within their reach than they proceeded to assume the offensive ; they dispersed or annihilated in succession five barbarian armies, which were collected to overwhelm them ; they traversed a country, in which foreigners had never before warred with success, almost unknown to Europeans ; they seized three of the principal towns of the enemy, kept possession for two years of the provinces of Pegue, the affection of the inhabitants of which they won by their exemplary discipline ; and finally dictated a peace to the barbarian monarch at the gates of his capital.

The author was employed on the General Staff of the Rangoon Expedition. He has devoted a very few hours of the leisure of peace to tracing this memorial of the operations of an army, a part of the sufferings of which he shared ; the

last successes of which he had the happiness to witness. His employment was executive, not confidential. He has had no access to any sources of information, which have not been unreservedly opened to the public.

It cannot be concealed that even this by far the most important portion of the Burman war, will not possess sufficient interest to authorize the erection of a large historical superstructure, It was a war against barbarians, a struggle against local difficulties. It excluded the promise of those splendid achievements, which illustrate the page of history; investing it with the charm of romance. Of its theatre few men even now know much. Former histories had been jejune, though laborious. But the public seemed to acquiesce patiently in this state of things. It betrayed no anxiety to multiply its historians of the affairs of Ava. Even now it is to be feared, that very many will listen coldly to the recital of vicissitudes, to the recollection of which the actors, and sufferers turn with affectionate interest. The author feels that it is his duty to strive to write this history briefly, as well as faithfully.

In a narrative merely military relating to war in regions, in which the colder months form the period of activity, and hostilities are commonly suspended on the approach of the season of rain, it seems most convenient to consider each cam-

paigñ as naturally bounded by the termination of this the Indian season of hibernization. As in Europe we speak of December, or the first weeks of January as closing the year's war, and describe as a winter's campaign operations conducted later. Thus the first operations in Ava may be designated as the campaign of the Monsoon.

According to this division the army under Sir Archibald Campbell made three campaigns. The first the trying campaign of the Monsoon of 1824, the second opened in December by Bundoola, embracing the advance to Prome, and terminating with the armistice, which followed the conferences at Nyoung-ben-zeik. The third began with the disaster of Watteegoung, followed up by the successes in front of Prome, terminating in the treaty of Yandabo.

The first two Books of this work relate to the first campaign, with the exception of three preliminary sections sketching events antecedent to the declaration of war; the next two Books trace the movements of the second, the last two those of the third campaign.



BOOK I.

RANGOON.

The argument.—I. Burman aggressions. Shapuree. The Pilot Chew.—II. Relations on the North Eastern frontier of Bengal. Burman aggressions in that quarter.—III. Frontier lines of Ava. British lines of invasion.—IV. Preparations of the British for war.—V. Rangoon expedition sails.—VI. Arrives at the mouth of the Rangoon river.—VII. Anchors off Rangoon.—VIII. Rangoon cannonaded. British and American, Greek and Armenian residents seized and imprisoned. Sufferings of the prisoners.—IX. The British land. The inhabitants abandon the town.—X. Brief description of the town.—XI. Measures of the Rangoon.—XII. XIII. The British take a position.—XIV. Military question. Strategical relations of the Army.—XV. Fabian views of the Barbarians. First skirmish near Kemmendine.—XVI. The British remain in position. Heavy rains begin to fall. Houses defective. Severe out-post duty. Baneful damps.—XVII. XVIII. Further description of Rangoon, and its environs. The Great Pagoda.—XIX. The Barbarians reinforced. Reconnoissance in force. Affair of the 28th May.—XX. Reconnoissance by land and water, and ill-concerted attack on the intrenched camp at Kemmendine.—XXI. Burman deputation.—XXII. XXIII. Operations against Kemmendine. Work near Kemmendine breached and stormed (June 10th.) Kemmendine invested and battered. Garrison escape (June 11th.)—XXIV. Capture of Cheduba.—XXV. Naval and Military reconnoissance of Negrais.—XXVI. Progress of

disease at Rangoon. Endemic fever. Dysenteric ailments. Gathering difficulties, and discouragements of the Army. Its constancy.

I.

THE historian of the three campaigns is relieved from the necessity of entering deeply into an examination of the causes of the war. Neither do the conditions of his task exact more than a cursory notice of hostile demonstrations antecedent to the final declaration of the 17th March, 1824, or of subsequent operations along the line of frontier, which lies between Rungpore in Assam, and the northern extremity of the island of Cheduba.

It is well known that the first collision between Burman troops, and soldiers in British pay took place in October, 1823. Shapuree Deep is a little island formed of the mud and sand thrown up by the action of the river Tek Naaf, the boundary line between Arracan and the Chittagong district, at its mouth. This spot had been cleared and partly cultivated by the British. The judicial authorities of Chittagong had stationed on it a police establishment with a guard of native soldiers. In a season of profound peace, without any previous representation or complaint, a body of Burman troops attacked, and forced this post.

Weak men have chosen to consider this aggression as the sole cause of the Burman war. It was only the first overt act of hostility in this particular quarter. It was committed by a detachment of an armed force already assembled for the invasion of Bengal.

The Military commandant at Chittagong moved troops upon Shapuree. The Burmans retired. He continued to observe the frontier. On the arrival of his first reports preparations were made to embark at Calcutta His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry and a battalion of Native Infantry; and some Artillery. Lieut. Colonel McCreagh of the 13th, was to have commanded this little expedition. All having remained tranquil, this embarkation was countermanded. The force at the Chittagong frontier received a reinforcement of native soldiers only.

In January, 1824, the silly adventure of one of the Senior Pilots in the Bengal service gave rise to full as much discussion and speculation, as its importance demanded. Mr. John Chew, Branch Pilot, landed upon his own suggestion, and responsibility on the coast of Arracan, at a time when the minds of the Barbarians were embittered by the recollection of the affair of Shapuree Deep, and agitated with distrust regarding the sudden appearance of a Company's cruiser off their Naval frontier. Of this cruiser

Mr. John Chew was the commander. He landed, and was seized, and carried to the capital of Arracan. There the Governor, disavowed the act of his subaltern. He caused Mr. John Chew to be escorted back to his own vessel ; he even released at his instance twenty-seven inhabitants of Chittagong, who had been detained from various periods. Mr. John Chew appears to have suffered little either in mind, body, or estate, by his detention. It may have served to teach him the value of his personal liberty, of which his notion appears before to have been imperfect. As policy could hardly advise a war for the assertion of sovereignty over Shapuree Deep, neither would it counsel hostilities to avenge the wrongs of Mr. John Chew. Doubtless both the affair of the island, and of the pilot naturally led to a demand for international explanation ; but they were not causes of war. They were however indications of the feelings and plans of the Burmans.

A political agent had been employed since October, 1823, in endeavoring to adjust in an amicable manner the matter of claim to the insignificant island. He found the subordinate officers amongst the Burmans ignorant, and prone to evasion ; and their superiors, insolent and intractable. The latter told him roundly, that if the Governor General of India fancied that he could

establish a claim to Shapuree Deep, it became him to make known his wishes, in the form sanctioned by Burman usages, that of *petition* to the Monarch of Ava.

II.

But in February, 1824, fresh symptoms of Burman restlessness were exhibited. The river Soorma rises in the hills of Kathee or Cassay. It flows westward, leaving on its left bank Silhet the capital of a district. At Solagur it runs off toward the south, and assuming the name of Megna at Sujatpoor falls into the Burrampooter near Sunerampoor. From Budderpoor to within ten miles of Silhet a distance of more than forty miles it forms the boundary line between the British territories, and those of the Rajahs of Cachar and Gentiah, both protected by the British. The determination of the Burmans to extend their dominions in this quarter had long been known at Calcutta. But, on the 13th February, their forces appeared in a menacing attitude on the Soorma. They threw up stockades on its northern bank close to Budderpoor.

Mr. Scott, Political Agent to the Governor General, was informed of this demonstration. He reflected that the act of entering the territory of Cachar was in itself an aggression. He saw that the Burmans were strengthening themselves in

their position. He knew that they disdained all the ties, which bind more civilized nations. The force in British pay on the North Eastern frontier was small. If the Burmans were permitted to extend their works; they would soon command the province of Silhet; and overrun it at their pleasure. He resolved to cause the native troops at his disposal to march against them. A wing of the 1st Battalion 10th Native Infantry, a detachment of the 2nd Battalion 23rd Native Infantry, and a party of the Rungpore Light Infantry passed the Soorma under the command of Captain Johnstone of the 23rd. Mr. Scott tried negotiation. He represented to the Burmans the evil consequences of these hostile acts, and intreated them to desist from the work of fortification. They paid no attention to his remonstrances. He then ordered Captain Johnstone to move against the works, but not to fire unless fired upon. The advancing sections were received with musquetry. Then the native soldiers charged, and stormed in succession the whole of the stockades.

Mr. Scott caused the Burmans a few days afterwards to be driven by Colonel Bowen from another position, which they had taken up at Juttrapoor. The force, which had thus invaded Cachar had marched from Munnipoor. Its advance only had reached the Soorma. The main

body was intrenched at Daoodputlee nearer to Cospoor the capital of the Rajah Gumbeer Singh, the ruler of Cachar. This chief accompanied in person the detachments of the British Government. He claimed its protection against the invaders. Colonel Bowen attacked their works at Daoodputlee with native infantry and field Artillery. He was repulsed. He, and three of his officers were wounded; one was killed. He lost one hundred and fifty soldiers *hors de combat*. But in a few days afterwards the Burmans abandoned their works.

Mr. Scott turned his attention to the frontiers of Assam. In 1793 a British force penetrated into this country to espouse the cause of Maha Raja Surjee Deo opposed by a rival. His claims to the Government were established by their aid. A treaty was concluded which from a sentiment of gratitude guaranteed to the British commercial advantages. In 1820-21, a Burman army overrun the whole country, and committed the most execrable atrocities. The British might then have interfered to protect an ally but it was not until the ambitious projects of the Burmans were fully developed, and they had first insulted a British post on the Naaf, and then invaded Cachar, and established themselves in force on the Soorma; that the small force under Brigadier Macmorine was directed

to prepare to operate against Assam. Mr. Scott proceeded towards Goalpara; but long before he reached it, the resolution of the Supreme Government had been taken. On the 17th March 1824 it formally declared war against the subjects and dominions of the King of Ava.

III.

Few wars have been undertaken with a less precise or extensive knowledge of the topographical circumstances of the enemy's country. This deficiency was one of the most serious of the difficulties to be encountered.

Four territorial lines of invasion seemed to present themselves to the choice of the British. From Rungpore in Assam to Mogaun in the Burman Empire are one hundred and sixty miles, thence to Bhaumo on the frontiers of China, are one hundred, thence to Moyeen thirty-five, from Moyeen to the Burman capital one hundred and forty. Thus the route from Rungpore to Ava extends along four hundred and thirty-five miles, no part of which has been trodden by an European. An Army that should advance in this direction would derive a great advantage from the command of a navigable stream from Moyeen to Ava. But its magazines must be formed at Gowahatty and Rungpore; supplies must be dragged from Goalpara two hundred

and fifty miles more up the intractable Burrumpooter.

From Silhet to Munnipoor are two hundred miles, from Munnipoor to Ava are little more than other two hundred miles. This second line would not far have exceeded four hundred miles. On the first view therefore it appeared probable that if a large portion of the Army in Bengal were concentrated either upon Rungpore or Silhet it must in either case have penetrated to Ava in from forty to forty-five marches. But the difficulties experienced by the force under Brigadier General Shulldham in his attempt to advance through Cachar seem to demonstrate the fallacy of these calculations in the closet.

From Silhet to the Naaf, the Burman territories are protected by thick, pestilential forests, and successive ranges of mountains. It is not unlikely that by following the course of a river called the Goomtee, which is supposed nearly to bisect this iron line, a route might be elaborated into the central provinces of Burma. The Goomtee rises in the mountains two hundred miles eastward of Comillah. Its embouchure into the Burrumpooter is forty miles to the westward of that town near Daoodkandy. But after ascending to its rise, a column would still have to clear a mountain range of thirty miles, and hence again it must descend the valley of another

small stream a distance of sixty miles more, before it could debouch upon the right bank of the **Kyaingdyaing**. This last river unites itself to the **Irawaddy** at **Toumgain** seven marches from **Ava**. This under a change of circumstances, which time may produce, might become a connecting route between the **Tipperah** district and **Ava**; but as a line of invasion it was far too dangerous. No one thought in 1824 of penetrating the frontier at any point between **Silhet** and the mouth of the **Naaf**, a distance of two hundred and eighty miles. Sound principles seemed to dictate the course of observing the whole of this interval, and all to the northward of it, and striking a blow, with the concentrated force of the **British Empire** in the **East**, further to the **South**.

From the 21st parallel of latitude to **Cape Negrais** the vital parts of the **Burman Empire** are protected only by a single range of mountains. These were known up to 1824 by the name of **Anou-pee-too-myo**. They were said to rise in places to the height of 8000 feet. Their mean altitude has not been very correctly calculated. They are covered with wood. They divide the land into two great vallies, the **Eastern** lying between the **Irawaddy**, and the mountains; the **western** included between the mountains and the sea. But the sea coast and the line of the **Irawaddy** are not parallel. The two lines

meet and form an acute angle at Cape Negrais. Thus the Burman dominions southward of 21°, and westward of the main waters of the Irawaddy are described within an isosceles triangle; of which Cape Negrais is the apex, a line drawn between the mouth of the Náaf and a point opposite Sillay-myo on the Irawaddy the base; and which is bisected by the mountains Anou-pee-too-myo.

If history had been wholly silent on the subject, still it would have been concluded that the passage of this range of mountains promised the most important advantages to an invading army. No soldier of experience could permit himself to doubt that more than one route could be elaborated across them, by which troops of either arm, cannon, and all the accessories of war could be moved into the valley of the Irawaddy. But more than this, Symes in detailing the conquest of Arracan by the Burmans had clearly designated the tracks followed by the armed bodies, which achieved it. They had passed the barrier in two masses, debouching respectively from Myanaung and Padoung; both well known to the British in 1825-26.

But these roads do not issue from the Chittagong frontier, on which it seemed expedient to collect a force to penetrate into the interior provinces of Burma through Arracan. A choice

of other lines presented itself farther northward.

From Ramoo within the British frontier to Mungdoo beyond it, the distance was calculated at forty miles; thence to Loadhung at thirty-five, thence to the capital of Arracan at fifteen. It was believed that from Arracan to Talak were thirty-five miles, from Talak to Aeng twenty-five, from Aeng to Sembewghewn on the Irawaddy seventy. Thus a force setting out from Ramoo would reach a point on the great stream of the interior after traversing two hundred and ten miles, that is, in twenty-one marches. A nearer cut could have been found from Talak to Sembewghewn, but it had been seldom explored, and was reported difficult.

There is however another very eligible mode of surmounting the barrier of the Arracan mountains. There is a road perfectly familiar to the Mughs of Arracan which debouching on the Irawaddy at Padoung only five miles below Prome on the right bank of the stream, finds its opposite outlet on the coast near Yamyee or Ramree. If the means of invasion were collected on that island, a column of good troops would force its passage across the mountains, pass the Irawaddy, seize Prome, and make it the centre of its operations. Here it would be more safely situated than at Sembewghewn.

It is true that it would expose the flank to an attack from lower Pegue; but it would soon convert Prome into an excellent tête-de-file; and place of arms. The same result might be attained by an Army marching from Ramoo. It would only be necessary that on reaching Aeng, it should wheel to its right and march on Padoung and Prome, instead of turning to the left and manœuvring upon Sembewghewn. The merits of these several plans of invasion through Arracan will admit of much discussion. The division of war to which they belong is in the nature of an art, not a science; of conjectural, not positive knowledge. But the enterprise of crossing the Irawaddy at Padoung, would seem best to derive success, because it is conformable to some of those grand principles, which it is never safe to disregard.

Three lines of invasion through Assam, through Cachar, through Arracan, have been reviewed in succession. But in March 1824 the attention of the Supreme Government was absorbed by a fourth.

It had resolved on a maritime expedition. A force drawn partly from the Presidency of Fort St. George; partly from that of Fort William, was to be united in the Bay of Bengal at the Andaman islands. It was to make a descent upon the Burman coast at Rangoon, the princi-

pal sea port of the kingdom, and thence force its way up the great river of the country, and along its banks to the capital.

The execution of this project is the subject matter of the history of "The three campaigns."

IV.

There are stationed in the territories of the Bengal Presidency, seven Regiments of the Infantry of the King's Army. They are cantoned along a line of fifteen hundred miles. In the Madras Presidency there are also seven of the same corps. These contribute to the guarding a sea coast of fourteen hundred miles, and an inland frontier line of fourteen hundred more in extent. Each Government possesses two Battalions of Europeans in the permanent pay and service of the Company. Local circumstances fully weighed, it might be deemed unsafe to send beyond the seas at one moment more than six out of sixteen European Battalions. Here was felt the first but not the only inconvenience of a maritime expedition. The rules of their superstition teach Hindoo soldiers of the higher castes to regard with abhorrence a voyage at sea. To be pent within a narrow space, together with other Hindoos of an inferior religious grade, and with Moossulmans, Christians, and swine, to be insecure of the purity of their water, or of pri-

vacy, and separation at the hours of cooking, and repast; involves so many causes of pollution, and annoyance, as would render an order to embark, a severe test of the loyalty of a corps, the ranks of which are filled with Brahmans and Cshatriyas.

Hence in Bengal there are two Native Battalions only, which are held absolutely available for service beyond the seas. The rest embark on emergencies in the character of men volunteering to go beyond the pale of their duty. The soldiers of the Madras Army are commonly men of lower caste; and more liberal views regarding those inconvenient and somewhat unmilitary distinctions. At the commencement of the first war against the Burmans it was proposed to require their voluntary services. To their lasting honor, and that of those, who had infused such spirit into them, these troops answered the appeal by acclamation. There was but one sentiment—"Let us embark!—let us march against the Burmans!" Thus a large native force became disposable for active operations.

The command of the forces from both presidencies was confided to Colonel Sir Archibald Campbell, a Lieutenant Colonel in the King's 38th Regiment. This officer had served with distinction in the campaigns of the British in

Spain, Portugal, and France. He had attained the rank of Major General in the service of Portugal. He now received from the Bengal Government the local commission of Brigadier General.

The contingent of Infantry from Bengal consisted of a single Brigade formed of the King's 13th Light Infantry, and 38th Foot, and the 2d Battalion 20th Bengal Native Infantry. They were commanded by Lieut. Colonel Mc'Creagh of the 13th. Public opinion spoke of the acknowledged ability, with which this officer had formerly led at different periods more than one Portuguese Battalion. It described him as having been conspicuously useful in training the newly raised Light levies for the defence of Portugal. Two companies of Foot Artillery under Captain Timbrell, and an Engineer establishment, completed the force from Bengal.

On the side of Madras were prepared for service; three European Regiments, the King's 41st and 89th; and the Honourable Company's 1st European Regiment, and eight Native Regiments, the 3d, 7th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 18th, 34th, and 43d. Engineers and Artillery were added. Thus, although one of the five Brigades into which this force from Madras was subdivided, did not reach Ava until June, it was in May in the power of Government to have united upon a

point four Battalions of British, and six Battalions of Native Infantry, completely equipped ; with fifty pieces of cannon.

V.

The command of the force from Madras was given to Colonel M'Bean, a Lieutenant Colonel in the King's 54th Regiment. It happened singularly that he also had fought with distinction at the head of Portuguese troops, at the period of the renowned campaigns against the Lieutenants of Napoleon. He was created a Brigadier General.

A complete Staff, personal, and departmental, had been appointed in Bengal. This was the General Staff of the Expedition. A complete Staff had also been formed at Madras. This was the General Staff of the force from that Presidency. The command of General Sir Archibald Campbell embraced the whole force, that of General M'Bean the force from Madras, that of Brigadier Mc'Creagh the Infantry from Bengal. The General from Madras corresponded with his own Government regarding all matters connected with the equipment, organization, and provisioning of the force specially under his command. But in the council, and the field, he was subject to the supreme control of the General from Bengal. Thus unity of command was re-

conciled to regard for the feelings, wants, and peculiarities of the troops from either Presidency.

The Naval force in the East Indies was in March, 1824, under the command of Commodore Grant. His broad pendant was hoisted in the *Liffey* frigate. It was arranged that the *Liffey*, the sloop of war *Larne*, Captain Marryat, and *Slaney*, Captain Mitchel, the brig *Sophie*, and the Honourable Company's Cruizers *Teignmouth*, *Mercury*, and *Hastings*; should, meeting from various points at the Andamans, co-operate in the objects of the expedition. A flotilla of twenty gun boats was equipped for service on the waters of the Irawaddy. They were manned by native sailors commanded by the young officers of the Pilot service. The port of Calcutta, and the Coasts of the Madras Presidency furnished excellent vessels for the transport of troops, cannon, stores, provisions, and camp equipage. Each of those, that sailed from Bengal, towed down the bay a stout row boat capable of containing fifty soldiers. The aid of steam became a valuable addition to the means of transport by water in a war, in which it was foreseen that it would be necessary to contend with an impetuous stream. The Vessel *Diana* propelled by an engine of fifty horse power was ordered to accompany the fleet. As regarded a period antecedent to the actual descent, the prevailing

winds of the season might be expected to affect the expedition as follows. The South Western monsoon beginning to act in the second or third week of April up the middle and along the Eastern coast of the bay would rather forward than impede the traject from Madras. It threatened however to retard the progress of the fleet from Bengal. But as the Andamans lie to the southward of the mouths of the Irawaddy; the whole armament once united within Port Cornwallis, the place of rendezvous, would have reason to hope for a rapid passage to Rangoon.

In February, 1824, the Commander in Chief in India pursuing a grand tour of military inspection, had already arrived at one of the most distant stations in the Empire. The importance of the crisis demanded his return. He travelled rapidly; and arriving at Calcutta late in March added the weight of his counsel, and energy to the preparations for war.

No man, who has not experienced the effects of the climate, and observed the character of the natives of Calcutta, can form an adequate notion of the difficulties that attend the equipment of an expedition from that port. Indolent to excess from habit and constitutional temperament, careless of engagements, and promises, and embarrassed by idle superstitions, and powerful antipathies, the working classes, on whose

exertions so much depends, present a mass of obstinate inertness, which scarcely any zeal or talent on the part of their employers can animate. There exists not in the hearts of this effeminate race any principle of patriotism, of emulation or self-esteem to supply the place of bodily energy. Avarice the only active impulse, which they seem ever to obey, quickly yields in its turn to the predominating influence of the love of repose.

The heat of the season was terrific. General Campbell passed in review on the Esplanade of Fort William the two regiments, which were afterwards companions in so many marches and fields. After this, troops, stores, tents, and cannon, were embarked daily from the landing places southward of the Fort. The transports got under way, and tided down the Hooghly opposed by baffling winds. By dint of incessant exertion the last of them had disappeared from the upper reaches of the river early in the second week of April. Cholera at first made its appearance to rather an alarming extent in the more crowded ships. It was checked at once by the sea breezes.

The Military Commander embarked in the *Larne* sloop of war. The *Nereid* yacht was destined to convey to Rangoon the Political Agent. Capt. Canning of the Bengal Army appeared in

this important character. He was a man of pleasing physiognomy, address, and manners, of ready wit and retentive memory. He had travelled in Europe, and was an accomplished linguist. The princely profusion of his habits had tended materially to increase his influence in the diplomatic sphere, in which he had always moved. Moreover he had been twice in the capital of Ava. This circumstance in the prevailing ignorance of the court, land, and people, against which war had been undertaken, caused him at this period to be listened to as an oracle.

VI.

All the vessels of the Bengal expedition, excepting one or two accidentally detained, had left behind them the Sandheads before the 17th of April. The armament from Madras, unembarrassed by river navigation, had set sail at once from their Roads on the 15th. The major part of the ships of both fleets had congregated in the beautiful bay of Port Cornwallis in the three first days of May. A scarcity of water was reported. The exertions necessary to supply this want occupied two days. On the 2d Général Campbell had briefly announced his assumption of the chief command of the joint forces. In obedience to the instructions which directed him to seize as nearly as possible on

the same day three points of the Burman coast ; he detached against the island of Cheduba Brigadier Mc'Creagh with four Companies of H. M's. 13th, and the Bengal Marine Battalion ; he sent against Negrais Major Wahab with the 17th Madras Native Infantry, and himself sailed with the mass of the armament towards Rangoon. He conducted upon that principal point of invasion five thousand bayonets.

On the 10th of May, a day memorable in the annals of Ava, the British fleet arrived off the mouth of the Rangoon river. It had skilful pilots on board ; and therefore passing without hesitation, between the points, designated by navigators Elephant point, and Eastern grove, it anchored within the bar. It had arrived within twenty-six miles of the stockade of Rangoon.

The surprise was complete. The Court of Ava intent on schemes of conquest, the means of which it had collected in Assam, in Cachar, in Arracan, never dreamt of this sudden blow against its southern provinces, and great maritime town. It was wholly unprepared for this rude interruption of its projects. There was not at the moment any governor or Myo-woon, in Rangoon, or in the whole of Pegue. Authority was exercised in the town by the subordinate officer called Rewoon. He had no force for its protection but armed police. When

therefore successive reports of the arrival at the Elephant of a large fleet of ships of unusual size, crowded with foreigners, gathered like a thunder storm around him ; this unfortunate Barbarian became almost beside himself with wonder, consternation, and rage. Two of these emotions he did his best to conceal, but gave full vent to the third. His first order ran thus : “ English ships have brought foreign soldiers to the mouth of the river. They are my prisoners ; cut me some thousands of spans of rope to bind them.”

His next mandate directed the seizure of all the English residents in the town. It so happened that several of them were on that day enjoying themselves at a festive meeting in a garden in the suburbs, laid out in the days of his prosperity by Diego Lanciego, a Spanish adventurer. This order was executed with ready zeal. But it was gradually enlarged, in the course of its operation. It was soon extended to bring within its pale all Europeans. Shortly afterwards to obviate the mischief, which might arise from geographical distinctions too nice for the apprehension of Burman subordinate officers, it was further explained as comprising all, “ who wore the English hat.” Thus the American missionaries, who had been long established in the land engaged in the most

sublime of labors, were brought within the circle of its terrors. The British merchants Røy, Tench, Trill, Thompson, and Snowball, the ship-builder Turner, the pilots Wyatt and Wisè, the Armenian merchant Aratoon Avie-tick, Haidee a Greek adventurer from Pera, and the Missionaries Hough and Wade, were successively seized, placed in confinement in a brick-building near the water's edge, and loaded with fetters. Their alarmed, and infuriated keepers assailed them with insults and menaces. A terrible death appeared to them to be the only termination which they could expect to their sufferings. They passed the night of the 10th in a state of indescribable horror, uncertainty, and dread.

VII.

The British fleet got under weigh in the morning of the 11th. It began to advance up the river led by the Liffey. On each side the banks were seen thickly covered with low tangled forest, of a brilliant green. Such an air of silence, of remoteness, of rudeness, and of innocence was impressed on all around, that the Army could at first hardly persuade itself that this was in truth the land it had come to conquer. Small spots cleared from wood were occupied by hamlets of a few huts. A few peasants gazed

with astonishment at the ships. But as the fleet gained the higher reaches of the river the scene became more animated. It was received with discharges of cannon from trifling batteries, which appeared to have been hastily thrown up. It required all the skill of the pilots to keep the leading frigate from grounding on a succession of shoals, which here present themselves. Several times she plowed the sand with her keel, but without striking. The Larne less fortunate took the ground ; but was quickly got off. Soon there were descried from every deck the dome and spire of a large gilded monument. Soon after the broad mouth of the Syriam river appearing on the star-board bow warned the least skilful topographer, that the town was near. Lastly the fleet found itself between a long straggling village on the right bank, and a considerable Asiatic town on the left. This latter seemed to be encircled by a rampart of solid timber from fifteen to twenty feet in height, pierced with embrasures. Boats of various sizes and shapes lay moored along the banks; on which were constructed wharfs, jetties, and landing places. Clumps of light green forest occupied the plains around. They were every where decorated with the gilded spires of Pagodas. Above them all, on a height at some distance, was seen the grand monument, which had first attracted remark. But

attention was now fixed by the defences of the town. A Burman stockade had been the theme of wonder and curiosity for weeks and months at either Presidency. It was to try its mettle against this redoubted species of work that the Army had sailed. Hence as each ship neared the town, the first glance towards the embrazures produced a murmur of deep interest amongst the troops ; "There it is, at last ; the stockade, the stockade of Rangoon !"

VIII.

The Liffey led. It was soon seen that the chief defence of the Burmans consisted in a battery of twelve guns mounted on the platform of the great landing place ; which was also the *tête-de-file* of the principal street of the town. It is called the King's Wharf. Adjacent to it is the Taik-dau or Custom House, in which the British and American prisoners were immured. Opposite to this battery the Liffey anchored.

General Campbell was on board of her. Both commanders saw that the means of defence were contemptible. They agreed that it was most desirable to spare a town, which they supposed to be filled with helpless women and children, the horrors of a cannonade. The plan of landing had been previously digested. The Liffey therefore

lay silent, and idle, along side of the battery, whilst the transports came in succession to their ground.

The sequel will demonstrate that if at this interesting moment this defenceless town had been surrendered to a regular summons the lives of many thousands of the inhabitants of Pegue and Ava would have been saved. Disease too would have missed some thousands of victims from the ranks of the invaders.

It was otherwise ordained. Burman impatience broke forth. The guns of the battery opened upon the frigate. Still the British Commanders would not be driven at once from their forbearance. Each gun of the Burmans was answered by two from the British. The Burmans fired about once in a minute. It was hoped that they would soon see the folly of persisting in this unequal contest. At length it became evident that mercy was mistaken for weakness. The Barbarians thought their enemy was doing his worst, and continued to do theirs. It became necessary to undeceive them. Then the Liffey opened her fire in earnest, not with a broadside; but in one long, loud, steady, continuous roar, killing, shattering, crashing, splintering, dismantling. The effect was theatrical. In a moment the battery was silenced, the Barbarians driven in panic from their guns; the platform

strewn with broken carriages, and dismounted ordnance. The fire of the Liffey ceased.

Since sunset on the 10th, terror and confusion had been increasing in rapid progression within the stockade of Rangoon. Even before this, many of the inhabitants had fled from the town carrying with them their wives, children, and household possessions. Others assembling in groups in the streets demanded the immolation of the white-faced prisoners.

The situation of these unfortunate persons was terrible. They had been dragged from their homes under every circumstance of brutal indignity. Their clothes had been torn off, their arms tied behind them with ropes tightened until they became instruments of torture, rather than means of security. They had been followed by the execrations of the populace; whose national barbarity was heightened into frenzy by the terrors of the crisis. They had been loaded with chains. They spent a night of hunger, pain, and agonizing uncertainty. But no sooner had the fleet appeared in sight on the morning of the 11th, than an order from the Rewoon was delivered through the grating of their prison. The prisoners, all of whom were acquainted with the language of the country, listened intently to catch its import. Suspence was converted into despair. The Rewoon had

commanded that if a cannonade should be opened against the town of Rangoon, every prisoner should be put to death. The first gun was to be the signal for their decapitation.

Instantly their gaolers commenced their preparations. Some spread over the floor of the Taik-dau a quantity of sand to imbibe the blood of the victims. Others began to sharpen their knives upon brickbats with surprising diligence. Others brandished their weapons with gestures, and expressions of sanguinary joy over the heads of the captives. Some seizing them, and baring their necks applied their fingers to the spine with an air of scientific examination. The Burmans coerced for ages by dint of tortures, and frightful punishments have acquired a kind of national taste for executions. The imagination cannot picture a situation more dreadful than that of these foreigners placed at the mercy of such fiends.

They listened for the first gun. It was heard; and, in less than a minute after, a shot from the Liffey in reply struck the walls of the Taik-dau with a deafening noise. The Burman guard sprung upon their feet. A look of consternation, and perplexity mingled strangely with their ferocious words and gestures. The more hardy however suppressed their fears, and prepared to perpetrate the massacre. But again a ball from

a thirty-two pound carronade shattering the brickwork filled the Burmans with fresh alarm. They evidently began to think more of their own safety, than the destruction of their prisoners. An angry dispute ensued amongst them. In the midst of it the Liffey commenced her continuous cannonade. The roar of her fire seemed to shake the prison-house to its foundation. The assassins abandoned themselves to the most childish dread. They roared out with affright ; and exclaiming, that “ the house would certainly fall upon their heads,” broke open the barricaded door by violent efforts, and fled into the streets. The prisoners thus providentially delivered from imminent destruction began to conceive the liveliest hopes of escape. But these were dashed with bitter disappointment, and dismay, on discovering that the Burmans in their precipitate flight had retained sufficient self-possession to secure the door of the Taik-dau on the outside. The prisoners were doomed to fresh trials.

IX.

General Campbell made his arrangements for the landing and capture. He commanded a Brigade of the troops from Madras under General McBean to land below the town, and His Majesty's 38th Regiment above it. His Majesty's

13th Light Infantry was directed to effect a lodgement in the central battery. The commanders of the two columns, pushed on shore above and below the town, were counselled discretionally to make a circuit of its stockade, and to avail themselves of any opportunity to force an entrance by the rear.

The troops leapt on board the boats. But on the cessation of the fire of the frigate the Barbarians had taken heart, and again manned the battery on the King's Wharf. Some ill armed Burmans had also been collected for the defence of the stockade. It was advisable again to silence the battery, and to disperse this rabble by a cannonade. The guns of the *Liffey* were again directed against the works. A singular scene was at this time enacted in the town.

The evasion of their guards had left to the prisoners in the Taik-dau some minutes of present tranquillity, embittered by the dread of sufferings to come. Suddenly fifty armed Burmans burst into the chamber, in which they were confined. They were seized, their clothes torn off, and their arms bound with cords cruelly tightened. They were dragged forth into the open air. A tumultuous populace filled the narrow streets of Rangoon, which resounded with the cry of "That dau! that dau!"—"Let them be put to death!"

Dragged hither, and thither, at the caprice of their persecutors, goaded along like cattle with the points of spears and javelins; exhibited as a spectacle to the whole rabble of the place, the prisoners were finally conducted to the Yong-dau, or hall of justice. It is a wooden building in the Eastern quarter of the town, which the soldiers of the Regiments of Ava will long remember as the hospital of their sick and wounded. Here sat the Rewoon. The prisoners were placed before him in a kneeling posture, with their faces bent to the ground. The public executioner advanced with his broad, sharp, and glittering knife, uplifted, and ready. At length it appeared that this atrocity was to be consummated. The prisoners now believed that their hours, and minutes, were numbered. Two Burman interpreters had the humanity to intercede for them. But the clamours of the populace prevailed. The Rewoon gave the order for death. The executioner approached the nearest victim to strike off his head.

At this moment the Missionary Hough, who spoke the language fluently, had the presence of mind to demand to be heard. The Rewoon bid him speak on. He proceeded to propose that one or more of the prisoners should be permitted to go to the British fleet as mediators. He expressed his conviction that on their repre-

sentations the British would cease to fire upon the town. The Rewoon after some hesitation consented to permit Mr. Hough alone to proceed upon this desirable embassy.

He had hardly granted this permission when his council was dissolved in the rudest, and most unwelcome manner. The roar of that cannonade was heard, which covered the landing of the troops. The streets were swept with cannon-shot from the fleet. Several falling near the Yong-dau completed the dismay of the Rewoon. He abandoned himself to his fears. He mounted a horse, and hurried through the South Eastern gate into the country followed in confused flight by the armed rabble, which he had collected. Then terror reigned without control in the town. The whole inhabitation, native and denizen, Burman, Peguer, Portugeze, Parsee, Mooghul, and Chinese, male and female, young and old, followed by the rushing sound of eighteen and thirty-two pound shot, fled like frightened deer to the neighbouring forests.

During this scene of dread and flight, four of the prisoners were remanded to the Taik-dau; the rest were carried off, and confined in a dungeon within the inclosure of the great temple Shwè-da-gong-praw.

The cannonade a second time ceased. The troops landing entered the town without diffi-

culty at three fixed points. Major Sale of the 13th advancing up the principal street was met by the Missionary Hough, on his way to the fleet, with that offer of negociation, which the flight of the Rewoon had now rendered impracticable. Guided by the information of the Missionary, Major Sale proceeded to the Taik-dau, burst open its doors, and had the happiness to set free four of the prisoners. Their reason had nearly given way under the varied horrors of the 10th and 11th of May.

The troops took possession of a town scarcely tenanted by a living being. The British flag was displayed over the principal landing place.

X.

Rangoon is defended by a quadrangular stockade; the longer sides of which are that, which guards the river bank, and the side parallel to it. It contains from ten to twelve houses of brick; all of which are the warehouses of foreign merchants, excepting only the Taik-dau, or Government Custom-house. Its best wooden houses are the Yong-dau, or hall of justice, built on an official model borrowed from the Chinese, the residence of the Vice-roy of Pegue on the water's edge, and about half a dozen more in the same vicinity, constructed by adventurers of various nations. All the rest of the

habitations are fabricated of mats and bamboo; roofed with tiles, or the leaves of the palmyra. All are prudently raised on wooden supports some feet above the level of the town. Thus the inhabitants wisely shun the effects of the damp, and inundations of Pegue. Two narrow streets planted on either side with dwarfish trees run at right angles with the river face and Eastern face, of the stockade. One of these leads from the great landing place to the North Eastern gate; the other from the river bank to the South Eastern gate. There are two streets again transverse to these. Their northern extremities rest on gates in the northern face of the stockade. Of these, that which is farthest from the river opens into a suburb of huts called Takalee inhabited by Chinese dealers, and artificers; and Burman prostitutes. Such was the town of huts, wooden dwellings, and mouldering warehouses, destitute of supplies, and inhabitants, of which the events of the 11th May placed the British army in possession.

XI.

When the Missionary Hough reached the fleet, the town was already occupied by the troops. He was accompanied by a Burman, who intimated that the lives of the seven prisoners yet in the hands of his countrymen would pay the

forfeit of further aggression on the part of the British. This man was charged by the Naval and Military Commanders to return to the Rewoon; to announce to him that private property and the personal safety, of all but those, who carried arms in their hands, would be strictly respected; but to warn him that any violence committed on his prisoners would be requited by a terrible reprisal.

No reply was ever received to this message. The Rewoon was already at some distance from the town. It is doubtful, when, and where he received this declaration, or whether it ever reached him at all. His motives for shunning all communication with the British at this interesting crisis, are a mystery to this day. He may have acted merely on the suggestion of terror or distrust; he may from the first have deliberately meditated a Fabian defence. The national ignorance, and the national cunning afford an equal support to either conjecture.

XII.

The General headed in person the reconnoitring parties which were pushed on the morning of the 12th, up the roads, which lead to the great monument.

The Barbarians had planted two pieces of cannon on its platform. They gave way be-

fore the troops after the first discharge. In two several dungeons the General had the happiness to discover, yet alive, and without wound, but sinking to the earth under mental agony, and corporeal suffering, the prisoners, on whom he feared that the Barbarians had wreaked their vengeance. The moment of their liberation was a joyful one. The American Wale was amongst them.

No where was any respectable resistance opposed to the troops. They proceeded to establish themselves in position.

Three principal roads lead from Rangoon to the great temple of Shwè-da-gong. One of these issues from the Takalce gate, and speedily joins the nearest of the other two; which conduct from each of the two gates in the Eastern face of the work. All three have been elaborated with much care by the Burmans, as being the sacred avenues to the Great Temple of Shwè-da-gong.

If the space between the two gates of the Eastern face of Rangoon stockade be taken as a base; then this interval and the two roads which lead from it will form an irregular triangle, of which the great temple will be the apex. The angle at the summit will be small. Each limb of the isocles triangle will fall short of two English miles.

A concise view of the first disposition of the troops is afforded by saying that a Brigade of the troops from Madras being posted in the town ; the remainder of the Army was disposed on the two sides of this triangle. The Brigade from Bengal had its right supported in the direction of the town ; and its left on the great temple. The troops from Madras rested their right on Shwè-da-gong-praw, and their left on the town.

Either front was of course covered by outposts. Thus in the second week of May in India, this little Army took upon itself the task of occupying four miles with a continuous chain of sentries.

The road which leads from the South Eastern gate is a prolongation of one of the two main streets of Rangoon. It passes through a little hamlet, and for upwards of half a mile is cut across a level plain. After this it ascends. From the point, where the ascent begins, to the very foot of Shwè-da-gong, either side of it is decorated with an uninterrupted line of the shrines, temples and pagodas of the superstition of Boodh. The road itself runs along the summit of a chain of heights, which amply command the plains to the Eastward. These heights formed the position of the Bengal Brigade.

At the moment, of their first assuming it their

right resting on an open space, and behind a mango grove, at the point, where the gentle rise has insensibly worn away into a dead level, was liable to be compromised. The Barbarians might have interposed between it, and the town. Part of the Brigade from Madras, which reached Rangoon on the 4th of June, was posted in the intervening space. All was then secure in that quarter.

The vantage ground, which this wing of the Army enjoyed, was denied to the troops from Madras. Their front was towards the Rangoon river, and plains covered with forest, their right towards the great temple, their rear towards that of the troops from Bengal, the distance between them gradually increasing from the temple to the town; and their left towards the town itself. But the road, upon which they were aligned, run from the town to the temple on a uniform level.

The troops were housed in the wooden dwellings of the priests, in convents or monasteries, in the temporary abodes of pilgrims, under the arched recesses of shrines, and in the square chambers of temples. All of these abounded on either road. Where a whole population had fled to the forests, there was no lack of cantonments. But it was soon seen that the roofs of few of these structures were capable of resisting

a season of Indian rain ; and some began to reflect on the probable consequences to this Army, if instead of menacing, and manacling Greeks, Armenians, Americans, and English, the Ragoon had applied the torch to the dwellings, which his Barbarians had abandoned.

XIII.

On the right bank of the Ragoon river directly opposite to the town stood, in May, 1824, the straggling hamlet of Maindee. The breadth, and rapidity of the river seemed hardly to relieve a leader from the necessity of covering this point by the construction of a field work. Maindee is on the island called Dalla, which is inclosed between two of the smaller branches of the Irawaddy towards its mouths.

The *embouchure* of the Pegue river is somewhat less than three miles and a half below Ragoon. It falls in on the left bank. But not half a mile from the stockade of the town the waters of the Ragoon river receive those of an offset of a little stream called from a hamlet on its bank the Puzzendoung creek. It swells considerably under the influence of the tide. The ground all around this last point of confluence is swampy. Ooze, mud, and tangled ozers contribute to bar all advance in this direction against Ragoon. But higher up the banks are firmer. The

Puzzendoung creek describes for a considerable distance a curve parallel to that of the position of the troops from Bengal. The necessity of crossing it renders it difficult for any formidable body to debouch into the wooded plains between it, and the heights, without being speedily discovered. The front of this position is moreover guarded by two considerable lakes, the only passage between which is by a narrow causeway. The crest of the heights is strengthened by the innumerable pagodas, with which it is covered. The range of hills is terminated on the left by the great monument. The art of the Engineer might soon convert its quadrangular inclosure into a fortress, which Barbarians need not with ten-fold odds hope to wrest from British soldiers.

Here then is a line sufficiently strong in itself; and having its right securely supported. Still it is not in itself a position. Because though its left terminates in the great monument; it is evident, that the strongest insulated fort may be turned out of cannon shot. The whole space between the western face of Shwè-da-gong, and the left bank of the Rangoon river is covered by the densest forest. A body of barbarians might therefore pass through this out of reach of the fire of the position, masked by the wood, and debouch on any chosen point in the rear of the

line occupied by the troops from Bengal. Hence arose the necessity of establishing a second line to protect the left flank of the first. The most obvious mode of doing this might seem to be the throwing the left of this new line on the Rangoon river.

A road conducts down to its very margin in a direct line from the Great Temple. It is two miles in length. The left of the line might have rested near the village of Kemmendine. Shwèda-gong would have been the centre of the whole. But no leader would have consented, especially at this season, to encamp in the forests, which intervened. This objection might have been obviated by taking a shorter line, retired nearer to the town, resting like the other on the river. The certainty of tolerable shelter for the troops seems to have fixed the resolves of the Commander of the Expedition. The second line was described along the main westerly road leading from the town to the Great Temple. Good wooden dwellings abounded on either side of it. Thus, as we have seen, the army was disposed in a triangle. The Great Temple was the key of the position. There were in front of its North Eastern angle a tank, and little heights, which ought under all circumstances to have formed a part of this position. Picquets were posted on these little hills.

XIV.

Thus the Army took a position. This second step in the invasion of the Burman Empire will not satisfy all judgments. It will be said that the four or five first days after landing should be precious as his reputation in the eyes of the leader of an invading army. In the five first days after he had debarked on the shore, Napoleon had been seen to make himself master of the keys of lower Egypt. It seemed to be expected that some such brilliant model would have been copied at Rangoon. The Rewoon was followed only by armed police. He could not communicate with his court in less than six or eight days, nor receive any considerable reinforcements in less than thirteen or fourteen. It was thought that in the mean time Sir Archibald Campbell availing himself of the boats of the fleet, and squadron, would have pushed his light troops to the outlet into the great Irawaddy, seized it, and commanded it, by occupying an intrenched position; that he would have intercepted the flying inhabitants, achieved a conquest over their affections, as he did at a later period, by moral means, and grasped at once the resources of the country. But by taking a position on the 12th of May, it will be said that he virtually abandoned the possibility of advancing before the 12th of December.

The question of the expediency of an advance at this conjuncture is one, which it is not easy to free from unknown quantities. It will be the duty of every future historian of the period at least to consider calmly the difficulties, and dissuasives, which abound in it.

The information of the British regarding the theatre of operations was exceedingly limited. Of the little, which they had heard, a considerable portion was not to be relied upon. The flight of the inhabitants deprived them of the power of increasing their stock. Whatever means the British General might have used to draw back the population, the Rewoon would have striven to counteract. In this game his local knowledge would have given him a terrible advantage. The movement in advance must have been executed entirely by Naval means; it could only have been made on the river line. For the transport of the camp equipage, of the ammunition, of the provisions of the troops, the British did not possess fifty animals; nor fifty of that useful kind of men, which in India supply their place. It was evident that the Monsoon was setting in. It was easy in this Army to have selected one out of many resolute, and enterprising leaders, who would have overcome all previous obstacles; beaten every thing that opposed him, and established his Head Quarters on the great Irawaddy. But encamped

there at this season his whole detachment would have fallen victims to disease. The Flotilla too was unequal to the task of keeping open the communication on an extended line. It was not in 1824, what it is known to have become in 1825. But if it could have commanded the waters; the roads must still have been left in full possession of the Barbarians.

To what ulterior advantage would this spirited advance have led? No tenable place of arms could have been established short of Prome. Will it be said that the British arms could have been pushed so far during a season of deluge? Pegue affords no position on the line of the river lower than the environs of Prome. Without means of transport the British could not have diverged from that line. On such ground, however, as they could have taken up, their advance must have sustained the shock of a numerous force in July, and of overwhelming levies in November. Ought any leader's reputation to suffer for having refused to run such terrible risks on so insufficient a motive? The project can only be relieved from appalling difficulties by the hypothesis of very extraordinary success in procuring cattle, and the favor, and aid of the Peguers during the first four days. But the Army was spared the labor of solving the problem. It seems to have taken four days to comprehend

its situation. During those four days it held its position. It might then have been predicted that it would hold it six months longer.

XV.

The Army retained its position. Until the 16th the river was not explored even so high as Kemmendine. The reconnoitring parties had trifling affairs with the followers of the Rewoon on the 14th, and again on the 16th.

The Rewoon hovered through the forests, which surrounded the position of his enemy. His parties always gave way before the British. By the 16th he had succeeded in collecting a force of boatmen; and forming some levies. He caused them to throw up stockades near Kemmendine, a village on the left bank of the river.

The boats of the Liffey were directed to pull up to this point, about four miles distant, to reconnoitre. The Grenadiers of H. M's 38th were placed on board of them. They were commanded by their Captain Birch. The soldiers landed, and cleared Kemmendine, and the adjacent villages. The enemy fled before them into the jungles. They re-embarked; but had advanced only a short distance higher when a smart fire was poured upon them from a work filled with shouting Barbarians. A ball wound-

ed Lieut. Wilkinson of the *Liffey* in the boats. Another passed through the heart of Lieut. Kerr of the 38th. The Grenadier Captain caused his men to leap ashore, clear a passage through pointed stakes and bamboos, form, and rush upon the stockade. The Barbarians displayed no want of confidence. They kept up a fire full in the faces of their enemies. When the British were at the foot of the work, they continued to shout, and grin defiance. They threw with a truly savage fury, spears, javelins, knives, hatchets, and even stones at the assailants until they had surmounted the parapet. Then the Grenadiers employed their bayonets. They killed on the spot sixty of the Barbarians, wounded and dispersed the remainder, and demolished the work.

The conduct of the Burmans, who in this little affair, had met British soldiers within the work with the points of their spears, gave the Army no contemptible notion of the bravery of their enemy. The Barbarians were about four hundred strong.

XVI.

The transports lay idly at anchor; the Army lay inactive on its heights. The attitude of the whole armament was one of pure defence. But night after night the outposts were insulted by

small bodies of the enemy. Their attacks were always paltry ; and false alarms inevitably originated in the attempts of parties of the peasantry of Pegue to return through the British lines to their homes. Officers felt that it would be a stain on their soldiership to suffer themselves to be over-reached by these crafty Barbarians. Not a single case of surprise occurred. But already the rain had begun to fall in torrents by night and day. It was evident that Pegue was blessed with an early Monsoon. These heavy falls, and the vicinity of forests, of lakes, of rivers, bred noxious damps. This severe and unremitting duty at the outposts quickly made an impression on the frame of the soldier.

XVII.

But the Army remained in its cantonments. In the intervals of relief from the picquets its officers found leisure to examine the singular spot, to which their ships had brought them.

Within the stockade of Rangoon, there was at this period no object of interest, excepting that it created a feeling of joyful surprise in the reflecting mind to see the cross of the Saviour displayed in the midst of idolatry on the top of the little chapel of the Armenians. Shipbuilding, and the trade in teak were suspended by events. There stood on the stocks near the house of the

Mio-woon an unfinished frigate, which the ship-builder Turner, was preparing for the Imam of Muscat.

The British seemed rather to have inherited than conquered Rangoon. It had no tenants but the Army and its followers, the Armenians, at the head of whom was the merchant Sarkies Manook, the individuals lately released from captivity, a few Parsee and Mooghul adventurers; and a body hardly more numerous of sick, aged, and bed-ridden Pegners. The bazars destitute both of dealers, and commodities, were a perfect picture of desertion.

Every thing began to indicate a protracted occupation. Rangoon received a Military Governor, and a Fort Adjutant. Not long after, the scanty remnant of its inhabitants were registered. Fiscal regulations were framed. Houses, and portions of the town began to be designated, according to the names and occupations of the functionaries, whose departments were established in them.

The stockade of Rangoon is a fence of square timbers of teak wood from twenty to twenty-five feet in height driven into the ground perpendicularly, and close to each other. They are conjoined by a transverse piece at the top. Embrazures are formed by cutting away at intervals about one foot from the upper part of

the timbers and leaving the horizontal beam entire. Thus a square *port-hole* presents itself of the simplest construction. But it is evident that soldiers cannot give their fire through this without the aid of platforms. The few of these which remained in May, 1824, were ruinous. The ditch was sufficiently broad, but contained nearly as much mud over-grown with weeds as water. As in most oriental fortresses the berm was of a faulty breadth. The sides of the quadrangle were broken into long curtains flanked with square towers. Batteries of Field Artillery will make a breach in one of these timber parapets in half an hour; if the pieces be fired with half charges of powder.

But if all within the stockade of Rangoon was, in May, 1824, gloomy, squalid, and discouraging; much that was picturesque and interesting was to be seen without.

It has already been shewn that the point, to which all the roads issuing from the gates of the town tend, as by common consent, is the great temple of Shwè-da-gong-praw. They are all in fact its sacred roads uniformly paved with brick. As the routes from the gates in the northern face of the quadrangle, and that from the northernmost gate of the Eastern face are only subsidiary branches conducting to a greater line; the principal approaches to the grand monu-

ment may be considered as two only. One of these conducts in a right line from the landing place called the Chinese Wharf to the foot of the Southern staircase of Shwè-da-gong. The other runs from the Southernmost gate of the Eastern face of the stockade passing at last under the temple in a line coincident with that of its Eastern base. The first of these soon received the name of the *Madras* the second that of the *Bengal lines*.

The interest of the first is confined to a view of the towering dome and spire of the monument through a long vista of the houses of the priests, of mango trees, peepul, tamarind, acacia, palmyra, and cocoa.

The second, as it traverses a height, commands a greater variety. Close under the stockade of the town the idolatrous splendors of Buddha, adored by Burmans under the title of Gautuma, begin. Lofty Pagodas of graceful proportions are seen to rise. Even on the plain the prospect of mango groves, and rule gardens in the oriental style inclosed with hedges of bamboo is not unpleasing. But soon after the road begins to ascend, is seen the commencement of that uninterrupted line of monuments, which skirts it for a mile and a half. At the highest point of elevation stand, one on either side the way, two pagodas taller than all around them.

Each has its quadrangular inclosure of masonry. Attached to that on the right is a square temple. It is supported by gilded pillars. The carved work, which decorates its architraves, evidences no contemptible progress in the art. Its gilded ceiling displays multiplied resemblances of the mystic impression of the foot of Gautama. In the middle of the chamber sat in May on an elevated throne a gilded divinity. In framing these idols, whether of stone, of brick, of wood, of silver or of white marble, (all are found here,) the only proof of skill is in the exact resemblance of them all. He, who has seen one sitting Gautama, has seen a thousand. The same crossed legs, and right arm easily depending, and left arm laid across the lap, and ears with pendant lobes, and simpering features, and hair twisted into an ambitious knot, are to be seen in every figure.

It was in this temple that the Head Quarters of the troops from Bengal were afterwards fixed. Hence the spot was lastingly designated "Mc'Creagh's Pagoda."

From its enclosure in clear weather the prospect was fine. Southward was seen the Rangoon river winding towards the sea. The Syriam Pagoda was distinctly visible. The town lay in the valley at the feet of the spectator encircled with glittering pagodas. Beyond it on the waters rose up a forest of masts. Beyond these again

were spread forth the green, extended flats of Dalla.

To the Eastward, were the windings of the river of Pegue, the wooded plains, through which it flowed ; and nearer, the creek and hamlet of Puzzendoung, and the lakes, and level interspersed with thickets, and mounds, on the hither side of the creek.

This plain of bright green wood and pasture is beautiful seen from the heights ; the heights, of undulating outline, and crowned with a thousand spires, are yet more beautiful, viewed from the plains.

XVIII.

The road descends, and ascends again, before it passes under the base of Shwè-da-gong. That great monument is built on a platform of artificial earth, supported by a strong *revêtement* of brick work. Each exterior angle is guarded by the colossal figure of a winged monster with human face. A staircase of stone conducts from each of the four cardinal points up within the grand area. Each flight of stairs is covered by a succession of sloping roofs, supported one upon the other in the style of architecture, which the Burmans have borrowed from the Chinese.

The area itself is planted with majestic trees.

Along all its four sides are ranged houses of the priests, and temples filled with colossal idols, sitting, standing, and reclining.

Shwé-da-gong rests its claim to sublimity, chiefly on its vastness, and its gilding. It is a solid cone of brick-work, tapering into a spire, the gilded summit of which is one hundred and thirty-three feet above its base. That base is encircled with a triple row of small pagodas. From its foundation to its pinnacle this vast monument is overlaid with gold leaf richly burnished. This glittering coating was renewed in 1817. The rain of six monsoons had not, in May 1824, much impaired its brilliance. The proportions of this huge structure are not ungraceful. But the piling of brick upon brick until the mass reaches the clouds amazes without interesting. The mind seeks in vain for moral beauty or grandeur. The tradition of the erection of Shwé-da-gong is a tissue of pure absurdity. Reason teaches to decide that a solid mass of building without definite meaning or utility, is fit to excite the reverence of Barbarians only. Nevertheless viewed in an hour of moonlight above its graceful groves, and in the centre of its fantastic ornaments, Shwé-da-gong achieves a conquest over the admiration of the more civilized observer, in spite of his graver reflections, and fixes its image on his memory as that

of one of the most stupendous and imposing of those fabrics, by which the nations of modern Asia, have striven to immortalize the errors of their varied superstitions.

On the Eastern side of the monument is a small Chinese temple of exquisite workmanship. Its columns, walls and roof, its front, and pinnacles are all richly gilt, and decorated with ingenious carved work. At the top of the Eastern staircase are arranged a succession of bells of very fine metal, of musical tones, and cleverly cast. They are suspended between slight wooden pillars, covered with grotesque figures. But the monarch of the peal is to be seen on the western side of the area. This vast bell is estimated at eighteen thousand English pounds (avoirdupois) in weight. The missionaries have copied, and translated the long inscription on its exterior surface. It is a tissue of mythological absurdities.

XIX.

May 28th. The Barbarians had received reinforcements in the third week of May. It was thought that they had concentrated behind the forests to the Northward of the position. Their attacks upon the outposts grew bolder. They were reported to have established a vigilant *cordon* to prevent all communication between the

Peguers, and the English. The insult offered to their national pride by the seizure of Rangoon, was stated to have raised the minds of the Burmans to the highest pitch of exasperation.

A narrow road leads from the foot of the Eastern staircase of Shwè-da-gong through the forest towards the village of Todayhee. A small detachment of the 38th, under a subaltern officer, were pushed in advance to feel, and observe the enemy in this direction, on the morning of the 27th. Close under the position they dislodged Burman sentries. Only forty yards further in advance they found a well-constructed work. Eighteen men attacked and carried it. The Military Secretary witnessed this affair. He felt convinced that the enemy were in force not far from the spot.

On the 28th General Campbell reconnoitred in person. General Mc'Bean, and some of the principal officers of the Staff rode with him. He took with him two companies of the 13th Light Infantry, two companies of the 38th Regiment, the four amounting to two hundred men, two hundred and fifty Native Soldiers, a light gun, and a howitzer.

The road or rather path, through the forest was narrow, tortuous, and impeded by the overhanging boughs of trees. Felled timber thrown across it at intervals rendered advance yet more

difficult. The plains, which the troops afterwards traversed, were already covered with water knee deep. Detached parties of the enemy presented themselves to dispute the ground. They were dispersed by discharges of Artillery.

But when the column had penetrated five miles from the town; the cattle, which had dragged the guns over such multiplied obstacles, were utterly overcome with fatigue. The strength of the soldiers of the Artillery was exhausted by their protracted exertions. It became impossible to carry on the guns further. They were sent back to the lines guarded by the native troops.

General Campbell resolved to advance with his four British companies into a plain, which the dispersing mists shewed beyond. The heavy rain, which had fallen several hours without interruption, was beginning to clear away; but the atmosphere was yet dense and clouded. At length the enemy were distinctly seen, drawn up in force near a trifling village. The General resolved at all hazards to bring them to action. He caused his little band to advance across the plain in direct echelon of companies. The forest lay on the left. Suddenly a heavy fire was opened upon the British. Looking to the left they perceived on the very edge of the jungle two finished field-works apparently occupied by a considerable body of barbarians.

The General did not hesitate a moment. He caused one company of the 13th to be extended across the plain to hold in check the main force of the enemy. The other three were led in admirable order straight to the attack of the two stockades. The flank companies of the 38th rushed upon the nearest. The most distant was assailed by a company of the 13th.

At this moment began a race of generous emulation, between both officers and men of these two corps, which was kept up with unabated spirit, and no slight advantage to the service, to the end of the war.

The Captains of the 38th set the most animating example to their men. The young officers attached to them imitated their boldness, rushing into the fire with a chivalrous resolution. The Grenadiers of the 38th forced an entrance by tearing down by main force a portion of the bamboo parapet. Others clambered over the work assisted by their comrades. The stockade was carried. The Barbarians within contended hand to hand armed with long spears. They presented their bare breasts devotedly to the bayonet. A dreadful carnage was made of them. Few or no prisoners were taken.

Meanwhile the 13th led by an old *Peninsular* captain had reached the foot of the second work amidst a storm of bullets. With singular

address and good fortune they hit exactly the narrow gorge of the work.

Thus the Barbarians found themselves pent up at close quarters with their active and well-armed enemies. Those, who were nearest to the scene, have ever testified, that they did not lose heart in this emergency. They acquitted themselves like men. They fell in heaps under the bayonet. Some toward the conclusion of the affair fled to the huts within the stockade; they were speedily dislodged. None ultimately escaped but by scrambling over the wall of bamboo, and taking refuge in the forest.

The British set fire to all that was combustible, in these works. The main force of the enemy had made a shew of advancing, whilst the firing lasted. The conflagration of their works checked them.

In the onset Lieut. A. Howard of the 13th, was killed. Lieutenants O' Halloran and Michel of the 38th, were severely wounded. Each lost a limb by amputation. The latter, who had been struck in both legs, did not survive the operation many days.

General Campbell kept his little force formed in front of the main body of the Burmans long enough to evince his readiness to accept battle. He then felt them by an advanced movement. Their outposts retired before him. Demonstra-

tions were made, which proved their determination to retreat if attacked. Despairing therefore of alluring them to an action with forests in their rear, the General countermarched his troops, and returned to the lines.

This day of spirited, and decisive soldiership produced a grand impression on the minds of the barbarians. They understood at once that it would be no light task to contend against these tall white-faced strangers in scarlet uniforms, who had been seen, without the aid of artillery or ladders, to burst into their bamboo field-works hitherto deemed impregnable, to put to the sword every armed man within them, and leave in a moment nothing in their area but the bodies of the slain, and blood, and smoke, and ashes. This is the most merciful mode of making war on barbarians. These severe lessons need not be often repeated.

Strong detachments which were moved, on the 29th, under General Mc'Bean upon the scene of the affair of the 28th, found no enemy to oppose them. They completed the demolition of every field-work, which they could discover.

XX.

June 3rd. The Barbarians recovered themselves with much quickness after the blow of the 28th. They chose a better point of concentra-

tion than any that could have been selected to the Northward or Eastward of the British lines. They began to form a large intrenched camp at Kemmendine. Here they might derive every advantage from the co-operation of their war boats. They preserved too their best line of communication with Ava.

Day after day intelligence reached Rangoon, of the extension of their works, and the accession of fresh levies. Sir Archibald Campbell resolved to make a combined attack by land and water upon Kemmendine on the 3d of June.

His plan was to bombard, and assault the Barbarian camp from the river, whilst three columns moved from the lines upon its Northern and Eastern faces. Two of the Company's cruizers and other armed vessels got under weigh at an early hour. Some companies of H. M's. 41st were embarked in them. General Campbell and his staff were on board the cruizer Mercury.

At the same time the three co-operating columns commenced their route. The first under Lieut. Col. Smith, of the Madras army, was commanded to move down the direct road from the Western face of Shwè-da-gong. The second under Lieut. Col. Hodgson of the same, was to shape its course for some furlongs directly North through the forest, and then, gradually

bringing up the right shoulder, to arrive on the Northern side of the hostile camp. Thus it was calculated that it would encounter and cut to pieces any body of the Barbarians, that should endeavor to retire up the line of the river. To spread the net yet wider a third force under Major Frith, H. M's. 38th, was at first to direct its movements to the Eastward; and ultimately arrive at the point of attack by a yet more extensive *détour*. Tried by the rules of the art, this will be pronounced rather a project to hem in; and prevent the flight of a Barbarian enemy, framed in contempt of his powers of resistance, than a deliberate plan of assault.

Between five and six was heard the cannonade from the river. Within the area of the Shwè-da-gong Pagoda was distinctly audible the loud, sustained, wild, dismal chorus of shouts, with which the Barbarians answered this war-like prelude. In their progress up the river a detachment of the troops had landed, driven the enemy from a village, and captured an eighteen pounder. The cannonade continued. The yell of the Barbarians responded to every gun. At the Pagoda all agreed that it was a cry of defiance, and desperation. Colonel Smith's Column was soon closely engaged. His troops have spoken with enthusiasm of the spirit and perseverance of his attacks, and the gallantry of

his personal example. But all the efforts of the native soldiers to surmount the stockade without the aid of ladders were unsuccessful. On the other side the attacks of Colonel Hodgson were equally bold, but not more fortunate. The Madras European Regiment, in leading one of them, was exposed for some time to a heavy fire between the abbatis, and the bamboo wall, which it was unable to penetrate. At this short range it suffered severely. But its leader felt confident that its last attempt would have been crowned with success but for an incident, sinister, and unexpected. At the moment of advance the cruiser Teignmouth lay within half cannon shot of the Barbarian camp. Intervening thickets shrouded partially the hostile works, but wholly shut out from view the movements of the troops. With a luckless zeal the commander of the cruiser opened, in the direction of the enemy, but right across the line of the column's advance, a furious fire of shot and shells. Bullets ploughed up the earth, and shattered with a crash the trees on every side. The fire of the enemy met the soldiers in front; the cannon of the cruiser took them in flank. Some brave men fell. Success became impossible.

Finally both columns were ordered to retire. That under Major Frith, harrassed by a useless march through the forest was unable throughout

the day to reach any point, from which it could co-operate with the other two. The armed vessels dropped down to Rangoon.

It was not the resolution of naked and shouting savages, which caused the British to taste on this day of the bitterness of retreat, but the natural tendency of their own false manœuvres. Their attacks were disunited. They were made by masses composed of small detachments. If the Burmans had been capable of manœuvring, more than one British column might have been taken in detail. The plan of the enterprise was founded on contempt. Nothing could be finer than the resolution taken, on the 28th, to attack the field-works of the Barbarians, without the aid of a single gun or ladder. The circumstances of the crisis gave to this act the character of genuine soldiership. The decisive moment was seized, and a lasting impression wrought. But wisdom in war dissuades from seeking gratuitous difficulties. In a deliberate plan of attack, the labor of preparing ladders, especially amidst the bamboo forests of Ava, is not to be balanced against the true glory of avoiding to over-task intrepidity. It is not to be expected that the bravest soldier will always force his way through or over a strong parapet exceeding ten feet in height.

It is not necessary to the reputation of this

Army to cloak the failure of this day by describing the attempt as a mere demonstration, or passing it over in silence. It is a part of the history of the campaign. Suspicion can only be attracted towards the fame of the brave men employed in the operation by an effort to disguise the truth. It is better to write boldly that, which will command belief, "On the 3d of June the British attacked Kemmendine by land and water. They did not manœuvre skillfully. An unlucky incident operated to their disadvantage ; they made many bold efforts ; but were repulsed."

XXI.

Brigadier General Sir A. Campbell did not waste the hours in peevish discontent. He ordered his Engineers to fabricate fascines and ladders, and caused heavy ordnance to be landed from his transports.

"The posture of the blows" of the Barbarians was now known ; it remained to estimate the skill and fashion of their words. A letter arrived from the Barbarian Camp on the 7th. Its bearer was a Peguer of the Moohummudan persuasion. Natives of Ava and Pegue, who have adopted this faith, commonly speak the Hindoostanee. This qualification had apparently obtained for this messenger the honor of a visit to Rangoon,

and its invaders. He had with him several attendants. The letter craved safe conduct for a man of distinction, who desired to confer with the British Commander at Rangoon, on the 8th. It was granted.

Before noon on that day two war-boats appeared amongst the ships of the English. Each was manned by forty-six boatmen, short of stature, athletic, of fierce and scornful countenances, and singularly dexterous in the use of their paddles. In the stern of the leading vessel was fixed a staff surmounted by a massive silver ornament. In the bow of either, which is the place of honor in Ava, was displayed a gilt umbrella. A white flag floated in the aftermost. In the first boat sat the principal personage. He was a Burman past the middle age; who had formerly held the office of Myo-woon of Bassein. In the second was seen the interpreter of the preceding day, and a menial suite of seven or eight.

Major Canning, the Political Agent, had established himself in a spacious wooden house on the water's edge, built for an Ex-myo-woon. There the conference was to be held. Thither the Military Commander, and his Military Secretary repaired. The third Commissioner, the Commodore, was no longer at Rangoon: Some days before he had been compelled to quit it in search of purer air. A mortal distemper, which

he carried with him, cut short his career a few weeks later at Penang.

The deputy landed. He was of lofty stature, in shape fat and pursy, but muscular, and powerful. His grey beard was coarse, but neatly trimmed. His hair, unthinned by age, was bound by a very slight turban of red cloth. He wore a waist-cloth, (called by the natives of Hindoostan *lungotec* or *d'hotee*, and by the Burmans *patzo*) of crimson silk; and a long, loose robe of the same color and material. His features were rude, but not devoid of intelligence. Their expression was not however exactly in accordance with the account, which report gave of his administration at Bassein. He was said to have conducted himself there with singular mildness, and liberality towards Europeans. On the contrary every look and gesture spoke the wily, grasping, shrewdness, and self-complacent nationality of the true Burman.

Seats were taken at the table; betel-boxes arranged. A groupe of officers assembled at the lower end of the principal apartment, and crowded its staircase. Roland, interpreter to the Political Agent, took his post to expound. The Ex-myoo-woon began the conference. He expressed his own surprise, and that of his colleagues in the camp, at the warlike scenes, which had been enacted since the beginning of

May. "What," said he, "is the object of all this hostility. Why have the English come to these peaceable shores with ships and soldiers?"—The reply was a succinct enumeration of the causes of the war; "which" it was added "can hardly be quite unknown to you, and other Burmans of rank." The deputy launched forth into praises of his government; of its power, wealth, and justice; but above all of its moderation, and pacific feelings towards foreign nations, and more especially the English. Then followed the expression of his anxiety to be personally instrumental in promoting a pacification. This point was seized. It was proposed to him to be the bearer of the terms, on which a treaty of peace would be concluded. This mode of addressing a distinct, pointed proposition had throughout the war the same effect on Burman diplomatists, which the silent advance of a column commonly produced on the garrisons of their field-works. Both quitted their ground, and took refuge in impenetrable mazes. The deputy was dislodged. He could not venture on a direct acceptance of this dangerous office; but saw that a decided refusal would unmask his insincerity. The Ex-myo-woon was outmanœuvred; but not abashed. He began with perfect composure, and command of features, to represent that a reference to the capital

was a matter of vast moment. That it demanded caution, and reflection. That to cut short a negotiation thus happily begun, was the thing the furthest from his thoughts. But that it would be necessary to consult with men of higher rank than himself, before a measure of so delicate a nature could be determined on. He proposed therefore a delay of some days, when this friendly, and desirable intercourse might be renewed. This was the substance of his reply, drawn out to a tedious length in the ductile rhetoric of the Barbarian, and interspersed with discursive remarks on miscellaneous topics. The Commissioners saw that they were trifled with. It was vain to waste more time in arguing with an unaccredited agent, who had evidently come to feel the pulse of his enemies, and gain time for his friends. They suffered the serious conversation gradually to drop; and encouraged the old man's disposition to escape under cover of rude pleasantry. He was not sparing of his sallies. He asked questions not very nearly connected with the subject of the conference, amongst others some touching the nature and frequency of the devotions of the British General. All his attacks were parried with good humour.

Most of his speeches were uttered with an affected air of carelessness, which frequently dege-

nerated into buffoonery. But all thought that much real anxiety, disquietude and curiosity regarding passing events and surrounding objects were imperfectly veiled by this thin garb of indifference.

The Grenadiers of the 89th Regiment were drawn up at the foot of the staircase. They presented arms as the Burman passed down accompanied by the General, and the Political Agent. A shade of something like apprehension passed over the features of the deputy, when the soldiers raised their firelocks. The interpreter explained the compliment. The Burman forced a smile, and replied with a jest. He would accept of no assistance in embarking; but tucking up his crimson robe, and displaying muscular limbs, he waded knee deep to his boat. When he was seated; the boat men, who had been grinning spitefully at the soldiers, and spectators, during the conference, resumed their labors. The display was surpassing in its kind. They rose above their seats, striking exactly together, singing in loud and not unmusical chorus, as they pulled; and tossing their heads towards the British, with an air of defiance that needed no interpretation. The war boats passed up like lightning against the strong tide of the Rangoon river. The Naval Officers declared they had never seen rowers, more powerful, and dextrous.

XXII.

The Burman deputy left Rangoon two hours after noon on the 9th. Before day-break on the 10th more serious employment was found for him, and his countrymen, than propounding diplomatic enigmas, or breaking half-witted jests upon national customs. By two o'clock in the morning columns of strong detachments were in motion from every point towards the head of the lower road to Kemmendine. The country was already deeply inundated. It was necessary to harness the soldiers to the ponderous guns of the battering train. They dragged them along a route generally more than ankle-deep in water. The light troops in advance felt the way cautiously in the darkness, and glimmering light, along a narrow road flanked with thickets.

About five their progress was checked by a nulla. The pioneers began to bridge it. The smoke of the bivouac fires of the enemy were seen beyond it. Some of the 13th were pushed across in observation. When the column could pass; its head saw, that not fifty yards in advance a paltry work, which had been easily taken on the 3rd, had subsequently grown into a bastioned quadrangle of one hundred and fifty paces by fifty. It was constructed on the edge of a plain seven hundred yards in length cleared for the

cultivation of rice. The level was under water, and could only be crossed by wading, or by stepping carefully along the narrow dams of earth which secured the irrigation. Three sides of the stockade were embedded in the thick forest; the fourth looked down upon the swampy flats. On its platforms the armed Barbarians were seen, equipped with large Chinese hats of straw, and dressed in jackets of dark oilskin, decorated with small, round, brass buttons. Standing, sitting, or reclining at their ease, all gazed with an air of stubborn indifference at the halting columns, not deigning even to remove from the mouth the cigar of mild tobacco, which forms the constant solace of a Burman. The garrison appeared to be very numerous.

It would have been against all rule to pass by a work of such importance. Its uncovered face was parallel to the river bank. A detachment was directed to detour through the swamp and post itself to the Northward in observation. Staff officers penetrating into the forest traced upon paper the outline of the hostile fortification. General Campbell arrived in front of it. The columns closed. The Burmans remained passive spectators of these preparations. They did not even fire a shot at the detachment, which had marched within one hundred and twenty paces of the work.

General Campbell determined to batter the wall of bamboo with heavy ordnance. Eighteen-pounder guns, and large howitzers were boldly run up by the cannoneers to within fifty paces of the stockade. The artillerists were partially screened by the forest. They opened a furious cannonade. The Barbarians remained as unmoved as if the terrific din, and frightful whistle of large bullets amongst the trees had been connected with any other object than their destruction. They seemed obstinately bent on reserving their fire for extremities.

Balls of eighteen pounds in weight propelled by full charges of powder against solid masonry from so short a range, would soon have produced a terrible impression. But from green bamboos fixed perpendicularly in the ground they experienced too trifling a resistance. The bullets forced their way between them. The horizontal excision of a bamboo was of rare occurrence. Fired with half the weight of powder these balls would have effected a redoubled mischief. They would have prostrated that, which they now either missed, or only wounded in their rapid passage.

Nevertheless at the expiration of an hour a considerable gap yawned in the face of the field-work. Two columns had been silently formed to storm. The first consisted of companies of

the Madras European regiment, and the King's 41st, the second of soldiers of the 13th and 38th.

The cannonade ceased. Then an advanced party of the Madras Pioneerſ were seen to hurry towards the work, and begin to tear up, chop down, and demolish its abbatis, to remove its pointed stakes, to dismantle and fill up its *trous-de-loup*, and to carry wide and well-compacted ladders of bamboo towards the opening in its parapet. The Barbarians poured in their fire the moment they saw their enemies in motion. The column followed on the heels of the Pioneers. In the ardor of the moment some of the 41st outstripped the leading corps, and arrived first under the work. The fire of musquetry was briskly kept up. The assailants were thought to expend too many cartridges. It was the bayonet alone that could bring the matter to a close. Balls continued to whistle ; flashes of fire and smoke to be descried through the thicket. A Major of the 41st was borne by the soldiers wounded to the rear. He had received a ghastly spear-wound in the face in ascending the first ladder. But the number of combatants without the work rapidly lessened. It was evident that a passage was forced. The rear files of the column continued to direct an irregular fire against the wall, whilst the more advanced wedged themselves through the narrow gap. But suddenly

the top of the parapet presented a singular spectacle. A crowd of the Barbarians, still retaining their arms in their hands, but with countenances, and gestures, that betokened confusion and dismay, and the long black hair of each loosened from its knot flying wildly about his shoulders, were seen clambering over the front face of the stockade almost in the very teeth of the assailants. Some leaping madly down rushed into the swamp in front, others dropped from the parapet struck by the balls of the rearward files of the column, more rushed back again into the work, to meet their fate desperately, or to seek some other outlet into the jungle.

There existed in their rear a sufficient cause for this singular eruption. Four Companies of the 13th and 38th had moved rapidly through the forest upon the rearward face of the stockade. They had no ladders. But Major Sale, of the 13th, calling upon one or two of his men to assist him in climbing the parapet, suddenly threw himself sword in hand amongst the amazed spearmen within. Soldiers who are thus led, are seldom slow to follow. There were soon men enough at the side of their leader, to protect him, and hold the Burnians in check, until the whole detachment was landed in the area. This second assault produced a terrible confusion amongst the Barbarians. Two counter-currents of arma-

ed men were now hurrying irresistibly into their place of strength. After a short resistance, they began to fly under the influence of that species of terror, which seems to seek escape by fifty ways at once. It was the onset of the 13th. and 38th. which had driven the mass of bewildered fugitives to attempt to break away into the swamp. The bayonet once more found ample employment. In ten minutes from the signal of attack the British were masters of the work. Nothing remained but to bury, to burn, and to dismantle. This success cost the captors two killed and forty-eight wounded. The voice of opinion has not been the voice of reason, when it has designated the affairs of this campaign as expensive to the army in life, and the blood of brave men. The severer losses of this force belonged to another division of human calamity.

XXIII.

The troops snatched a hasty repast on the drier skirts of the swamp. Then they moved onward in column towards their main object. The Barbarian camp was surrounded by forest so thick that the soldiers defiling within a hundred yards of it were insensible of the presence of an enemy.

When the column had reached a point near the northern extremity of the plain, it was sud-

denly wheeled to its right. Pioneers advancing before it began with incredible activity and labor to cut a road for the troops, and cannon. They had to fell forest trees, and clear away tangled brush-wood. The ground presented an ascent steep and slippery. Up this, eighteen pounders had to be dragged by the application of human strength. In this dense wood the heat was suffocating. The Engineers guided the steps of the Pioneers by the aid of the compass.

Day was declining fast before two thousand men with their artillery could be established in a line of investment, either flank of which, ought to have rested on the river. But it was discovered that fresh works had been thrown up since the 3d. higher up the stream. Either these must be forced before the right could be prolonged to the water's edge, or the *cordon* must be weakened by being stretched to surround them. It was impossible otherwise to inclose the main work without exposing a portion of the force to be taken in reverse.

This was embarrassing. Night approached, and a deluge of rain created a premature darkness in the over-hanging woods. Reverting to the difficulties of this moment, criticism will say that as the investment was demonstrated to be imperfect; and circumstances rendered this defect irremediable; the assault on the main work

ought to have been immediate. If it had succeeded, the Barbarians would have been driven headlong into the deep and rapid river of Rangoon. The blow would have been signal. The minor works would have been abandoned. But the Engineer and Artillery Officers were anxious to try their skill against the defences of this camp. They represented urgently the saving of life, which a practicable breach would insure. It is an ungracious task to refuse to listen to this consideration. Another argument was added. The exuberant audacity of the enemy, and the experience of former affairs, afforded strong grounds to hope that the Burmans would stand an assault. It was determined to breach. Batteries were marked out. The sun had long set, and an impenetrable darkness prevailed before they could be completed.

The woods of Kemmeline choked with rank weeds, and pestilent brush-wood, and soaked with a continuous deluge, formed a dreary bivouac. From time to time, the Artillery threw shot and shell into the work to prevent the raising of new obstructions. The Burmans answered each discharge with a loud and barbarous shout. They opened at intervals an irregular fire of musquetry and jinjals upon the more exposed sentries, and investing parties.

From five in the morning no shouting was

heard. Was this the silence of flight, or of dogged desperation, or a prelude to an attempt to break through the surrounding line? At daylight the Artillery began to batter by salvos. By eight o'clock there was a breach. But long before this a general suspicion pervaded the force, that its foes had evaded.

A column was formed opposite the breach, another at a point one hundred and fifty paces from it. Both moved on to confront, and bear down a stout resistance. Their firm resolves were wasted on vacancy. The enemy had fled. The two columns met in the camp. Not even the dead body of a barbarian remained. All that was valuable, every mark of disaster, the wounded and the dead, had been removed with incredible silence and dispatch. Nothing met the eye, but a few yelping, mongrel dogs, the vast area of the camp strewn with coarse grain, and its walls decorated with drooping streamers.

The British had scarcely lost a man, and they had gained the strongest post of the enemy. But they felt themselves outwitted. Thus is it when principles are forsaken to act upon surmises however plausible, and suggestions however humane.

XXIV.

The British occupied Kemmendine thus

won with detachments of Native soldiers, and one hundred Europeans. It formed a valuable post on the river.

When the troops, employed against it, marched back to their position, they found the ships of the Expedition against Cheduba reunited to the fleet. The episode of the capture of that island formed the news of the day.

Brigadier McCreagh reached Cheduba on the 12th May, with two of his troop ships. He found that the Slaney sloop of war, and his third transport had already anchored on the Eastern side of the island. Cheduba was profusely covered with forest, which stretched to the very water's edge. Near the point of anchorage was the mouth of the principal river of the island. The outlet is barely distinguishable at the distance of a few hundred yards. The Brigadier perceived that his enemy might have the full advantage of concealing his numbers, and masking his movements by means of the thick jungles, which every where met the eye.

Captain Mitchel advanced in the boats of the Slaney to reconnoitre the river. Its width was found to vary from forty to one hundred yards. The enemy was discovered to have taken post in force half a mile from its mouth, in a position cleared of forest. His defence was a trench of one hundred and fifty toises.

The Brigadier prepared to attack him. He collected boats for the transport of two hundred men of the 13th, and one hundred of the Native Infantry. With this force he pressed up the stream. The Burmans with singular stupidity permitted the flotilla to row on unmolested until the headmost boat had reached the right of their line. Then they opened a fire of swivels, jinjals, and musquetry, aided by a flight of arrows. These last were not their least efficient weapons.

The soldiers in landing had to struggle against the difficulty of a shelving and precipitous bank. But as the boats came up in rapid succession the troops scrambled on shore, formed, charged the Barbarians, routed them, carried their work ; and hotly pursued them up to, into, and through the town of Cheduba.

At the head of its principal street the leading files of the British found themselves under the fire of a regular work. The Brigadier saw that he had to operate against a permanent defence of solid timber. It was in fact a quadrangle of two hundred yards, with demi-luned gate-ways in each face, a parapet of stout timbers seventeen feet in height, a thick embankment of earth within, a triple inclosure of railing without. It was lined with swivels, and guns of small calibre. The Brigadier knew that six hundred of the best troops in the Burman empire had been sent over

from Ramree, on the news of the British movements on the Naaf. He checked the pursuit, and resolved to proceed systematically against this timber citadel.

The Brigadier had no Engineers, or Engineer establishment. He had no Artillerist of higher rank than Serjeant. His battering train was restricted to two nine-pounders, and a carronade, on ship carriages drawn from his fleet; and a single field howitzer to project shrapnels. His little siege became therefore a chapter of expedients. His artificers had all to be educated for the occasion. A ceaseless deluge of rain deranged, and retarded the operation. The platforms of the guns repeatedly sunk in the projected battery, which the heavy fall converted into a swamp.

Perseverance and cheerful activity triumphed over these discouragements. By daylight on the 16th the guns were ready to open. The Brigadier caused his newly-raised artificers to throw down the small pagoda and huts, which masked his battery. It was not more than one hundred yards from the great gateway of the place. The Brigadier drew the attention of the Barbarians by a false attack to another angle of their work. He began to batter. By 4 p. m. the gateway was in ruins. During these nine or ten hours of fire the shells from the single howitzer had done severe execution within the work.

The very instant the breach appeared practicable the Brigadier formed his men for the assault; the 13th to lead, the native troops to support. A body of sailors, preceded the column provided with axes and ropes to clear away the wounded spars and timber. These resolute, active fellows soon opened a passage. The Barbarians met the British boldly in the breach. Their commander in person wounded in the arm with a spear Major Thornhill, of the 13th, who led the assault. The Burman was shot through the head by a serjeant. The column pressed on with equal steadiness and ardor. Resistance was soon overcome. The garrison were driven in confusion through the gates of the opposite face of their fort. Cheduba had no other fastness. The island had thus become British by right of conquest. The women, and children of the Barbarians crowded within the *encinte* of this hold, had suffered dreadfully from the shrapnel shells, which burst amongst them during its short siege. The Burmans could not comprehend the generosity, which induced the Surgeons of their successful enemy to labor night and day to alleviate the sufferings, and save the lives of these unfortunate people.

Cheduba abounded in supplies of rice, fish, poultry and cattle. The fertility of such spots

as had been cleared from dense forest appeared to have always repaid the cultivator.

In conducting a reconnoissance through the woods of the island Captain Aitken, of the 13th. had the good fortune on the 19th. to take prisoner the Rajah of Cheduba. The *debris* of the Burmans, who had suffered severely in the assault and siege, retired precipitately across the channel to Ramree. The enterprise was complete. The Mug inhabitants hailed with delight their deliverance from the Burmans. The Brigadier left the native troops to garrison the island, and their commander Lieut. Colonel Hampton to hold the reins of civil government in the name of the Rajah. That Barbarian chief was destined to a mild detention within the walls of Fort William. The Brigadier sailed with the 13th to unite himself to the Head Quarters of the Army at Rangoon.

XXV.

Major Wahab had left the Andamans on the same day with the Cheduban expedition. His ships entered the Rangoon river not long after those of the Brigadier.

His adventure had been brief. It was a voyage of discovery rather than a military operation. His fleet of three vessels, the H. C's. Cruiser Teignmouth, and two transports, had not

without difficulty hit the narrow channel which affords an entrance into the great western branch of the Irawaddy ; a noble stream, which after washing the walls of Bassein, flows into the ocean at Cape Negrais. The Major landed a body of troops, and took possession of the desolate island which bears the same name as the Point, so well known to navigators. Two detachments, which he afterwards directed to traverse the whole isle, encountered no other obstacles, than those presented by the swamps, and jungles, which overspread its surface.

No hosts of Barbarians appeared to dispute the possession of Negrais. But an enemy as redoubtable, interposed to arrest the march of conquest in this direction. The expedition had sailed from the Andamans with rations for fifteen days only.

Major Wahab judiciously tried negotiation. He opened a communication with the inhabitants of the main land, near the spot, where in a deep, and commodious bay are seen some traces of the antient English factory. His hopes of obtaining supplies at first run high. But an unusual assemblage of the population excited on the 16th. some suspicion regarding their intentions. Soon after it was known that the Barbarians had thrown up and garrisoned a field-work on the coast.

Major Wahab resolved to attack it. He landed troops on the morning of the 17th.. The native soldiers carried the work by storm. They were commanded by Lieut. Stedman, who fell in the third campaign.

But with this hostile movement vanished all prospect of obtaining provisions near Negrais. Meanwhile Captain Goodridge of the *Mercury* had ascended as high as Bassein. He reported favorably of the navigation to that point.

But supplies were not to be obtained. It seemed to Major Wahab that there were no alternatives but starvation, or sailing to Rangoon, which was likely soon to become a singular place of refuge from such a calamity. He sailed accordingly. This resolve did not embrace any very serious evil, beyond that, which always attends the manifest abandonment of a project. In fact true principles of operation demanded at this period nothing more in the direction of Bassein than blockade, and observation. Both these purposes were effected from June, 1825, to the conclusion of the war by a single cruizer, and a handful of native soldiers under the direction of Captain Fenwick of the Madras Army.

Yet Bassein was made in 1824, the object of a first, and 1825, of a second expedition. This war was long enough to enable many to improve by experience, by feeling their way in

successive attempts and profiting by their own errors. This was fortunate; and ultimate success has stamped justification on the whole. Yet it will be acknowledged and felt that the talent, which seizes at once circumstances, and the measures, which they demand, arrives at its end by a less expensive, as well as a more brilliant process.

XXVI.

Immediately after the capture of Kemmendine the Army at Rangoon was attacked by an endemic fever. Its symptoms were mild, but its general prevalence marred the efficiency of the force, crowded the hospitals, and overtasked the diligence of the Surgeons by the sudden influx of patients. It happened that the disorder made its earliest appearance at Head Quarters. The robust frame of General Campbell was one of the first to be affected by it. The officers nearest to him in rank, and command, his personal staff, and the heads of his departments were added to the lists of sufferers in rapid succession. The visitation was therefore at the outset ascribed to causes strictly local. The Peguers repair their roofs annually on the approach of the rains. Vast quantities of dried palmyra, and other materials had been collected previously to the invasion. These were piled in heaps through-

out the town. Abandoned at the general flight, these masses had begun to rot and infect the atmosphere. The military police busied itself in their removal. It caused also the drains and sewers of the town to be opened, and repaired. But these desirable reforms did not check the progress of the disorder. From the town it made its advances into the lines. Soldiers of European and Native battalions were daily stretched on the bed of sickness. The disease fastened with greater violence of symptoms, on the former, whilst the number of patients rather preponderated amongst the latter. It was clear that if this evil owed its origin to atmospheric causes, they were such as were engendered, and spread their malign influence far beyond the circuit of the walls of Rangoon. In fact the first ships brought the news of the same affliction reigning in Calcutta.

The fever was mild. It seldom resisted the force of medicine beyond the eighth day, commonly gave way on the fifth, in many cases disappeared on the third; and in some attacked so lightly that it seemed rather to take formal, than actual possession of the patient. The simple intermittent produced no fatal cases. But its appearance unsettled the health of the army, already tried by circumstances of severe exposure. Pains in the limbs, and prostration of strength

often survived the removal of the more active symptoms of the distemper. Rheumatic ailments, acute dysentery, and obstinate, and wasting diarrhœa often supervened. The bloom of health—such health as Providence permits to exiles between the tropics—was brushed off from this Army in the third week of June.

The events of the 10th and 11th, had given a short respite to the outposts. But the rapidity with which the Barbarians recovered from the shocks of disaster was a remarkable feature in their warfare. They quickly recurred to their system of petty insults and alarms.

The want of wholesome provisions began to be severely felt. The small stock of cattle procured in the country was already exhausted. There was no hope of more. On the appearance of the fever, fresh meat could with difficulty be procured in sufficient quantities to supply soup for the hospitals. The salted rations were generally of a bad quality. Flour abounds at both presidencies, the sap of the cocoa and palmyra is procurable in every grove round Rangoon. Yet this Army was without bread. There were yet no military bake-houses or ovens established in the town.

The spirit of the troops was excellent. Yet the nature of the private soldier could not be wholly proof against the multiform privations,

by which it began to be assailed. More than this, his limited powers of reflection sufficed to conduct him to the conviction, that the Army, of which he formed a part, stood in a false position. The Barbarians were at least masters of their own movements. They could march, encamp, concentrate and intrench themselves upon any point they pleased. They were acquainted with the scene of warfare. But the British were pent within a circumference of seven miles. All beyond it was to them a blank. They had no cavalry. They could not push a reconnoissance twenty miles from their ships. They could not advance or pursue two marches. They could do nothing but repel. It was now evident that the original plan of the campaign however fertile in events and sufferings could produce no political results. It was equally evident that the situation of the Army, if indifferent in June, might grow worse, but could not be ameliorated, by any accession of strength or resources deriveable from the invaded province, before November. A new impulse might be given to it by stupendous exertions at the seats of empire, from which it had sailed. But the fleet which formed its means of communication with its base, yet lay idle in the river of Bangoon. This amazed many at the time—it amazes many still. It may be easy to assert,

but it will be difficult to compel those, who know his intrepid character, to believe that the Military Commander harbored at this period any thoughts of retreat. But it is possible that in the third week of June he might not yet comprehend his position. He might yet hesitate between the hope of obtaining supplies in Pegue, and realizing the first conception of an advance in the monsoon ; and the necessity of avowing to his government that the resources of the lower provinces had evaded his grasp during the first four days of invasion ; and that his army was now in a state of blockade on the land side, from the effects of which it required the prompt application of all the resources of the Indian empire communicable by sea to extricate it. It is easier to affect astonishment at this, now that the knot has been unravelled, than to solve the riddle of events beforehand. The difficulties of the period were not slight. It was owing to the inconceivable arrogance alone of the barbarians, which urged them to commit themselves in affairs, and actions, that the British found in their partial but brilliant little successes the only sources of consolation, during the first six months of the war.

The posture and prospects of the Army were already discouraging. But the spirit of the troops was as unbroken as when they first leapt full of

hope and exultation on board their ships. Nightly damps, and the fatigue of constant alerts could not subdue it, the daily penance of loathsome and noxious food engendering disease instead of yielding sustenance could not subdue it, the sharp agonies, the tedious caprices, and wasting delays of ailments, which threatened to bring more malignant scourges in their train, could not subdue it, the dread that because the result of unlucky combinations forbade for a season the hope of a general success, their resolute deeds, and generous endurances would be underrated, and held cheap; themselves misrepresented and calumniated by the ignorant, the secure, and the thoughtless;—this above all could not subdue it. The spirit of the Army remained ever the same.

BOOK II.

RANGOON.

The Argument. Second period of the Campaign of the Monsoon. I. The Barbarians assemble another army. They essay to establish themselves on points from Dalla to Syriam. II. They manœuvre in a mass against the British in position, and effect their retreat (July 1st.) III. They stockade in the forest under the great Pagoda, and are dislodged. (July 5th.) IV. Their works at Pagoda point are bombarded, and stormed; and they are routed at Kumaroot with carnage. (July 8th.) V. Reconnoissances, and affairs on the line of the Puzzendoung creek, at Syriam, Dalla, and up the Panlang branch of the river, in August, and September. VI. A Brigade of the Madras Army assaults the works of the enemy at Kaiklo, and is repulsed. (Oct. 7th.) VII. Brigadier McCreagh marches upon Kaiklo. The enemy retire before him in confusion. Their atrocities. Major Evans demolishes their works on the Laing branch. VIII. Reduction of Tavoy, Mergui, Tanasserim, Martaban and Yè. IX. The Army of Mèngee Maha Bandoola recalled from Arracan enters Pegue. State of the British Army to the end of the Monsoon. X. Review of the campaign.

I.

THE Barbarian enemies of the British appeared to multiply like the heads of Hydra. They had been defeated in May; they had been dispersed in June. In July their *cordon* was re-established. Rangoon was again in a state of blockade

by land. The fleet preserved its single line of communication by sea.

The plan of the enemy as developed in the course of July and August was as usual far too vast for their means. Beginning on their right, they had resolved to raise the levies of Dalla, and to establish and intrench themselves in the creeks which intersect the island. Their grand position on the great river was to be taken up five miles above Rangoon. It was to give them the command of the two *embouchures* of the Panlang, and Laing branches; being fixed below the point of junction. The right bank of the river was to be secured by two large field-works. On the left the narrow plains of Kumaroot were to be covered with defences far superior in strength and extent to those of Kemmendine. The flower of the Barbarian forces was to be drawn to this point. Another corps was to be assembled at Kaiklo to operate, as occasion might offer, upon the line of the Puzzendoung creek. This field was not yet wide enough for Burman ambition. Orders were dispatched to raise the levies of the Syriam district, to construct defences on and near the site of the old factory, and to act down the left bank of the Syriam river upon the rear of the British. Though the information at the British head quarters was at this period unavoidably defective; yet wiser Barbarians might have

predicted that intelligence of the progress of this grand plan would reach the adverse General in time to enable him to debouche from his lines, and throw his forces successively upon several points of this hostile circumference.

II.

The Barbarians ventured on a yet harder attempt. On the morning of the 1st July the British had pushed reconnoitring parties of five hundred men upon the roads to Kumaroot, and Kaiklo. At noon those, who now occupied the tranquil streets of Rangoon, were roused by the loudest, and closest cannonade which had shaken its huts, since the 11th May. A staff officer arriving in haste announced that the Barbarians in force were making a demonstration against the right of the position of the troops from Bengal. The General and his staff galloped to the lines. They entered the mango grove at the foot of the gradual ascent to Shwèda-gong. A desultory fire was heard from the picquets to the right of this.

It was seen that a mass of two thousand Burmans had entered and set fire to the hamlet of Puzzendoung. Their van was penetrating slowly through the swamps and thickets, between that village and Rangoon. Brigadier McCreagh had already taken measures to repel

this adventurous column. His division was under arms, and he had placed some pieces in battery on the most commanding points. Round shot, and shells, were already flying amongst the Barbarians in Puzzendoung, from which columns of smoke and spiral flames were issuing.

It seemed to be the object of the Burmans to pierce the British line by penetrating across the low ground between the heights and the town. As therefore they had originally debouched opposite to the left centre of the British, in advancing they constantly exposed their right flank and rear. Brigadier McCreagh immediately conceived the plan of causing a column to descend obliquely from the centre of the position into the plains to cut the line of their retreat. But his own line of defence was weakened by detaching five hundred men on the duty of reconnoissance. A regiment under his control was posted in the counter-line. He sent officers at the gallop to order five companies of it to execute the manœuvre, which would have secured a brilliant advantage. It is now in vain to enquire by what accident this force failed to arrive in time.

Meanwhile the Burmans continued to advance over the undulating ground. General Campbell took four companies from the nearest Native re-

giment. It was the 43d. He ordered them to attack the Barbarians, who had halted on a rising ground, and begun to fire. The Native soldiers pressed boldly forward, overthrew the Burmans, and drove them back upon the morasses behind them. This was the moment, at which the column issuing from the heights, should have marched upon their rear. The finest opportunity of the campaign was lost. The Barbarians escaped to their forests.

This attack of the 1st of July did not tend to elevate the war-like character of the Burmans; but neither must the invaders quote it amongst their best of days. What! permit a body of ill-armed Barbarians to manœuvre against a British division in position; abandon their line of communication in their ignorance and audacity; and yet operate their retreat with the loss of a hundred men? This is either to know little of war, or to profit little by the knowledge.

A single squadron of horse would have sabred or taken the whole mass; but it had been pronounced that in Ava there was no field for cavalry. There is not any known country under the sun, of a superficies of one hundred square miles, wherein the manœuvres of cavalry may not be signally advantageous to an army, or wherein it will not bitterly feel the want of its aid.

III.

The arrogance of the Burmans mounted higher. From the Western side of Shwè-da-gong to the river, the country is covered with forest so thick, that masses of troops might be formed in it, and debouch upon the line of sentries without any previous intelligence of their existence. British parties pushed into this dense wood early in July from time to time encountered and put to flight small bodies of the Barbarians. It was evident that they meditated something on this point.

During the night of the 4th the noise of their pioneers in full activity was heard. On the morning of the 5th the spies reported that the enemy had traced the outline of one large work, and nearly completed a second of equal magnitude. They had garrisoned the latter with troops. These hostile intrenchments were within nine hundred yards of the base of the great monument. Thus the Burmans had interposed; a force between the main position of the British, and their post at Kemmendine.

This was not to be endured. The General, who had been busied all the morning in receiving reports from his outposts caused at three in the afternoon howitzers and rockets to be placed in battery on the platform of Shwè-da-

gong. The smoke of the enemy's fires was seen rising above the trees of the forest. This was the mark of the artillery men. Shells and rockets flew innoxious. It was a display of noise not of power. "What!" said an officer of rank, "are we sending shells into the forest to hunt for field-works?" This sarcasm put a stop to a fruitless bombardment, in which two hours had been lost.

A column of five hundred British stood formed below the monument with scaling ladders in their front. One hundred had been taken from each of the European battalions. This force was directed to advance four hundred yards on the road or pathway to Kemmendine. Then, diverging from a point, three hundred men were to penetrate to the right, and two hundred to the left through the jungle. Each body was to seek out a field-work, assault and carry it by escalade.

The column of the left found unfinished works. They took them in reverse, and dispersed the Barbarians by their fire. That of the right missed in the dense thickets the weak side of the stockade, which it sought; and after wearying itself in a tedious *detour* through the forest, came unexpectedly under the fire of the strong side. The attack was hurried, and irregular. The soldiers, disconcerted by a false partition

of force, which deprived them of their natural leader, and destroyed mutual intelligence; and received by a fire, as brisk and well-aimed, as it was unexpected, were for some moments in confusion. They were animated however to perseverance, planted their ladders, and took the work. But this trifling advantage cost them twenty-five of all ranks *hors de combat*.

Those who meditate on the events of war great and small, with a view to instruction, will see little to praise or to imitate in this attack. They will not be delighted, with the expedient of planting howitzers and rockets in an area seventy feet above the level of the plain below, to project missiles at an invisible object. They will think that it tended only to degrade in the eyes of Barbarians these formidable engines. They will not commend the division into two bodies of a small force destined to operate in a thick forest upon points imperfectly known. They will not be enamored of the device so frequently adopted in this campaign, of uniting small detachments of several corps into a provisional body. This false partition deprives troops of all the advantages of the habit of acting together. In the most pressing moment of danger the commander finds himself unacquainted with the officers and troops under him; they on their part know nothing of each other, or of their leader.

What is there in this system of dislocation to counterbalance so dangerous an absurdity ?

IV.

The reconnoitring party which traversed the plains of Kumaroot, on the 1st, observed demonstrations of an intention to concentrate upon it. Large trees had been felled, and quantities of the bamboo cut down in the woods, which were occupied by the skirmishers of the enemy. But on the level itself there was not any trace of a field-work. The Burmans are capable of prodigious feats of manual labor. Concurring reports proved that in six days they had thrown up stockades at Kumaroot, which could not adequately be manned by fewer than twelve thousand men.

Besides this their stockaded position on the river consisted of three principal works. The first was on the right bank of the Rangoon branch of the Irawaddy, eight hundred yards below the point, at which the waters of the Laing branch unite with it. The second was on the left bank of the river of Rangoon nearly at the same distance from the point of junction. The third was constructed round the small Pagoda, which gives its name to the point itself. Thus the Barbarians considered the mouths of the two river branches hermetically sealed.

This was the fortified position of Pagoda point. Kumaroot is nearly one mile and a half higher than this up the left bank of the Laing. It is fifteen hundred yards from the river. But the enemy's *appui* was preserved by subsidiary works. Though the only road by which it can be approached from Rangoon is a mere pathway, it is nevertheless the principal route to Ava on this side of Pegue. Thus the enemy had thrown himself across the direct communications with the capital by water and land at the distances respectively of four and a half, and four miles, estimated in the one case from Rangoon, in the other from the great Pagoda.

The British General prepared to strike a blow, but the violence of the weather kept him quiescent until the 8th.

The design was to employ the whole Naval force against the works of Pagoda point. Captain Marryat labored incessantly to complete the arrangements. Strong detachments of troops were embarked on board the several vessels. At an early hour on the 8th the fleet availed itself of the tide to move towards the scene of action. At the same time a column debouched from the northern side of Shwè-da-gong to march upon Kumaroot. It was formed of detachments, taken from nearly every corps and regiment in the army, and compacted into moveable columns for

the day. But the 13th and 38th had the good fortune to be united under the personal command of Brigadier Mc'Creagh. He was the second in rank with this force. It was commanded in chief by Brigadier General Mc'Bean. General Campbell was with the fleet.

The country was in a frightful state of inundation. The troops were drenched with the heaviest rain. The atmosphere was obscured by clouds driven into lowering masses by the Monsoon. The wooded *défile*, into which the column plunged, was too narrow for the passage of a single gun-carriage. The division was compelled to send back all its field-artillery, except some small howitzers, which were borne along on the shoulders of the valuable corps of enlisted bearers from Madras. The woods abounded with splendid specimens of the teak-tree, and with the delicious pine-apples of lower Pegue.

At length the column arrived, and halted on the margin of the plain of Kumaroot. The enemy's skirmishers were particularly bold and active. They attacked every reconnoitring party, and the picquets, which the British threw out in front and flank. The *défile*, through which the troops had advanced, was considerably wider than before in the vicinity of the plain. Its gorge was partially closed by clumps of thicket. The columns were formed behind these near the

outlet into the plain. There could not be a more favorable position for observation. The Commanders determined to ascertain by a deliberate reconnoissance, the real strength of the force opposed to them, and the number and character of their field-works.

The stockades, of which a view could be obtained, were nine in number. All were constructed on the margin of the forest, into which a retreat was open from the gates of their rearward faces. All had well compacted parapets of bamboo, with the usual subsidiary defences. But it appeared that the main force of the Barbarians was concentrated for the defence of two only. These were large works directly opposite to the head of the route of the British. The enemy in his attempts to disconcert the reconnoissance, and disturb the picquets on the flanks, as well as in his movements to reinforce the smaller of his two defended stockades, displayed considerable forces. It was estimated that not less than seven thousand Barbarians stood opposed to the British. As the swampy plain in front of the latter would on their first movement be swept by the cannon and jinjals of the works, and the musquetry of this large body; it was not to be expected that the column could debouch upon it without considerable loss.

General Mc'Bean determined to direct his

first attack full upon the salient angle of a bastion in the nearer and smaller, of the two stockades. The 13th and 38th were destined for this assault. A column of reserve was formed at the same moment of the Grenadiers of H. M's. 89th to lead; and a portion of the 3d and 7th Native Infantry. The minutest details of the attack were organized with the coolest circumspection. Tirailleurs were prepared to extend themselves on the flanks of the columns and divert the attention of the Barbarians by their fire. A single subdivision of the 13th was placed in front of the scaling ladders. These were carried by the Madras pioneers, a corps, which in the course of these campaigns, exhausted the commendations of the army and its commander. Major Sale, who was to lead the storm, raised their animation to the highest pitch by speeches in their native dialect, with which he had become familiar in the days of his service in the Mysore. He had taken post sword in hand, in rear of the leading sub-division. It was clear that all was to be achieved by the bayonet. The troops of this column were instructed to advance with their firelocks slung.

Three howitzers had been placed in battery. A prelude of a few shells was prepared for the Barbarians. But the fuses had been cut for a long range; and the British had approached with

three hundred yards of their enemy. There was little cause for regret. The bugles sounded the signal to advance. The thrilling call was repeated by each corps, with the regularity of a day of field exercise. At once the mass was in motion. It passed the screen of thicket. In an instant the bullets of the Burmans were whistling round the heads of the British. The 13th, which led on that day, advanced in perfect silence, the 38th loudly cheering, both in the most perfect order. The column was seen to make its way across the swampy plain, knee-deep in mud and water; but rapidly and steadily. It reached the work, the ladders were fixed. Then each section unslung its firelocks, and fixed its bayonets, with the precision of the platoon, and began to ascend in the face of the Barbarians. Section after section leaping down disappeared within the work.

The very instant that the cessation of the fire marked the completion of this first capture, the Brigadier caused the second column to advance to assail the larger work. But at the moment, in which it began to move, he saw with surprise the troops under Major Sale sally from the stockade they had stormed, form in the plain, and prepare to assault the flank face of that, which was now menaced in front. They had interpreted the signal for the advance of the se-

cond column into a demand for fresh exertion on their own part. It was too late to check them. Both columns pressed on. Captain Rose of the 89th, was soon on the top of the enemy's parapet encouraging his grenadiers. They did not lose a moment in following him. Both columns had passed within the work. "This stockade too is ours," said the Brigadier. A round shot passing close to his head, and a brisk renewal of the fire of musquetry proved that the conclusion was premature. He sent to General Mc'Bean to request that the remainder of the 89th might be ordered up to him. He formed them in line on the plain obliquely to the enemy's works. A staff officer, covered with mud, arriving from the front reported that on gaining the larger stockade, the troops of both columns had found themselves under the fire of interior parapets. The Burmans were now disputing obstinately a succession of retrenchments. The British and the Barbarians contended for a few minutes hand to hand. Here a singular combat took place. A Burman chief singled out a soldier of the 13th. He aimed a blow at his head. Major Sale, who was near, interposing his own sabre, parried the cut. He in his turn made a cut at the chief. The blow caused the Burman to stagger; but the Major's sabre shivered like glass to the very hilt. In-

stantly closing with his enemy he wrested from him his broad, gilded weapon, and striking the Barbarian with his full force below the ribs, nearly severed his body into two portions.

The conflict was too close to be of long duration. It was too hot, and desperate for quarter. The last retrenchment was forced with terrific slaughter. The Barbarians, when compelled to fly, found it difficult to escape through the narrow outlet of the work.

Finally, they were precipitated in confusion into the swamp. Here they attempted to rally. But it did not become necessary to cause the 89th or the native detachments, which were formed in line, to charge. Their steady and galling fire compelled the defeated Burmans to take refuge in the forest.

In fifteen minutes after the first onset, nine stockades, with all the guns, ammunition, stores, standards, and ensigns, of the enemy were in the hands of the British. The Barbarians had lost not less than twelve hundred killed and wounded. The retrenchments of the last stockade were the scene of a frightful carnage. In the swamp and in the forest, the Burmans had fallen in heaps. Several chiefs had perished.

During this rapid and brilliant attack, and for an hour after, a furious cannonade was heard

in the direction of the river. On this side Sir Archibald Campbell had not been less successful. He had overwhelmed the stockades of the enemy with a shower of shot and shells, breached, and stormed them. Detachments of H. M.'s. 41st and of the 34th Madras Native Infantry had been most actively employed in these attacks.

V.

The enemy had received a severe lesson. Hitherto their spirits had not given way under disaster. But now every account dwelt on the dejection of the chiefs, and the dismay of their followers. The British outposts were freer from annoyance during the remainder of July.

But though the main forces of the Burmans beaten, and dispirited, had retired to a safe distance up the river, the plan of closing in upon the flanks of the invaders was still kept in view. Towards the latter end of July every exertion was used to assemble bodies of armed men at Kaiklo, at Syriam, and on the island of Dalla.

On the 22d Sir Archibald Campbell caused troops to be embarked in the boats of the flotilla, and on board the steam vessel Diana. He ascended the Puzzendoung creek in the direction of Kaiklo. A column had been ordered to co-operate by land. But the heavy rains had at length rendered the roads every where im-

practicable for infantry. The enemy did not await the General's attack at Kaiklo. He reconnoitred completely the line of the creek, and brought back to a safe asylum in Rangoon a portion of the peasantry of Pegue, whom the severities of their Burman rulers had reduced to a low stage of wretchedness.

On the 5th of August he moved up its river against Syriam. The enemy's works were unfinished, and their resistance feeble. The place was carried by a column under Lieut. Colonel Smelt.

The creek of Dalla affords a line of communication with Bassein. The peasantry of this island had partially resisted the order to take up arms against the invaders. But the Burman forces had entrenched themselves strongly on the creek. General Campbell ordered them to be attacked on the 8th. The column, which passed the river on this service was commanded by Lieut. Col. Kelly, of the Madras European Regiment. The boats grounded in the shallows of the creek. To reach the point of escalade it was necessary, that the troops and sailors should form a line knee-deep in water, and hand the ladders from man to man. The Burmans kept up a smart fire until this difficulty was overcome. But when the ladders were brought up, and the troops had begun to form in force, the

Barbarians fancied that they saw the flash of the bayonets of Kumaroot, and gave way precipitately. The British had forty-five killed and wounded.

In August, Brigadier General Mc'Bean resigned the command of the troops from Fort St. George. Colonel Fraser, of the Madras Army, was sent to succeed him.

Besides the principal creek, which intersects Dalla, there are various subordinate channels. Availing themselves of all of these, the Burmans transported forces from time to time through the island in war-boats. They intrenched themselves far inland, and carried on a war of outposts with the native troops, which held the works, from which they had been driven on the 8th of August. They were invariably repulsed.

The garrison of Rangoon was kept on the alert on the night of the 8th September by the desperate attack made by a body of Burman war-boats on a gun-brig anchored near Dalla. They were repelled by the courageous efforts of her commander, Mr. Crawford, and his crew. At the sound of the firing, Captain Marryat manned with the speed of lightning the boats of the Larne. He flew to the scene of action, attacked the Burmans, threw them into confusion, pursued them up the creek of Dalla, and board-

ed, and captured five of their gilded flotilla. The war-boatmen began to discover that they had as little hope of success on their own element as within the works, which they had defended so boldly.

The expedition under Lieut. Colonel Miles destined to attempt the subjugation of Tavoy, Mergui, and Tanasserim sailed on the 25th August. On the 13th of September Lieut. Colonel Godwin proceeded against Martaban, and Yè.

It was resolved to disturb the enemy in their retired positions on the river. On the 27th September Colonel Fraser was charged with the execution of this plan. He had five hundred men under his command, and ample naval means at his disposal. He succeeded in penetrating fifteen miles up the Panlang branch of the river, and demolished stockades on either bank. The enemy gave him very little trouble on any point. The slaughter of Kumaroot still haunted their imagination. The sickness of her crew had compelled the *Larne* to sail for Penang; Captain Chads of the *Arachne*, was now the Naval Commander.

The Burmans are nearly as superstitious as the Highlanders of Scotland. The prince and the peasant are alike under the influence of astrologers and horoscopes; their chiefs calculate

the changes of the moon for auspicious days; and their warriors seek to fortify their persons with charms, amulets, and all the resources of the art magical. An adventure, which has since been sufficiently amplified, owed its origin to these superstitions. A band of fanatics, who styled themselves "Invulnerables," attempted to surprise the important post of Shwè-da-gong, and force an entrance at night through its northern gate-way. It was a mere affair of outposts. A single gun from an Artillery picquet poured grape upon the "Invulnerables." The fire of the infantry outpost beyond the lakes took them in reverse. They were repulsed. If their pretensions to impassibility remained intact, they had only to thank the darkness of the night.

In October the news reached Rangoon of the death of the Political Agent, Major Canning, on the day of his landing at Calcutta. Thus was lost the developement, which he is said to have promised, of the true causes of the ill success of the expedition. The Supreme Government appointed Sir Archibald Campbell his successor. The policy, which thus armed the Military Commander with the full powers of sole negotiator is to be commended, as often as it is mentioned. The progress of events demonstrated its advantages: and these only became more apparent, when they were lost to the

state, which late in 1825, consented to divide its confidence, by transferring a portion of it to a civil colleague. It is vain to urge the acknowledged talent of the second Commissioner. History will regard the principle, not the man. In war or diplomacy it is ever unsafe to lose sight of the sterling advice of the old poet,

“Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίῃ εἰς κοίρανος ἔσται,

“Εἰς βασιλεὺς,”—

VI.

Rain had fallen almost without intermission up to the end of September. At the commencement of the next month the army was favored with some days of dry and sunny weather; but it yet saw no prospect of relief from the famine, which threatened, or the scarcity which wasted it. It cannot be doubted that it was supported under its privations chiefly by the excitement of affairs and skirmishes. Fortunately a succession of fresh adventures never permitted it to stagnate in total inactivity.

There was no lack of zeal in this Army at this dreary period. It seemed to be even exuberant in a portion of it. It had been said early in June; “You enquire after the fate and movements of our Army. We have here in truth two armies, nearly alike in training and equipment; but accustomed to be guided by forms

"of military administration as different as those
 "of the French, and Prussians. But in the com-
 "bined armies of Fort St. George, and Fort Wil-
 "liam this will produce no inconvenience ; be-
 "cause they are animated by one and the same
 "spirit." This was a fair description of the feel-
 ings with which the contingents of either Pre-
 sidency generally co-operated during a two year's
 war. But after the castigation of the Burmans
 in July and August the minds of a part of the
 Madras Army were inflamed with jealousy and
 discontent. They thought that particular corps
 had been selected to take an active part in the
 operations, which promised the highest *eclat*,
 to the disparagement of others not less deserv-
 ing. This ground of complaint, adopted on a
 misconception of circumstances, was not on that
 account the less stiffly maintained. "Our native
 soldiers," said many, "extended their services
 "by acclamation. They stifled their prejudices,
 "and did violence to their antipathies. They
 "crossed the sea. They have shared the fatigues,
 "and privations of the Europeans. Are they
 "not to share their laurels? Are these corps so
 "complete in equipment, so perfect in discipline,
 "—all zealous, active and impatient to engage—
 "many of them of approved valor, of resolution
 "often tried, in successive campaigns, and never
 "found wanting—are these corps to be defraud-

“ed of the golden opportunities of distinction, “which are systematically afforded to others?”

It is difficult to quarrel seriously with this species of impatience. For is it not a form of that very *esprit de corps*; which is lauded so highly as the parent of virtuous resolves, and resolute actions?

Only it behoves those who thus venture to complain, also to reflect that in war neither valor nor skill are seen absolutely to control the current of events; and that detraction will not sleep, if their success in the field should chance to be less than commensurate with the loudness and bitterness of their invectives in the camp. It happened in Ava that an opportunity speedily occurred of appeasing this appetite for renown.

The enemy had retired from Kaiklo in August. But he had soon re-occupied his position. The labors and manœuvres even of Burmans had been partially suspended by the floods of September. The first gleam of sun-shine sufficed to cause their resumption. In the first week of October the Barbarian forces were strongly posted on the most easterly of three roads which conduct to the northward of Shwè-da-gong; their advance being stockaded near Todaghee, their main body and reserve near Kaiklo. It was the principle of the British in this campaign to at-

tack the enemy whenever he ventured within reach. A force had to be selected for this new service.

Sir Archibald Campbell determined that the 4th Madras Brigade should be permitted to appropriate without partner or rival the honor of the enterprise. It consisted of the 3d and 34th Native Light Infantry. It was impossible to look at these two corps, without being struck with their fine appearance. Their equipment was as perfect as that of light troops can be made, which are compelled to adhere to the absurdity of a *scarlet* jacket. They had been trained to manœuvres, under the eye of one of the first officers of their Army. The last wish, which he had expressed previously to their embarkation, was that in Ava they might be placed in the fore-front of danger, and exertion. In their commander Lieut. Col. Smith, the officers and sipahees reposed the most unbounded confidence. They quoted the favorable opinion, which in the wars against the Murhuttas in the Deccan had been entertained of his military qualities by the General, who has since become the great Captain of his nation. Two howitzers were attached to the Brigade. It amounted to eight hundred rank and file.

Colonel Smith reached Todaghee at ten on the morning of the 5th. He halted an hour. His

subsequent advance was delayed by the necessity of bridging a rivulet swollen by the tide. Beyond the stream his van-guard was attacked. Parties, which he threw out to the right and left, continued to skirmish with the enemy always to advantage. At length a field work was described by one of them. The Lieut. Colonel has described it as constructed, "directly facing the main road, a plain bounding it on the right, its left face being enveloped in jungle." A fire was opened upon this from the Howitzers. Then three small columns assaulted it at the same moment, escalated, and carried it. Lieut. Campbell of the Pioneers received a mortal wound, whilst actively employed in planting the ladders.

But immediately after this gratifying success the minds of the leader, and his troops appear to have been assailed with doubts of their ability to complete the enterprise. The Lieut. Colonel relates that in the woods beyond "a prisoner was taken armed with an English musket." The foreign and effective equipment of this Barbarian seems to have given extraordinary weight to his representations. "From this man I obtained information, which led me to suppose that the enemy was in considerable force in the neighbourhood with guns, and a party of horse very strongly stockaded. They were spoken of as a different description of soldiers from those

“which we had hitherto encountered.” The last sentence may be thought to offer a cause of disquietude too vague to be permitted to enter into a military calculation. For with what race of men, were these new stockades to be filled? *Invulnerables* were not numerous enough in Ava to garrison whole field-works; and *invulnerables* had already been proved not wholly indomitable. With what men then? With mortal men, at least; and men, worse clothed, worse armed, worse disciplined, and far worse commanded, than those, who were to oppose them. With dark-visaged men at the worst; and therefore with soldiers not more than a match for two Regiments of the *élite* of the Native Army of the British Government. The report of the numbers of the enemy, of the presence of cavalry, and the strength of their position, embraced fairer grounds for precautionary measures. “I was induced in consequence to request that I might be furnished with a strong reinforcement. The correspondence, that passed subsequently on that subject I need not dwell upon; the Commander of the Forces being aware of its nature.” There is a mystery in these expressions. If they refer to any thing more than numerical strength, they may possibly be connected with the incident, which is about to be related.

At a late hour in the night of the 5th, an offi-

cer arrived at Head Quarters in Rangoon from the camp of Colonel Smith. He demanded an audience of General Sir A. Campbell. He described the boldness, which the Burmans had displayed in the contest of the morning ; and the difficulty with which success had been achieved. He represented that a yet more formidable resistance was to be expected at Kaiklo ; that all the accounts of spies, and prisoners agreed in describing the works as stronger, and lined with a more effective artillery, and defended by a garrison bolder, and better equipped, and more numerous than previous information had taught the Brigade to expect. Hence Colonel Smith had deduced the necessity for a strong reinforcement. The General replied to these suggestions, and this inference, and demand, by assuring the officer that a fresh detachment of three hundred Native soldiers, with two more field-pieces were already placed at the disposal of the Colonel. As this declaration did not seem to produce the feeling of satisfaction, which was anticipated, the confidential officer was requested to state specifically the nature and amount of the reinforcement, which would be considered adequate to the crisis. With some shew of reluctance he at length said, "In addition to the Native soldiers five hundred *Europeans*." At this unexpected proposal the General could not conceal a move-

ment of amazement and impatience. "Five hundred Europeans !" he exclaimed, "with five hundred Europeans I will engage to cut my way to Ava ;" and with this remark he abruptly terminated the conference. The confidential officer returned to camp.

The reinforcements, drawn from the 28th and 30th Native Infantry united themselves to the Light Brigade on the morning of the 7th. Colonel Smith marched upon Kaiklo. In traversing a plain his advance under Major Wahab was attacked by irregular cavalry. It repelled and routed them. It then drove the enemy from the advanced breast-works, which defended the approach to their stockaded position. The false reports, and contradictions of the guides delayed the progress of the column. It did not debouch in front of the main defences of the Burmans before five in the evening. The enemy maintained the most perfect silence, whilst a deliberate reconnoissance was completed. Colonel Smith arranged his plan of attack. Two columns under Captain Williamson, and Major Wahab were directed to assail the right and left respectively of the defences. A third under Major Ogilvie was held in reserve. A small pagoda crowned a hill, which commanded the stockades of the Burmans. Trusting to the reports of the guides, Colonel Smith had permitted himself to

believe that it was not defended. But a single cannon shot from that point undeceived him as the troops were moving on to the attack. He ordered a party of the 28th to assault the hill. The Barbarians permitted the columns of the Light Brigade to advance within fifty yards of their parapet. Then the garrison opened upon the assailants "volleys of grape, and musquetry, with an "effect hitherto unequalled in this country." The pioneers with the ladders were swept down by this fire. Major Wahab, whose intrepid example had been an earnest of victory, was severely wounded. Other officers in that column were struck by the shot. "The men from the awful, "and destructive fire, which fell amongst them, "and the loss of their commanding, and leading officers, were seized with panic, and lay "down to secure themselves from *its* further effects." A spirited attack, which was made nearly at the same moment, on the hill and pagoda, failed. The Barbarians, not satisfied with repulsing the assailants upon this point, made a sortie, and rushed upon them sword in hand. Captain Williamson's attack was concealed by the forest; but he had not penetrated the work. The Barbarians on every side raised a shout of triumph. This was not a state of things to last long. When troops are once checked, under a heavy fire, and no retrieving manœuvres are

executed, the crisis is not distant. "Order, regularity, and discipline, which had been strictly observed until about this period, vanished, and the whole corps crowded indiscriminately into one general mass, retired into the plain, which I had pointed out." Masses of the Barbarians sallied forth, with cries of indignation, and contempt, made prisoners, and cut down the wounded and flying. In conducting the retreat, Colonel Smith availed himself of the detachment under Captain Williamson. As the line of route of the repulsed run chiefly through the densest forest, it was difficult for the enemy to reach their flanks or rear in force. So long as the rear guard could hold the head of the narrow road, the main body was not likely to suffer severely.

Meanwhile the declarations of Lieutenant Campbell, who with his last breath described himself as sacrificed to the want of firmness of the leading soldiers on the 5th, created a deep sensation in the minds of the Army in front of Rangoon. It prepared them for that, which followed. Late in the evening, and during the night of the 7th, the successive arrival at the outposts of small and disorderly parties of native soldiers, with bewildered and dejected countenances, without sandals, without caps, without arms, proclaimed the nature, and extent of the disaster. Throughout the lines were heard

murmurs of grief, and indignation, and threats of ample requital.

The catastrophe of Kaiklo is to be attributed to a false partition of force. A timid, and senseless reserve has been affected in speaking of the causes of this repulse. There is no one fact or deduction connected with it, which need, or ought to be discussed in a corner. Of the armies of the British Government in India, their European troops are, and must ever be the *élite*. They hold this station in every arm, but especially in those of Artillery and Infantry. No conceivable plan of enlistment, or enrolment, not even impartial conscription, which is impracticable in nations of *castes*, could produce in India Native soldiers equal on the great average in strength, resolution, and activity to those recruited in the British isles. The training of both descriptions of infantry may be supposed to be equal, since each is the work of officers of the same nation. The preponderating difference is in the raw material. Infantry is seldom or never concentrated in Indian wars in sufficient numbers to form several divisions of four or five thousand each. Little seems to be gained by the partition of a force into two divisions; because in varied operations it will commonly have to act on more than two points. Then subdivision becomes unavoidable. The best practi

cal form therefore, which an army in India can assume, appears to be that of several Brigades, composed each of one European, and two Native battalions, and aided by an artillery of four field guns, and two light howitzers. These bodies admit of a convenient re-partition into half Brigades, of a wing of European, a battalion of Native troops, and three field-pieces, one of which will be a howitzer. These simple calculations are familiar to all who have learnt to lisp the first elements of the art; but their adoption in Ava might perhaps have saved some blood and some regrets. The forces of the Rangoon expedition were then in their first campaign naturally divisible into five Brigades; because they comprised five European battalions. If the army had been originally organised in this proportion; its partition need never have been altered or remodelled, and there would have been no disaster at Kaiklo. Prepossession may rail, but candor will embrace the conclusion, that *it is an error in Indian warfare to employ in an integral operation Native Infantry disjoined from its natural proportion of European foot, and a competent Artillery.* This rule, which will hold good in manœuvres on a large scale, and in battles of parade, can even less safely be disregarded in desultory and irregular warfare giving rise to short, decisive contests upon points.

But it has in these latter days been thought possible to complete a faithful narrative of the operations in Ava, without any mention whatever of the day of Kaiklo. Polybius, and Livy, heathen writers had not arrived at this refinement. They detailed the disasters of the Trebia and of Cannæ, as well as the victory of Zama. Yet no one saw grounds to suspect the patriotism of the Roman, or the fairness, and impartiality of the Greek.

VII.

The British General received with great composure the report of the check of the Light Brigade. He acquitted its leader of all blame. He acknowledged the prudence, and resolution, of his measures, and personal example. To gratify an ambition, of rather an exclusive character, an experiment had been made, unsuccessfully, and which did not deserve success. It was possible to profit by this error; but first it was necessary to retrieve it. If this was to be done by British troops it must be admitted that it was fit that they should march under a commander not implicated in the previous disaster. As it was not to be hoped, that the Barbarians at Kaiklo, though they boasted loudly of their achievement, would venture to manœuvre upon Rangoon, Brigadier McCreagh was ordered to lead

a body of troops to Kaiklo. Their numbers were ample. He took with him the skeleton of the 13th, two hundred and fifty men, who remained effective out of six hundred, that had landed in Ava. Detachments from H. M. Regiments completed his European force to four hundred and twenty. There were added to these, three hundred and fifty Native troops, a mortar, and two field-pieces.

At seven on the morning of the 18th, the Brigadier was at Todaghee, by sunset in front of the position of Kaiklo. But the Barbarians either deemed it inauspicious to try their fortune twice on the same ground; or they had heard that their enemies of Kemmendine, and Kumaroot, of Syriam, and Dalla were in the field. Their stockaded line was evacuated. A rear guard only at the first exchanged a few shots with the van of the British.

The reports of captured stragglers determined the Brigadier to follow the retiring enemy a day's march further. He had established one post of communication at Todaghee, he formed a second at Kaiklo. At two in the morning of the 11th, he marched on in pursuit.

But at Kaiklo a spectacle awaited the troops, which unveiled the full barbarity of the character of the enemies, against whom they were contending. Twenty-three bodies of British Offi-

cers, Sipahces, and Pioneers; of the killed, the mortally wounded, and the prisoners of the 7th were displayed on the trees near this fatal spot. Some were affixed in the attitude of the Roman crucifixion. The eyes of others had been plucked out. Of several the bellies were ripped open. Yet more brutal and indecent mutilations had been practised upon others. An iron stile had been driven through the head of one. The cowardly indignities of the Turks in Greece, and the not less savage retaliations of modern Greeks, had been emulated, and surpassed by the Burmans. The countenances of most of the victims were placid, even though mutilated, and disfigured. They were not those of men who had died in torment. It is to be hoped that their corpses alone had been the sport of this spirit of barbarous revenge. But there was one horrible exception. The features of the native officer, whose skull had been pierced through, were contracted into an expression of the most terrific agony. The sight of these sanguinary trophies of an ephemeral success did not chill the blood of the British: it caused it to boil with indignation. The troops of this column moved on muttering vengeance.

But retribution was for the present denied them. A rapid march brought them indeed upon a large stockade near the village of Coghee:

but as the van-guard pressed on, it descried the huts within already in flames, and the last band of fugitives escaping into the forest in incurable confusion, and dismay. The column advanced to the hamlet itself. This too it found in flames. All the statements of its alarmed inhabitants went to prove the consternation of the Barbarians, and their leader. They durst not face the avengers. It was useless to pursue them further. The troops marched back to Rangoon. At Coghee in the exposure of five more mangled bodies another display had been made of brutal and unmanly spite.

On the first day's march Brigadier Mc'Creagh had been brought to the ground by a stroke of the sun. Revived by bleeding, he caused himself to be carried in an Indian litter at the head of the column, and continued to direct the operations up to their termination. But the ulterior effects of this accident of climate compelled him to quit the Army for recovery. He rejoined it about the middle of the second campaign.

But if on one line the Barbarians had found cause to felicitate themselves on successful resistance, and safety purchased by flight; defeat had reached them on another. On the 5th Major Evans of H. M's. 38th had ascended the river. Three hundred of his own corps; and one hundred of the Bengal Artillery were embarked in

the flotilla. He passed up the Laing branch, he penetrated to the town of Tantabain, he escalated two large stockades, which defended it, he drove the enemy from many smaller defences, he threw into an agony of terror the Kee-Woongee and Sykia Woongee, who commanded, burnt war-boats, destroyed fire-rafts, and ruined the large magazine of petroleum, which the Burmans had been forming for weeks. This earth-oil, the produce of wells in the centre of the Empire, is of the last importance in the fabrication of floating engines of combustion. The defence of the Laing river on this occasion did little credit to the Barbarians.

VIII.

The opening of the Laing, and of the road to Kaiklo were the last operations in front of Rangoon up to the conclusion of the season of rain. But before the arrival of that period to a portion of their difficulties, the British had made themselves master of the whole of the coast to the mouth of the river Tanasserim. These events have to be detailed.

TAVOY.

The expedition under Lieut.-Colonel Miles sailed on the 26th August. H. M. 89th, the 7th Native Infantry, and a detachment of the Bom-

bay Artillery were embarked in transports. These were convoyed by two cruizers. This fleet arrived off the mouth of the river on the 4th September. Tavoy was reconnoitred the next day. The town is surrounded with defences of brick-work of lofty profile. The enemy had sunk boats, and created artificial obstructions in a stream already rendered difficult by shoals. Tavoy might have offered a respectable resistance. But an intrigue within its walls gave it without an effort to the British. Its governor had rendered himself odious to all under his control by his cruelty, and rapacity. His subordinate officers conspired against him. One of them on the 9th put himself in communication with the British Commander. His offers were at once tempting, and plausible. Lieut.-Colonel Miles availed himself with much address of this posture of affairs. His pilots had now acquired information, which would enable them to thread the shallows. The lighter vessels were already anchored three miles below the town. Taking advantage of the flood-tide the fleet appeared at noon on the 9th under the walls of the town. All had been matured within. In twelve hours after the opening of the secret negotiations the Lieut.-Colonel found himself master of the town, fort, out-works, and suburbs of Tavoy, together with the persons of its Myo-

woon, his women, and children, his brother, and principal adherents.

A considerable number of guns, and stores of greater value than had been expected, were found in Tavoy. Its inhabitants like those of all the states recently conquered by the Burmans, detested their yoke. They viewed the British as deliverers.

MERGUI AND TANASSERIM.

The capture of Mergui was found somewhat more difficult and costly. It was defended by batteries thrown up on commanding heights. These presented a fire from thirty-three pieces. The Myo-woon replied to a summons to surrender, by commencing a cannonade on all the ships, within range. But his works proved no match for the armed vessels. They were silenced in an hour. Then the boats of the fleet landed a body of troops to the Northward of the town. A detachment of the 89th at the same moment boldly attacked the main-gate of its stockade. They carried it by escalade, with the loss of thirty killed and wounded.

Tanasserim, formerly a flourishing settlement was found to have dwindled into a fishing village. It was taken possession of a few days afterwards.

Mergui furnished some supplies of cattle for

the use of the army at Rangoon. The medical officers pronounced its site eminently healthful. It was converted into a depôt of convalescence, and proved beneficial at this, and at ulterior periods of the war.

MARTABAN AND YÈ.

The passage from Rangoon on the Irawaddy to Martaban on the Salween appears insignificant on the map. But the strong currents of the intermediate portion of the coast, baffled day after day the fleet of Lieut.-Colonel Godwin. He did not arrive near the romantic lake, and heights of Martaban before the 29th September. On the 30th the Burmans were driven from its town, fortified pagodas, and stockaded lines by a scientific attack.

The Lieutenant-Colonel detached Captain O'Reilly of the 41st against Ye-myo. This also was rapidly captured. The occupation of Martaban brought the British upon the frontier line of the Siamese. But no efforts of either Burman or British agents, neither arguments, promises, nor threats, could ever divert that Government from their cautious, and reserved system of policy. They persevered in an armed neutrality to the end of the protracted contest, carefully watching the trepidations of the balance of success. They could never be drawn

into any overt act of hostility against the Burmans; but to keep well with their enemies, they filled the streets of Rangoon with a tinsel embassy, so soon as they heard of the advance of the British; and during the third campaign the political agents at Martaban were amused from time to time with choice specimens of enigmatical eloquence by a General-in-chief with the sonorous name of ROUNG-ROUNG.

IX.

Meanwhile the privations, and sufferings of the troops at Rangoon were painfully aggravated. The continued use of salt provisions had added to the diseases, which preyed on them before, scurvy, a frightful scourge any where, but on the humid Delta of an huge river, a foe to human health, which seemed to defy extirpation. The heavy rains, which had intermitted after the second week of October, were renewed in November with their former violence. Ships dispatched from Rangoon in July could not bring back any effectual succors in less than four months. Private adventurers had brought sheep, and poultry to this mart of starvation. But they were few in number, and sold at rates incredibly exorbitant. They furnished only an ephemeral repast for the tables of a few of the half-famished officers. Pine-apples a-

bounded in the forests. Limes and citrons were to be found in rude orchards. The juice of these fruits might have been rendered sanative to a few, if used as anti-scorbutics only. But the heedless voracity, with which such unripe rarities were swallowed by hungry soldiers, proved fatal to hundreds of dysenteric sufferers. Bread had been from the month of August supplied in sufficient quantities for the consumption of the hospitals. But the rations of the soldier consisted of rice, a crude, indigestible viand for the stomach of a native of Britain, salted beef, and pork, which vitiated the animal juices, and biscuit, seldom fresh, and commonly swarming with animalcules, or mouldy from long detention under hatches, or in damp magazines. The supply of medicines was not abundant, nor assorted with a view to peculiar ailments, which could not have been anticipated. Of most of the articles, included under the head of medical comforts, there was a yet greater scarcity. It may be surmised that where there were no cattle, milk was not procurable ; yet a milk diet, would have saved many valuable lives. Dropsical symptoms manifested themselves extensively. Dyspepsia, and acute hepatitis were yet more common. Diarrhœa, and dysentery committed lamentable ravages. For dispeptic, hepatic, dysenteric, and scorbutic patients

there were neither milk, vegetables, farinaceous food, nor nutritive broths. These deficiencies baffled the skill, though they could not extinguish the zeal of the medical officers. The plan of mooring transports at the mouth of the river, on board of which convalescents might inhale the sea breezes, did not produce very beneficial results. The most successful of the sanitary measures was the establishment of a depôt at Mergui.

Such was the state of the Army, as regarded health and resources, towards the conclusion of the month of November. It was yet ignorant of the exertions that had been made to succor it. It did not yet know that cattle for food and transport, and every supply adapted to the experimented exigences of its situation had been collected in either capital without regard to labor or cost. Magazines had been rapidly formed, the transports sent round from the conquered post had been promptly loaded, and dispatched; and additional ships eagerly freighted for the service. This the troops did not yet know; and even after they heard it, the tedious process of maritime transmission liable to the caprices of a changing monsoon was to the languishing and perishing soldier hope long-deferred with all its heart-sickness.

Individuals indulged in some ebullitions of discontent. Now that all has terminated fa-

vorably it is amusing to look back upon these symptoms of mental ferment. One writer thus vented his spleen upon the Burmans, "Here there is a land fertile and productive by nature, unimproved by art, of which the kings are absolute, the petty governors extortioners, the priests willing agents in the hands of the evil spirit. Its population half-tutored, but shrewd, and debased by slavery, and superstition, remain hardy and brave, but indolent, knavish, and sanguinary. Its religious faith is a scion from the stock of the antient superstitions of Hindoostan. It has borrowed its dress, and architecture from the Chinese, and its civil polity, and ethics direct from the devil." "Posterity," said another, "if posterity should deign to notice these events—posterity looking back on the singular spectacle of so fine an Indian Army pent for seven months in a distant corner of a hostile land, pinched by famine, and fearfully wasted by disease, exposed to the inclemency of a season singularly violent, subject at one period to the daily insults of a contemptible enemy, at another fairly beleaguered by the forces of a barbarous empire, and unable to boast of any counterbalancing advantage beyond the capture of an inconsiderable island, the questionable tenure of a paltry town, and the imperfect conquest of

“an *arrondissement* of six miles, will demand a more satisfactory answer, than the general plea of natural obstacles to its enquiries respecting the causes of this union of mortifying inactivity, with costly sacrifices, affording so humiliating a contrast to the brilliant, and rapid progress of our arms within the boundary line of the Ganges.”

These murmurs were echoed at Calcutta. Its saloons were soon filled with alarmists, who clearly demonstrated that the position near Rangoon must become the grave of the Army, which held it. “And how long,” said one of these to an Officer, who visited the Presidency in October, “how long is this war of yours to last?” “Two months if we are to be beaten, if we are to be successful two years.” Events did not falsify this prediction, which was thought at the time sufficiently extravagant. The intelligence of the day of Kaiklo followed by exaggerated statements of the wants and sufferings of the Army, did not tend to dissipate the gloom. Men of all classes in India permitted themselves in various degrees to forebode, and despond; and began to lavish upon this contest with inconsiderate haste the bitter epithets of precipitate, profuse, protracted, calamitous, ill-fated.

But the spirit of the Army as a body remained the same. The Native troops, which had lately

been called upon to furnish a large proportion of the out-post duties, before taken by Europeans, cheerfully supported their fatigues. Every European, whose remaining strength sufficed to support his firelock, yet held his foes as cheaply as ever. Each seemed to vaunt in the words of the Roman Consul "on fair ground, I could beat forty of them."

This resolute spirit was about to be put to a severe test. At the moment, at which sickness, destitution, and mortality had reached the extreme point, General Sir Archibald Campbell received information, which he could not question that the army of Menginee Maha Bandoola recalled from Arracan, and reinforced by every disposable fighting man in the Barbarian empire, had already entered Pegue. It was rapidly concentrating upon Donabyoo. Thus instead of finding itself in a condition to take the initiative on the approach of the dry season, the British army saw itself compelled to prepare once more for defensive measures against odds, and under circumstances of physical depression, which would have rendered pardonable some disquietude as to the result. But these troops and their leader felt none. They counted impatiently the days, which must intervene, before they should be enabled to descry the vanguard of this Barbarian chieftain.

X.

The campaign of the monsoon has to be reviewed, first, as a defensive diversion, concerted to suspend, or wholly interrupt a meditated attack on the Chittagong frontier; secondly, as the first move in a direct plan of invasion on a line of manœuvre coincident with that of the great river of the enemy. In the former character it was entirely successful. On the 17th May, the very day on which the capture of Cheduba was completed, the advanced divisions of the Burman army of Arracan had overwhelmed Captain Noton's detachment at Ramoo. In the middle of August the successful force suddenly broke up in full retreat upon Sem-bew-ghewn. The events in lower Pegue compelled its recal to the line of the Irawaddy. But long before the period of its retrograde, a covering army had been assembled on the menaced frontier. Every thing was secure. There was no chance of having a battle to fight for the safety of Fort William, almost as little of a contest for that of Chittagong. Maha Bandoola had no intention of making a "campaign of the Monsoon" in Bengal. The measure of diversion will therefore be pronounced successful, but costly, and supererogatory.

Secondly, the capture of the peninsula of Rangoon, and its defence against the Barbari-

ans have to be considered as the first measures of an invasion of the Burman empire. *The base of operations of the army of Rangoon was during the whole of the first campaign a line drawn through the capital cities of Calcutta and Madras.* The union of two portions of the force at the Andamans was merely the momentary intersection of lines of advance, producing no results influential on the fate of the expedition. Rangoon was a place of arms—a *pas d'echelon*, by which to approach Prome, and thence Ava. It became the centre of operations, but it was not a point on the base. *That line was traced on the opposite shores of the bay of Bengal, whence were derived all the supplies of the campaigning army.*

From the sixth day after the descent of the British it became abundantly manifest that their sphere of operation must until the change of the rainy monsoon be restricted to the defence of the single point, on which they had established themselves. The campaign of the monsoon was, as a measure of invasion, thenceforth to be considered a failure. For any purposes of advance the British battalions did not stand nearly so well as if they had remained in the forts, and cantonments, of their Presidencies. Rangoon was to be valued only as a point of support until the moment of activity should arrive. It was necessary to strengthen, and to provision

it. It was expedient to repair its walls, and line them with cannon, to hold by an outwork the right bank of the river, which formed the main ditch of its western face, to intrench the position in its front, and *promptly to cause every unarmed vessel to return towards the base to transport to it the means of forming provisionai magazines.*

Much of this was left undone, much was done slowly, and after long and dangerous hesitation. Therefore it may be presumed that British councils were influenced by the hope of carrying into effect the first plan of invasion. That project has thus been described. It was said to have been proposed that the British should make themselves master simultaneously of Rangoon, Cheduba, and Negrais. It was calculated that at Rangoon they would find provisions, boats, and boatmen. Embarked on the waters of the Irawaddy they were to penetrate on that line as high as Yangain-chain-yah, a point which was represented to be the key of lower Pegue, and of its inland navigation. Hence, if this daring movement did not terrify the Barbarian government at once into submission, it was projected to pursue the advance by water into the heart of the Burman territories. Moral and political means were to be rendered auxiliary to this enterprise. The detestation of the Burman yoke professed

by the Peguers, and the ardent desire of the Talaings to restore their ancient dynasty were securely relied on, as sources of co-operation, and alliance. The rainy season is said to have been selected as the fittest for the purposes of the invaders, because it promised the advantages of depth of water, and a prevalent wind from a favorable point on the great river.

It is as difficult to enumerate all, as to be blind to the most palpable of the numerous objections, to which this plan is liable. Rangoon, Cheduba, and Negrais do not form a military base. They are disconnected, and two of them not easily approachable. Cheduba, when taken and held, was only a point of observation. Negrais could have been no more, if retained. Either might indeed have been converted into an echelon ; but it was quite unnecessary to have three of these because it was most advisable to operate in Pegue upon a single line of advance. All therefore must centre in Rangoon. It is at this point that the insuperable error of this project begins to display itself. For what soldier will arise to maintain that even if boats, boatmen, and provisions had here been found in all imaginable abundance it would have been conformable to the true principles of war to attempt an advance of six hundred miles up a line of river, both banks of which must have remained in the

possession of the assembled levies of an empire ? The idea of an encampment in the morasses of Yangain-chain-yah in a season of deluge will meet with few advocates amongst those, who know its localities. It had been called the head of the Delta, the key of lower Pegue. But in fact it is not the summit of any Delta. The apex of the great Delta formed by the grand branches of the Irawaddy cannot without great conventional licence be fixed lower than Kewdowa, twelve miles above Sarawah ; and seventy miles above Yangain-chain-yah. But neither one nor the other form a military position. Again it is said, and can not be too often repeated. Woe ! to the leader, who should during the months of rain have encamped his battalions in the morasses of Pegue, on a point either sixty or one hundred and thirty miles from his first echellon before it was secure against a *coup-de-main*, or furnished with a single magazine. The graves of nearly three thousand brave soldiers, victims of disease on the more elevated position of Rangoon, may be viewed as monumental proofs of the temerity of such an attempt. If the "campaign of the monsoon" did not give the invader Prome, it gave him nothing ; and this he could hope for only on the supposition of being shielded from disease, which is unsparing in its nature, and of finding in the Peguers energetic allies, and in

the Burmans imbecile and inactive enemies. This plan of invasion seems to have had for its basis, contingency, instead of sound calculation. Conquerors have never made war after this fashion.

But in the annals of the British in India praise of no ordinary kind will be bestowed on the energy, and activity on the western and northern coasts of the Bay of Bengal, and the enduring constancy on its eastern margin, which ward off the threatening consequences of these false combinations. They will have to speak of an error resolutely retrieved, and a perseverance fitly rewarded. That Government will not be called weak, the armies of which could conquer a peace at the distance of six hundred miles from their first echelon, and of a month's sail more from their original base. Neither will these records fail to pronounce the eulogium of the Commander whose cool tenacity of purpose enabled him to triumph over the accumulating difficulties of his first campaign in Ava. In the midst of the famine, and sickness of those days, with the recollection of six months of harassing warfare, and the expectation of an attack far more formidable than any, which had preceded it, some secretly gave way to despondency, some gravely, and openly advocated the wisdom of a timely retreat. But with this Ge-

neral such counsel found no acceptance. He would not for a moment consent to lose sight of the simple but invaluable rule for a military leader "never to listen to the dictates of despair, whilst he has brave men under his colors."

BOOK III.

RANGOON. KOKAING.

The Argument. I. Active preparations of Bandoola. II. His army suddenly appears before Rangoon (Dec. 1st.) He invests it. He attacks Kemmendine. His dispositions. III. Major Sale pierces the left of his unfinished intrenchments. IV. Attacks, and counter-attacks of the 1st. 2d. 3d. and 4th. Resolute defence of Kemmendine. V. The Burman left attacked, and defeated by Majors Walker and Sale (Dec. 5th.) VI. Bandoola perseveres in his plan of investment, and attack. VII. (Dec. 7th.) Decisive overthrow of his centre. Rangoon deblockaded. The enemy routed in Dalla. VIII. Bandoola rallies at Kokaing. IX. The British General attacks, and signally defeats him. X. The British prepare to advance. Second attack on Syriam,

I

THE Barbarian Government evinced no want of energy at this juncture. The Burmans are a hardy race, patient of fatigue, inured to alternations of damp and heat, and accustomed to coarse and scanty fare. Yet it is well known that thousands of them fell victims to various hardships during the rainy months.

Nevertheless it has been seen that they never allowed the British a moment's respite or repose; and in the last week of November they stood prepared for the most tremendous effort against an enemy, which had ever been organized in their empire.

Maha Bandoola recalled with his army from Arracan was appointed Generalissimo of the forces destined to drive the British at Rangoon into the sea. He was invested with the fullest powers; the whole strength and resources of the empire were placed at his disposal. All that the sword had spared of the war-boatmen were ordered to join his standard, a portion of the Royal Guard repaired to his camp at Donabyoo, and he was authorized to avail himself of the services of the entire levy of Pegue. His measures of conscription were neither mild, nor ir-resolute. Threats of decapitation, impalement, and crucifixion, executed without remorse, or respect of persons, on the slightest symptom of reluctance soon forced around his banners the flower of the peasantry. A large proportion of these were promptly provided with weapons. The rest were made useful in the labors of in-trenchment. Squadrons of Cassay horse were united to this army.

This force collected at Donabyoo, was thence pushed down by detachments in boats, or along the left bank of the Irawaddy, and the Panlang creek. It fell nothing short of fifty thousand men when it reached the environs of Rangoon.

II.

It is to be remembered that at this period the

British troops were just beginning to raise their heads from the reviving influence of the change of season. They had hardly found time to estimate the beneficial effects of an improved diet secured to them by the supplies newly arrived. The hospitals were still crowded with dying, and distempered patients. The European corps could generally muster on the parade of each not more than two hundred and fifty soldiers, pale, emaciated, enfeebled, tottering under the weight of their arms, and equipments. To oppose to fifty thousand Barbarians, Sir Archibald Campbell had not therefore more than thirteen hundred sickly Europeans, supported by eight Native Regiments no strangers to disease, and depressed by the recollection of a recent check.

The *public* of Calcutta considered this General's game a losing one. Fortunately he had himself formed a very different estimate of it.

On the 29th and 30th November reconnoitring parties advanced up the left bank of the river were briskly driven in by such formidable masses of the enemy, as had never before been encountered in Ava. Every thing announced a grand effort.

Early in the morning of the 1st of December a body of ten thousand Burmans debouched upon the plains of Dalla. In July the British General had wisely reduced the town of Maindee

to ashes. But he had not secured the bank by a *tête-de-pont*. The enemy hastened to take advantage of this. They traversed the plains, and established upon the river the right of their meditated line of investment. Then, placing some paltry pieces in battery, they began to display their ignorance of Artillery in attempts to drive the ships from their anchorage.

Soon after day-break the post of Kemmendine was attacked by a heavy column of the enemy. Almost at the same moment masses as heavy debouched upon the mounds in front of the great Pagoda, whilst bodies yet more numerous unmasked themselves from behind the forest parallel to the British centre, and prolonged the line with the view of establishing their left on the Puzzendoung creek, near its salient bend about three miles from its mouth.

These columns moved on with an air of barbaric pomp. The glittering of gilded *chatus* (umbrellas), the prancing of Cassay steeds richly harnessed, the glancing of burnished spear-heads decked with waving horse-tails, the huge, towering forms of numerous elephants gave an appearance of splendor, and variety, to these sable masses, as they continued to march on, deploy, and form in this direction.

By noon their left rested near the village of Puzzendoung. A more advanced line was sup-

ported on a point directly in front of the white *convent*, variously designated in the army, as the "*Fakir's house*;" and "*The white-house picquet*." An outpost of the British had been established in it for many weeks.

According to barbarian maxims of war Rangoon was now invested. The enemy laid aside his arms, and began to intrench himself with incredible activity.

These dispositions indicated no want of boldness or of skill on the part of Bandoola. His line was extended: but then he had fifty thousand men. He had now left the British Army the stream of the Rangoon river alone open behind it.

On the approach of the forces of Bandoola the British commander had established his headquarters in the Shwè-da-gong pagoda, a point the most central, and commanding.

The Burmans fully comprehended the value of the post of Kemmendine. Possession of it would enable them to press forward through the low, jungly, swampy plain, which intervenes between that point, and Rangoon, invest more closely the Great Pagoda to its westward, harass the flanks and front of the battalions posted on the lower road, and menace Rangoon itself down the left bank of the river as well as the right. Kemmendine was garrisoned by one hun-

dred men of the Madras European Regiment, and by the 26th Regiment Madras Native Infantry.

A formidable body of the enemy had made prolonged, and reiterated attacks upon it early on the 1st. The sustained, and renewed firing was heard with anxiety within the walls of Shwè-da-gong. But the determination of its defenders finally prevailed. The enemy was constantly driven back.

To strengthen the post, and repel the Burman war-boats, His Majesty's sloop Sophie, the cruiser Teignmouth, and the best gun-vessels, and row-boats of the Flotilla were moored off the British intrenchment. The flanking fire of these floating batteries greatly contributed to the discomfiture of the assailants.

III.

The British Commander has declared that from the moment, at which Bandoola's columns debouched from the forest on either flank, he considered that the Burman chief "had fully exposed to him his plan of operations," and that "his own resolution was instantly adopted of allowing, and even encouraging him to bring forth his means, and resources from the jungle into the more open country on his (Bandoola's) left; where he knew he could at any moment attack him to advantage."

This plan of encouragement was on one point

pushed to an extreme, which was afterwards found to involve some inconveniences.

Along the Eastern face of Shwè-da-gong extends a kind of level glacis. The raised *chaussée* of the sacred route runs between this little plain, and the outer wall of the monument. At the foot of the level is a deep ravine forty yards in breadth. Beyond it are heights covered with impenetrable forest. But to the northward this valley sweeping round approaches much closer the walls of Shwè-da-gong, and smoothing its slope, and widening its extent, presents to view three diminutive lakes, the largest of which was, from some supposed mineral virtues, named by the British residents at Rangoon, "*The Scottish Tank.*" Directly from the northern ascent of Shwè-da-gong a causeway runs between two of the lakelets. Having passed them it branches off to the left and right; forming on the one hand the route, by which the British division marched upon Kumaroot, and conducting on the other to two successive hillocks, on each of which are some houses of the priesthood; and which are both insulated by a second, and third ravine beyond, and between them.

These mounds had been occupied by picquets of chosen troops from the third week in May.

On the 1st of December they were abandoned.

The enemy did not hesitate to seize them.

Thus he was enabled to push his intrenchments within forty yards of the Sacred Edifice; and open at discretion a close fire upon its parapet. The tanks, and ravine alone interposed between him, and its walls.

But towards noon on the 1st, the British General saw reason to depart from a purely defensive system. The enemy had at this time extended his line to within half musquet shot of the "*Fakir's house*." After turning this post an assailing column would find a level, though somewhat swampy plain open to its advance up to the stockade of Rangoon, which was neither platformed, nor armed with cannon. The post of "*the white-house picquet*" was insulated. It might have been mastered by successive attacks unless held by a larger force than it was now prudent to detach from the main line.

It seemed not inexpedient to manœuvre to remove the enemy from points of such vital importance, and delicate tenure. It was desirable also to try the mettle of this new enemy on favorable ground. The indulging him in a partial affair on this point might delude him hereafter into a more general engagement. His views would be developed by the countermovements, by which he might meet the first demonstration against his line. Major Sale was permitted to move down to attack his left.

His force consisted of detachments of four hundred men drawn from the ranks of H. M.'s. 13th, and the 18th Madras Native Infantry. A single six-pounder was attached to it. These troops advanced in high spirits. They soon perceived that they had the *élite* of the Burmans to encounter. The sable line, which they were approaching, was made up of athletic and bold-looking soldiers. They wore scarlet turbans of uniform shape, their necks and breasts were decorated with glittering chains, and collars; and they carried, besides the musquet, spears of unusual length, cased and tipped with silver, and ornamented with bannerols, and waving horse-hair. Major Sale caused a few discharges of shrapnel to be directed with great effect against this line of chosen warriors. He then deployed, and regardless of the disparity of numbers, attacked, and overthrew them. The Burmans retired, but they retired slowly, casting behind them stubborn and dogged looks at their rallying every moment, and finally reforming the mounds behind them. Major Sale redoubled his efforts to complete his manœuvre. Headvanced; and though resolutely opposed in front and flank, pierced the second line of the Burmans, threw back their left in confusion on the masses behind the lakes, and mastered the unfinished intrenchments. Then this little band

loaded with every species of barbaric trophy operated a deliberate retreat in the face of the Barbarian army back to the lines, under the observation of which it had performed this spirited exploit.

IV.

The sun of the 1st was not to descend without another interruption of the activity, and boldness, with which the Burmans pursued the work of intrenchment. Towards the decline of day their skirmishers in the woods eastward of Shwè-da-gong had kept up a fire galling, and incessant upon the parapet manned by the British.

It was deemed expedient to repress them in this quarter by a slight rebuke. At night-fall two companies of the 38th led by Captain Piper, (who had before led many such attacks, and with uniform gallantry and success) crossed the ravine, broke in a moment amongst the astonished Burman pioneers, dispersed their *tirailleurs*, and supporting parties, and carried off in their retreat jinjals, and intrenching tools.

A similar scene was enacted on the morning of the 2d. The Burmans had not slumbered during the night on the hillocks to the northward of the pagoda. The rising sun discovered them intrenched to their beards on this ele-

vated ground, and busily employed in running their approaches down into the ravine. Captain Wilson, H. M.'s 38th, was ordered to attack the hills. He precipitated his companies upon them, routed the Burmans, drove them from work to work, took from them arms, and standards, and then retired within the walls of the sacred fortress.

During the remainder of the 2d, on the 3d, on the 4th, and on the morning of the 5th; the enemy continued to invest, and harass by attacks, to extend his intrenchments; and bring up into battery his puny artillery. Neither did he cease, with redoubled numbers, and renewed violence to assault by night and day the field-work at Kemmendine. The Barbarians never lost sight of this object. Affecting to despise a native garrison they rushed towards its parapet, with scaling ladders prepared, and with loud shouts expressive of indignation, hatred, and scorn. If the troops within had wavered, nothing could have saved them from instant destruction. Every soldier would have been slaughtered on the spot, excepting such as might have been reserved for the barbarities of Kaiklo.

The Sipahes of the 26th, acquired a lasting reputation by their firmness at Kemmendine. Major Yates, who commanded them, sent for;

and received frequent supplies of ammunition; but never talked, or dreamt, of reinforcement, surrender, or retreat. The only luxury of a native soldier, is a meal sober, and simple in the extreme, but prepared with his own hands, or those of his brethren in *caste*; and finished in retirement, and without interruption. At Kemmendine the Sipahes characteristically complained, "these Burmans do not give us time to cook our rice." But hungry, and watching, pent in, outnumbered, and wearied, by night and day, they repelled the assailants with slaughter.

V.

From the first appearance of the armament of Bandoola the few inhabitants of Rangoon had been filled with a deadly alarm. This had mounted to despair, when they beheld the town environed by the legions of their terrible compatriot. The camp-followers of the army partook in no inconsiderable degree of these terrors. Their imaginations were haunted by the cruelties of Kaiklo, and the sweeping disaster of Ramoo.

But even amongst those, whose courage, and intelligence placed them high above such unworthy sensations, there were many, who could not comprehend the deliberate policy of their commander. They murmured at delays,

which they considered pregnant with multiplied dangers. "What," said they, "has our General forgotten the lesson of Ramoo? Does he mean to permit the Barbarians to mature without serious interruption their plans of destruction: to interpose in his rear, as well as jeopardise his flanks: to destroy his only means of retreat by involving the town, and fleet in one general conflagration. Will he wait until he is finally compelled to accept battle at disadvantage, cramped within a space so narrow, that even our battalions, thinned by the famine and sickness entailed on us by six month's lingering in this pest-house, shall not find room to deploy to defend themselves. Why are we not led to an attack, of which each day's delay will multiply tenfold the difficulties?"

When any portion of this ill-judged impatience assumed the shape of personal suggestion to this General; when manœuvres were discussed, which however brilliant, would have ruined by precipitation the plan of a complete, and general overthrow of the whole Barbarian force fully deployed, he concealed his vexation, and only said, "Ah! do you not see? They are not yet ripe." This hint ought to have sufficed to silence all objections.

But on the evening of the 4th, the General himself professed to allow, that on his left the

dispositions of the enemy were fully matured. He had brought forward the whole of his guns, finished his intrenchments, and batteries, and fully manned them in that quarter. General Campbell seemed to admit (but it was thought unwillingly) that it was time to crush him there. Orders were issued, which were to be carried into effect the next morning.

The Puzzendoung Creek subtended the whole rear of the enemy's left. Captain Chads was to lead the boats of the Squadron, and Flotilla up this stream, and cannonade the centre of that wing. Two columns were to descend from the heights the first to pierce the centre, the second to turn the left of its alignment. Major Sale was placed in command of the former; the latter was to be led by Major Walker, an experienced, and distinguished officer of the Madras Army. The first amounted to eleven hundred men, in the proportion of six hundred European, to five hundred native soldiers. Every one of the European corps furnished its contingent to this body. The second consisted of two hundred men from H. M's. 89th, and the Madras European Regiment; and four hundred Sipahces from the 7th, 18th and 34th Madras Native Infantry.

A single half squadron of the Body Guard of the Governor General had just landed from their ships; the first cavalry sent to draw sabre

against Ava. Their horses were cramped, and in poor condition after a protracted voyage. But the troopers were full of alacrity; and the Cassay horse were in the field. This was no time to neglect the aid of such a reinforcement. The half-squadron was directed to follow the movement of Major Sale's column.

Day had scarcely broke on the 5th, when an opening cannonade was heard, and curling clouds of smoke began to wreath and rise above the mists of the season, in the valley at the foot of the British position. *Mc'Creagh's Pagoda*, with its walled inclosure, and salient mound became the grand point of observation.

As the morning cleared the flash of the nine-pounders, the shells bursting from the mortar-vessel, and the Burman wing in full alert proved that the Flotilla had not missed its appointment. Its fire took the Barbarians in flank, and in reverse, and fulfilled the purpose of commanding their attention. But they were too well intrenched to suffer severely.

Meanwhile the columns stood formed, and impatient to attack. A flight of rockets, and the display of a flag from *Mc'Creagh's temple* gave Captain Chads the signal to suspend his fire. The troops were put in motion. Every eye was bent towards them from the pagoda, and hills, as they began to wind into the plains.

The slopes near Puzzendoung seemed alive with sable figures. The Barbarian ranks were rapidly condensing. Bodies were seen to move up to strengthen weak points; and fresh masses were hurried up from the rearward trenches to the sound of gongs, and barbarous war-drums to stop the inundation, which was rushing towards their foremost line.

Major Walker's column had the shorter space to traverse. It came quickly in contact with the enemy. It debouched a little beyond the picquet in the "*White convent*." A shower of musket, and jinjal balls instantly fell amongst the leading sections. The Burmans raised a loud shout, as they marked the effect of their fire. On the side of the British the silence of a rapid, and steady advance was only broken by their leader, who moving to the front gave the order to form line. Major Walker had suffered dreadfully from sickness during the campaign of the monsoon. He had been compelled to seek change of air at Madras, and had returned in defiance of the counsels of all, but his own firm mind. His countenance was yet pale, and emaciated, his form attenuated, frail and tottering. But all this was lost in the energy of the moment. His animating gestures, and established reputation gave confidence to the Native soldiers. His little column deployed. Major

Walker advanced before the line, and pronounced the word "Forward!" It was his last. A jinjal ball entered his temples, and he fell lifeless. Major Wahab of the 3d took the command. The line pressed on over the body of their fallen leader, threw the Barbarians into confusion by a steady volley, charged, and carried the intrenchments.

The spectators from the heights, the lines, and the pagodas hailed with exultation this success on the right. They saw the Burman left completely turned, their whole wing already alarmed at the jeopardy, in which this manœuvre placed them, and the expectation of the impending attack of a yet heavier column upon a decisive point. They had hopes of seeing it crushed between two bodies, whose lines of advance would soon be concentric. But they remarked at the same time that the progress of Major Sale was retarded by the nature of the ground. They began to fear that the Burmans would escape the meditated blow by abandoning their position.

But the natural fortitude of the Barbarians soon relieved them from those apprehensions. The right, and centre of the line still maintained the national character, and shewed an undaunted, and imposing front.

Major Sale's troops had found it impossible to make their way rapidly through ravines,

and wooded valleys, without sacrificing something of that compact order, which affords the surest earnest of victory. Their artillery embarrassed them in their advance; and they had found the *bund*, or restraining mound of the lake, which they had to skirt, cut through by the enemy's intrenchments.

Thus they were delayed some precious minutes. But soon the head of the column was seen emerging from the thicket. In a moment after the flash, and smoke of the destructive fire of the British fixed the attention. In another the glitter of polished steel glanced upon the sight, and their victorious shout was heard as they rushed upon the Burmans, and once more wrested from them this position.

The Body Guard completed the route by riding down in a swarm the scattered Barbarians on ground so broken as to defy the regular formation of a squadron.

But the Burman chiefs made one effort more to regain the day. They seized the moment, when the British were thrown into loose order by an advance of exertion succeeded by a rapid charge over intrenchments choked with dead, and dying, and abandoned guns, and scattered ensigns. The Cassay horse were ordered forward. They advanced in heavy squadrons, turbaned, plumed, and with glittering spears. But

the headlong flight of the Barbarians on foot, directly across their line of march, confused, and impeded them. The British found time to close their files, reform, and prepare to assume a shape, against which their mounted enemies might have wasted their exertions for a century. The Burmans saw that it was vain to struggle. The spasm of panic had seized on the hearts of their levies. Burman, and Cassayer, horse, and foot, were carried away in the full tide of confusion, and dismay.

There stands on the rising ground yet furrowed by the Burman trenches, not far from the margin of the lake, at a point, which defines the right of the defeated wing of the Burmans, a mango tree, of peculiar foliage. It became a kind of monument of this day's success. It received, still keeps, and probably will retain, so long as the axe, and natural decay shall spare it, and Pegue be an object of interest to British India, and to Britain, the name of "*Sale's tree*."

There was now no thought of abandoning a line, which had been a second time, so brilliantly penetrated. The troops under Major Sale encamped on the ground, which they had won, occupying it in observation of the enemy's left-centre, and rear.

VI.

* Still the Burmans clung to the hope of eventual triumph. They were worsted, but not crushed. Their centre in front of the sacred edifice was yet intact. They still held Dalla, still besieged Kemmendine, still invested Shwè-da-gong. They still thought that a fortunate event, or the aid of their divinity might give them possession of either of the two last ; and then that the weight of their masses might effect the rest. They exaggerated the losses of the British ; they calculated on the effect, which a protracted resistance, and repeated attacks might ultimately produce on their harrassed frames. Thus they reasoned themselves into hope. “ Besides,” said Bandoola, even after his Barbarians had been beaten by them in the proportion of one to five, and one to ten, “ after all, the English are not soldiers : I will carry their General to Ava ! ”

But though that General was not quite ready to proceed to Ava, either under such illustrious auspices, or otherwise, he was perfectly prepared to play through the game, which he had so successfully begun against the beleaguers of Rangoon. Every hour confirmed him in his resolve not to be surprised into premature demonstrations by doubts within his camp, or menaces, and insult, from without.

From the morning, on which the Burmans had assumed their imposing attitude in front of Rangoon, fifty pieces of British Artillery had been disposed on the most commanding points of the position. Every body of the enemy, which presented itself within range, was honored with a salutation from the batteries. Wherever the direction of the trenches, could be plausibly guessed at, the mortars and howitzers plied their occupants unsparingly with shells.

Throughout the war Burman prisoners affected to speak slightly of the effect of the British ordnance. They averred that when they were intrenched, the simple device of drawing a plank over their heads as they crouched down in the cavity effectually protected them against shells. They added that they soon became sufficiently alert, and well acquainted with the range of round shot to shun it in the skirmish. But notwithstanding these pretences it is certain that they suffered a terrible loss from the fire of the guns on the position at Rangoon.

From the evening of the 5th, however, they were relieved from all such annoyance. The fire of the British was wholly suspended. The posture of Major Sale's detachment fully held the enemy in check in that direction. If he ventured to renew his efforts on that line he must necessarily bring on an action in the plains.

In the prosecution of his direct attempts to reduce the Great Pagoda the British Commander resolved not to interrupt him by a single shot.

Meanwhile frequent attacks attested that the hope of winning Kemmending by storm was not abandoned. The war-boats too were still active, although many of them had been boarded and captured, by the sailors of the Flotilla. Neither were the Burmans less keenly bent, than before, on depriving of their means of retreat, by the conflagration of their ships, those invaders, for whom improving on the antique proverb, they ought rather to have built a bridge *of the rubies of Momeit*. They still, from time to time, launched fire-rafts upon the stream, which the rapid ebb carried with frightful violence into the midst of the fleet. They now better understood the art of constructing these floating combustibles. Immense piles of well-dried wood intermixed with cotton, were firmly compacted, and profusely fed with petroleum. These masses proceeded on their malignant voyage spreading around them a shower of sparks, and flakes of flame, and illumining with their blaze in the darkest hour of night the town, the two hostile positions, the river, and the more distant forests. They were dreaded as unwelcome visitors, and worse neighbours by numerous transports laden with provisions, and

ammunition, or crowded with sick, and wounded. It demanded all the dexterity, and boldness, of British seamen to avoid the contact of these moving volcanos.

VII.

The *denouement* was near. On the 6th Bandoolla had rallied his fugitives, and concentrated his forces for a decisive effort to regain the great Fane of Gautuma. He had pushed his trenches to within a few yards of its walls, his guns were all brought up, his works were crowded with armed men, and if his enemy might judge from their shouts, vaunts, and menaces, the hope of victory had remounted to its height after defeat.

Morning dawned on the 7th. The British had anticipated their adversary. Every gun, that could be brought to bear upon them, opened with an ominous roar upon the Burman woods, and trenches. The cannonade continued until noon. Then at once five columns moved upon five several points of their convex position. Major Sale had broken up his camp at an earlier hour, and was already threatening their communications.

At once their whole array was overthrown. In no one point could they resist the British assault. At once their hills were wrested from

them, their woods penetrated, cleared, traversed, at once their whole *materiel* became the trophies of their enemy. The British front was thus ridded of its foes, the town of Rangoón was thus relieved from its terrors, which up to this moment had experienced no abatement. Ignorant unbelief had seen no hope of succor in previous successes.

The projects of the enemy on Kemmendine were abandoned. It only remained to shew him that he was not safer on the right than on the left bank of the river. It is probable that a portion of his forces were withdrawn from Dalla after the events of the 7th. But on the evening of the 8th, a corps yet remained intrenched on the site of the ruined town. A column of detachments was placed under the command of Major Ferrier, of the 43d Madras N. I. He crossed the river by moonlight, and carried the enemy's trenches. A reinforcement was sent over on the morning of the 9th, under Lieut. Colonel Parlby, of the 30th, who then commanded the whole. He drove the Burmans from the thickets, into which they had retired. The enemy scattered in detached masses over the extensive plains of Dalla preserved a distance, which testified evidently his unwillingness to try his fortune again. In this quarter too all was finished.

An attempt has been made to throw an air of ridicule over the successes of the first ten days of December, because in his public dispatches the British General permitted it to be announced, that "thus," (by the defeat of the 7th,) "vanished the hopes of Ava." Now the hopes of success in this unequal contest did not in fact vanish from the minds of the arrogant Government of this Ava, until the British army was at the gates of its capital, little less than fifteen months after the event thus hailed as a final triumph. But only eight days afterwards the British had a severer action, than any yet recorded, to fight with the very army, which this premature strain of exultation taught the Indian public to contemplate as annihilated.

Military critics too did not fail to remark that whilst the official narrative declared the capture of "two hundred and fifty pieces of ordnance," the departmental return betrayed the secret that of these, thirteen only were of such calibre, as to entitle them to a place in a descriptive estimate of English field artillery. The rest were wall-guns, jinjals, or swivels.

But, in truth, the capture measured with a just reference to the state of equipment of a poor, ~~semi~~ barbarous nation was enormous. Besides, it is not the weight of metal, but the pledge of victory, which the successful soldier regards

in the seizure of such trophies. The fact of an Army being unable to carry off its cannon is received in all considerations on war as a demonstration of most egregious defeat. The more paltry, and portable then the *materiel* of the Barbarians, the surer the proof of their discomfiture.

But, at the worst, a turgid phrase, a premature flourish, an inflated title—all these belong to the division of rhetorical not military errors. They will not hereafter render the candid historian insensible to the affecting picture, which the dispatch of the 10th presents, of fifty thousand barbarians resisted in an extensive position by three thousand sickly soldiers.

It was not owing to any fault originating with the British Commander, that from May, 1824, to February, 1825, his Army was a corps of observation in the strictest sense, because it lacked the faculty of loco-motion; but it will redound to his lasting praise, that from the only ground, which unlucky combinations had left within his reach, neither famine, nor sickness, nor the keen hostility of a deluded population, nor the united levies of an empire could dislodge him.

VIII.

“The hopes of Ava” then “had” not yet “vanished.” The leader of its levies had not even yet abandoned the hope of triumphing in front of Rangoon. It would seem as if the calculating powers of the invaders were cramped by their long confinement within a circumference of three leagues. No sooner had the Barbarians retired from their line of investment, than they were regarded as an enemy, not only worsted, or beaten, but annihilated. They were no longer to be descried through the telescope: therefore they did not exist. This seemed to be the reasoning of the period. But the conclusion was hasty. Bandoola had not retreated more than two miles from the great Pagoda.

The *debris* of his army had rallied at that distance in a position on a rising ground adjacent to the village of Kokaing. Here too he is stated to have received reinforcements from the Upper Provinces. But the re-assembled fugitives, and the reserves which had never been engaged, in themselves formed a considerable force. The ground too, on which they were concentrated had been daily strengthened with new field works, from the moment that the Head Quarters of Bandoola had approached Rangoon.

Kokaing had been the grand reserve, de-

pôt, and citadel of the Barbarians during the whole period of the investment.

If the British had been in possession of such information and succors as would have enabled them to follow their blow of the 9th; it is not to be supposed that the Barbarians could have reformed upon a point so near Rangoon. But they were allowed the interval between that day and the 15th to recover from their panic, to bring up their reserves, to array their reinforcements, and to add field-work to field-work. If the Burmans are not a scientific, neither are they an indolent enemy. They have ever shewn that they know the value of activity in war. Reinforcements, and supplies reached the British by sea on every day of the first fortnight in December. The weather was beautiful, the sick were rapidly recovering. Every thing combined to inspire confidence. Yet the British remained inactive. The report of the existence of a formidable force at Kokaing was at first received with a smile of incredulity at their Head Quarters. "It could not be—the Burmans were doubtless in full retreat to the Upper Provinces." "But they had been seen distinctly in position. The outline of a vast intrenchment could be traced by climbing fifty feet up the side of the great monument." "Impossible! Or if so, the work was probably abandoned, or at the most

“occupied by a rear-guard.” Now at this very moment Bandoola at the head of twenty-five thousand Burmans lay within his fortifications at this very Kokaing, which was thus dimly spoken of.

Between the 10th and 14th, intelligence was received, which compelled belief. Bandoola had not only rallied his legions, on a point, from which they still beheld full in view the gilded spire of Shwé-da-gong, the object of all their efforts, but gaining courage from the apparent languor of his enemies, he actually meditated another attack on their position. On the night of the 12th, Rangoon was involved in a general conflagration. Incendiaries succeeded in setting it in a blaze at several points at once. Half of the town was reduced to ashes. The most valuable of the stores of the British were saved only by incredible exertions on the part of the troops. Further reports of the strength, views, and machinations of the enemy reached the British General. He now saw that a fresh effort was demanded from him. He resolved to anticipate, and dislodge Bandoola; and it was never his habit to let his resolutions cool.

A ravine has been before described, which separated the intrenchments of the Burman left, and left centre from the glacis of Shwé-da-gong. He who descends into this valley, may,

by following its windings, make his way with tolerable ease to the rear of the position, which the enemy held from the 1st to the 9th. He will find himself soon in a defile, narrow, and wooded. Pursuing his course through this for two short miles he may halt on the commanding edge of an extensive swamp. Beyond this last is an elongated height, which slopes off gently towards the North and South. It presents to an observer from the mouth of the defile the form of the concave side of a crescent. To the eastward of this rising ground are the huts, which constitute the hamlet of Kokaing. Its crests and slopes are now covered with brushwood; but still the stranger may trace amongst it the curtains, and ravelins, and square bastions, the fossè, and blackened abbatis of the Burman works. On the day, to which the narrative advances, this hill was covered by the whole force, which had survived the recent disasters.

The position was well chosen. Its whole western front was covered by a morass of fifteen hundred yards. The flanking works, which defended it, were disposed with a skill, which astonished the British. The main stockades, and the outworks were alike strengthened by a deep, and broad, external ditch. The marsh, on the face of which the floods of the season had not yet subsided, was passable only

by narrow gorges, and a broken bridge. Masses of irregular infantry were posted in the adjacent forest supported by the Cassay horse. They were prepared to seize any favorable opportunity of falling upon the flanks, and rear of assailing columns. Such was the Burman position of Kokaing, when their original plan of hazarding another attack on Rangoon, was disconcerted by the sudden determination of Sir Archibald Campbell to make the first move.

IX.

The attack of a field-work by the perpendicular advance of columns is usually esteemed a very simple operation. Occasionally however circumstances of time, ground, and distance combine to involve it in difficulty. If the assault be directed upon a single point, the enemy is enabled to meet it with his whole force. The tactician therefore devises to alarm them by a simultaneous effort on an adjacent portion of the defended circumference. This is the safest, and commonly the most successful mode. But in warring against troops indifferently trained and armed in a close country, it is subject to the objection of permitting them to escape by the opposite faces of the work. Feints and false attacks by columns, which are a third device,

create little sensation, if they are slight, and distant, and are as costly as real attacks if long persisted in. The loss sustained in a real attack occurs chiefly between the scarp of the place, and a point one hundred yards distant from it. Columns, which do not pass this point, do not cause much uneasiness to men, accustomed to such defences. If they advance beyond it steadily, they have achieved nearly all. It is time to convert their false, into a real, attack.

But if the assailing General aims at intercepting the retreat of the defensive party, he detaches a force to the rear of the work, a manœuvre, which is evidently analogous to a wide movement to outflank an enemy in position, and which involves the same danger, namely, that the reserves of the enemy assuming the initiative should fall with advantage upon the turning corps whilst in march. Here a delicate discretion is demanded to apportion distances. The movement must be wide enough to endanger the communications of the enemy without affording him too fair a chance of interposing between the body employed in the *detour*, and the columns of the main attack. When this arrangement is adopted, the opening fire of the troops, which have performed the circuit, is frequently made the signal for the grand assault, which thus becomes closely consecutive.

The hazards of the movement upon the enemy's rear are abundantly multiplied, when the line of march of the column runs through a country in itself a military obstacle, or has to be directed by a route imperfectly reconnoitred, or wholly untried.

The best rule seems therefore to be, to approach as nearly as possible to the point of attack with the whole force in junction so that when the turning column has diverged, the heads of all the columns may be found on an imaginary curve; the radius of which will not much exceed that of the circumference of the works. This principle is safe, but the nature of the ground may render a departure from it inevitable, and here, as in all such cases, military tact interposes to balance difficulties.

General Campbell advanced against Kokaing upon two lines of manœuvre. Three columns moved by the narrow valley—the shortest route, which they could choose. They were thus conducted upon the edge of the morass to act contiguously against the western face of the enemy's camp. These columns were under the personal direction of the General; Colonel Miles was second in command. Heads of columns were formed of British soldiers of the 38th, 41st, and 89th. Native corps formed the supports, and reserves.

The fourth column took an exterior, and circuitous line of advance. It passed down beyond the larger lake in front of the British position, cut the abandoned Burman line at an oblique angle, and traversing a close, and wooded country, debouched at last near the hamlet of Kokaing, against the southern face of the hostile intrenchments, near its great salient angle. This line of march exceeded four miles, that of the other columns fell short of two.

On the 13th, Colonel Willoughby Cotton had landed from his transport. As he came direct from the Supreme Presidency with the commission of Brigadier General, he assumed at once the command of the troops from Bengal. He had arrived just in time for this contest. A column was formed for him of the King's 13th; and the 34th Madras Native Infantry. To this was added the single squadron of the Body Guard. The ground afforded occasional opportunities for the movements of a small body of cavalry; and it was not unreasonable to expect that General Cotton might be attacked on the march; whilst the nature of the manœuvre, which he had to execute, threw him wholly out of communication with the rest of the force.

General Campbell speedily approached the morass, which protected the Burmans. Thickets, and small pagodas concealed the amount of

his forces, and facilitated a reconnoissance. He took a calm view of their works—and paused. He almost doubted for a moment the wisdom of the resolve, which had brought him to attack such a force, so intrenched, with divisions so thinned, and weakened. He could not fail to reflect that the column in the enemy's rear was weaker still. It is in the nature of these wide movements completely to commit the leader, who plans them. But they offer a tempting advantage. If his own columns were repulsed, General Cotton's would be according to every principle in jeopardy; but it was a consolation to reflect, that the corps, which led them, had never been checked in Ava, against any odds, or under any circumstances. A week since these Barbarians had been beaten by these same battalions. But at that time the former were spread along a concave line of seven miles. Now they were concentrated upon a single point;—and that point—the British officers were astonished at the height, width, and judicious construction of the works, which strengthened it. The crisis of the hour could not be deemed free from perplexity, and doubt.

The reconnoissance was completed. The light guns were brought up. Three columns of attack were formed to rush upon three salient points. The General, having dispatched an officer to

bring up from Shwè-da-gong every soldier, that could be spared from its defence, listened with intense anxiety for the fire of the co-operating force.

General Cotton had pursued his march upwards of three miles without interruption from the enemy. Knowing that the success of the main attack must be materially influenced by his prompt co-operation, he had pressed the advance of his troops. The 13th Light Infantry could only furnish two hundred and twenty men for this day's service. Of these scarcely one soldier had escaped without his share of sickness during the months of rain. Several of the officers had roused themselves from a couch of suffering to take part in the enterprise of the day. Troops, who in their lines could barely support themselves under the weight of their arms and accoutrements, were exhausted by passing through wooded vallies at an accelerated pace. The column was already harrassed, and panting, when it became evident that the thickets before it were occupied. Jinjal balls flew among the advanced by Major Thornhill. He drove in the outpost opposed to him. General Cotton felt assured from the manner of its retreat that the Burman intrenchments were not far distant. Advancing with his staff to reconnoitre he saw on his right the huts of Kokaing. He posted his

cavalry behind the hamlet. In a moment after he beheld full before him the outworks of the enemy.

The Barbarians hailed the advance of their foe with a loud shout of defiance. They were evidently inspired with a full confidence in their numbers, and formidable defences. They opened a destructive fire upon the British van-guard. The signal guns were fired by the Artillery. They were heard and answered on the opposite side of the works.

The scene became highly animating. Major Sale formed his weak battalion, and placed himself at its head. But as he advanced, a ball from the works struck him obliquely on the hinder part of the head. He fell to the ground stunned, and bleeding. General Cotton pointed to the work, "There is the stockade—at it." The 13th rushed on. But in an instant they perceived that the defences were prolonged far on either flank of their small column. They became the central object of a heavy, converging fire. Officers, and men began to fall, or retire wounded to the rear. The limbs of the soldiers weakened by sickness tottered under them, as they shook off their fatigue, to press forward, cheer, fire, and scramble over the intrenchments. Then—when the first work was won, it was only an outwork. A new fire was opened from another

parapet, another trench had to be crossed, another abatis to be struggled through. Fresh foes presented themselves in increased numbers, with the same sustained fire, and menacing shouts, and the same determination to support themselves in this second hold. The resolution of the 13th was severely tried. Major Dennie had promptly supplied the place of their wounded leader, but the fire of the Burmans appeared to issue from every side, and in every direction. For a moment the men felt themselves overtasked.

But aid was not far distant. General Campbell had heard with delight the firing to the eastward. He was assured that his troops had at length fairly gained the rear of the Burmans. He was left in ignorance however of the obstacles, which presented themselves to the column of the reverse movement. Fully persuaded at the same time that those, which he beheld before him, were of no trifling order, he waited for some decisive demonstrations of the progress of the affair.

In the absence of other indications the practised ear of the soldier seeks for his proofs in the sound of musquetry. The difference of arms and ammunition created in this war a marked distinction between the unseen fire of barbarous levies, and that of the troops of a state, which has carried mechanical invention to its highest

pitch. The cessation, and renewal, the advancing, and retiring of the sound, of rapid fire becomes in all combats a criterion of the success of bodies masked from the view by hills, forests, or redoubts.

It was soon evident that General Cotton had met with a determined enemy. Every moment the firing thickened. The stir, bustle, and uproar in the Barbarian camp proved that their attention was attracted towards a point in the reverse of their works. Then at once General Campbell caused his light artillery to open, closed up his columns, and dispatched his last orders to their Commanders. All stood ready for a general attack.

The situation of General Cotton's column was at this moment critical. The troops had not lost heart: but they saw their numbers thinned, and felt their strength exhausted, at the juncture, at which fresh efforts were demanded from them on every side. The leader of the 13th was bleeding on the ground, some of the boldest soldiers had fallen, the column, which had for some time preserved its compact order, was at length broken into small bodies obeying only the impulse of individual courage. In the hottest part of the conflict, the Cassay horse advanced from the forests, and menaced the rear of the British. The Body Guard charged,

and overthrew them. But several of the Hindoostanee troopers, and an officer, who had volunteered his services with the squadron for the day, pursuing their advantage too far, were entangled in the enemy's abbatiss, and killed. The charge however saved the column. This danger over, Major Dennie reformed his wearied, sinking men for another attack, happily the last, which was required of them. These assaults are spread through many lines in the narrative; but in the action they succeeded each other with a rapidity, which left no breathing time to those engaged.

The British were again successful. The 13th found themselves at length in the body of the place: All was confusion and dismay within. For, during the last moments of this struggle, the combined assault had been made from the westward.

It has been seen that on the reverse face the strife was sanguinary, and protracted. But the concerted advance of three steady, well formed columns, which had found ample time to measure the ground with the eye, and to scan, and anticipate difficulties, could not be resisted by an enemy already turned, and compromised. The charge of the 89th struck the most experienced officers, as being the most compact advance, which had been executed during the

war. The 38th enjoyed their usual good fortune. As it had happened to other corps in the first campaign the tide of fugitives from the works stormed by the 13th was driven full upon their bayonets. The 38th understand the use of that weapon. The Adjutant General of the Army had ridden with instructions to this column at the moment of its advance. He entered the work with its leading files.

It will not be doubted that in a Barbarian intrenchment penetrated at once by four columns of infantry the slaughter was immense. Every gun, every standard was captured. The note of triumph ought not to have been sounded until this moment. "The hopes of Ava" had not indeed even yet "vanished," but the Burman army of Rangoon was crushed at Kokaing. Henceforth Rangoon was as secure as Calcutta.

Bandoola had left the camp before the first shot was fired, after an harangue to his troops, which seems to have produced an effect in spite of the vice of example. They had compelled their foes to purchase their success dearly. The 13th lost sixty killed and wounded, seven of whom were officers, out of two hundred and twenty that had taken the field. Three officers of this corps were killed in the assault. Amongst them was a young, and promising soldier, over whom his comrades shed tears.

X.

The time is approaching when the British are to be seen on the advance. Bandoola could not reform his grand Army of Barbarians at a nearer point than Donabyoo. But the labors of organization had to be applied in every department before the force at Rangoon could be converted into a moveable body.

Its magazines were still at Calcutta, and Madras. It had no hold on the resources of the invaded country. Its bullocks, elephants, *coolies*, salted rations, flour, biscuit, arrack, a portion of its rice, its spices, had all to be transported by sea. An Army cannot move in India without all of these in modified proportions. As yet, the country of the Burmans supplied nothing but coarse rice, and small ponies. This army had spent the interval between May and November in discovering the nature of its wants by experience, that between November and February was to be consumed in supplying them.

The reinforcements sent to Rangoon in the first months of 1825 served to feed the waste of the Monsoon. They did not swell the force far above its original strength. But they were of a valuable kind. From Bengal came two corps, which excited great hopes, and never disappointed them—the Rocket Troop under Cap-

tain Graham, and a Brigade of Horse Artillery under Captain Lumsden. The arrival of H. M's. 47th furnished from six to seven hundred more British bayonets. The troops from Madras received definitively soon after the day of Kokainga new commander in the person of Brigadier General Willoughby Cotton. Military opinion, without the contradiction of a single dissentient voice has pronounced this the most popular, and fortunate appointment since the meeting at the Andamans. This contingent now consisted of Engineers, and Artillery, of three Regiments of British Infantry, H. M's. 41st, 89th, and the 1st Madras European Regiment, of eleven battalions of Native Infantry the 3d, 7th, 9th, 12th, 18th, 22d, 26th, 28th, 30th, 34th, and 43d. From Bengal there were likewise Engineers and Artillery; the detachment of the Body Guard, and three British battalions, H. M's. 13th, 38th, and 47th. The Royals made a fourth in February. The third month always thinned the ranks of a regiment in Ava. From this period the average of European Regiments may be taken at two hundred and fifty soldiers, of Native at three hundred and fifty.

The climate became daily more pleasant, and healthful. Fresh beef, from the plains of Bengal, and Bahar, and of the Carnatic, arrack, and tolerable biscuit now formed the rations of

the European. Rice for the native soldiers was abundant.

The preparations for advance proceeded. They were not interrupted by the only military operation, which was undertaken in January. Early in the campaign of the Monsoon the enemy had been driven from the town, and Pagoda, and the site of the antient factory of Syriam. After the defeat of Bandoola at Kokaing these were re-occupied by a portion of the levies of the district. They uncovered the old walls and formed a work.

On the eve of his advance General Campbell could not consent to leave a hostile force in observation on his flank, and on the left bank of a river, which unites with that of Rangoon, at so short a distance from the town. Colonel Elrington, and the 47th were ordered to dislodge the enemy. The Flotilla transported them to the spot. The column lost some time in crossing a difficult stream. Casualties occurred during the delay. An Ensign, and some Privates fell, two Officers were wounded. The obstacle was passed, and the attacks every where successful. The Engineers blew up the substructions, of which the enemy had availed himself.

A division of troops was at this time employed in the invasion of Arracan. General Morrison met with difficulties on his route, which he

surmounted with remarkable zeal, and perseverance. Public attention was roused by the developement of this new combination. Yet the tone of feeling was despondent. It is not possible to compliment the little body, which constitutes the British community in India, on the discernment, or sagacity of its military and political criticisms. It forgot entirely that there is no record in history of a poor, and semi-barbarous people like the Burmans resisting with ultimate success the efforts of a state so far its superior in arts and resources, as that, which Great Britain has built up in Asia. The object of General Morrison's march was Sembewghewn a town in the valley of the Irawaddy, directly opposite to Pakangyay, which is thirty-six marches in advance of Prome. Breaking up from the Chit-tagong frontier he advanced along the coast, his right to the sea, his left towards the mountain chain of Arracan. He crossed the Naaf, the Myoo, and the Koladaing, and directed his advance upon the city of Arracan. From this his route to Sembewghewn formed an acute angle with his line of march to the provincial capital, cutting the Arracan mountains obliquely. Thus were the two armies to combine upon Ava. General Morrison's force having moved from a point not too remote from the Presidency, and from a base within the Company's territory,

was amply supplied with means of transport. In this respect it formed a striking contrast to that Army, to the adventures of which the narrative now reverts.

In the campaigns, which broke the Moosulman rule in the Mysore, in those, which curbed the power of the Murhuttas, or in that, which crushed their last confederation, the European soldier never knew the weight of his knapsack. Cattle provided by the Commissariat carried for him all but his arms, and a limited proportion of ammunition. The practical officer knows the value of such aid. But this could never be afforded out of the scanty resources of the force, which now essayed to march from Rangoon. Nightly bivouacs, except in remarkably wooded or swampy positions are, probably less baneful in the South of Asia than in three-fourths of Europe ; but in the meridian sun the British battalions encounter an enemy inexpressibly more terrible than the wily Murhutta, the hardy Goorkha, the chivalrous Mooghul, or the dogged Burman. The heat is a lesser evil : it is in the insufferable glare, which searches every organ, blinding, bewildering, inflaming, maddening all, who confront it, that the European recognises his bane. Hence the necessity for tents, which encumber on the route, and betray the dispositions on the eve of battle, which

must be hazarded, or abandoned on an emergency, and the loss of which, is the loss of health, and life. In India these are usually of a large, and commodious size. The regiments at Rangoon were compelled to content themselves with *pals*, small triangular elevations of canvass, the ends of which resemble the gables of a diminutive dwelling, and which whilst they protect from the sun, also exclude the air. A British officer of the lower grades commonly campaigns in Europe furnished with a single carriage animal, which is loaded with two small portmanteaus, and the apparatus of the table. Against Seringapatam, or to the fields of Laswarree or Mahidpoor a subaltern advanced *en prince* with an equipage of eight bullocks, or four camels. A single bullock was allotted to each officer of the Army at Rangoon. When this was arranged, few remained for consumption. It was necessary to look to the river for the means of transporting the biscuit, arrack, and rice. It was necessary also to transport by water the battering train, and a prodigious quantity of ordnance stores. The maritime means were defective. The Flotilla, even with the addition of two divisions from Arracan, did not exceed thirty sail. The straw-thatched vessels of the country were either small or unmanageable. It was necessary to put in requisition all the boats of the Naval

squadron; and after all to chuse between leaving at least seven hundred men above the proportionate garrison in Rangoon, and causing them to advance by water.

Intimations of these difficulties reached the seats of Government. "The advance of Sir Archibald is impracticable," said the alarmists. "He will march," said others, "but his means of transport will fail him. His army will founder in the forests of Sarawah."

The officers of all departments at Rangoon were full of zeal, but their efforts were really cramped by deficiencies of every sort. Thus pressed on all sides they sometimes gave way to impatience, and entertained desponding views. As happens in all such cases they besieged their General with representations. When the storm of impossibilities was at its height he said to them abruptly, "Tell me, can you give me provisions for three months, and means of transport for three hundred infantry?" "Certainly." "Then I march to Ava."

There were two more grievous wants in this army, besides those already adverted to. It had no pontoons, and only one squadron of cavalry. The only pontoon train in India had been sent to General Morrison. This defect was supplied on the great river by the aid of the Flotilla. But without cavalry there can be no recon-

noissance, convoys cannot be seized, victories improved. For these purposes this Army, which was destined to advance through an unknown country, which had the most urgent reasons to desire to intercept the grain, and cattle of the land, which was opposed to an enemy, whose flight was a thousand times more embarrassing than his resistance, had one squadron only. But stranger still there were officers of experience in this Army, who seriously maintained that it had of this arm already too many, that cavalry were useless in a land of swamps and jungles. What ! a line of advance of three hundred leagues all forest and morass. These reasoners never seemed to have reflected on the impossibility of such a phenomenon. They did not seem even to remember that in India, that which is swamp so late as November, is greenward a month afterwards. The contest is over. In the repose of peace it is easy to forgive them this mischievous absurdity. They did not understand war. Yet they were listened to.

BOOK IV.

PANLANG—DONABYOO—PROME.

The Argument. The British advance into upper Pegue on two lines of operation, and into the province of Bassein on a third. I. Theatre of war. The enemy driven a second time from Tantabain. Feb. 6th. II. General Sir A. Campbell quits Rangoon, (Feb. 12th.) His plan of campaign. He advances without opposition to Laing. III. General Cotton embarks his division. Feb. 16th. He advances up the Panlang river. He storms the defences of Panlang, and forces a passage into the great Irawaddy. IV. He reaches, and reconnoitres Donabyoo. He carries by assault the Pagoda stockade. V. He causes the central work to be assaulted. The attacking column is repelled. He retires below Donabyoo. VI. General Campbell, who had debouched beyond Sarawah, countermarches, and returns upon that town. Major Sale's invasion of the province of Bassein. General Campbell passes the Irawaddy at Sarawah, and marches upon Donabyoo. VII. The two divisions combine, and operate against Donabyoo. VIII. Bandoola killed. Donabyoo evacuated. IX. The British enter Promé. Termination of the campaign. X. Armistice. Conference of Nyoang-benzeik.

I.

THE British Army was about to direct its march through a country less known than any, in which a campaign had been attempted for a century. The previous experience of their route was chiefly comprised in the accounts of

Colonel Symes, of Captains Cox and Canning, and the men of science in their suites. All these had furnished information to the state, and the public, which will be praised as considerable, whenever it is fairly compared with their opportunities of observation. The two first had ascended the Irawaddy nearly in a state of distress. Major Canning had enjoyed something more of Burman confidence, and of liberty. But the knowledge of all three was chiefly confined to the route to the capital by water. The adventurer Gibson, the ex-envoy of the Burmans to Cochin-China, was in the camp, but his intellectual powers were weakened by profligate indulgence, and his devotion to the British cause could hardly be relied on. When he died of cholera at Laing, his loss did not seem to be severely felt notwithstanding his abilities as an interpreter. The movement of Lieut. Colonel Mallet upon Pegue in December was a complete reconnoissance up to that point. But the rumored deficiency of water, the necessity of keeping the forces in junction, and the limited means of transport deterred the General from taking the line of advance through Pegue, Tounghò, and Ramuthayn. He resolved to observe on his right from Pegue, and to advance along the left bank of the Irawaddy.

Like those of the Nile, the Ganges, and the

Indus, the waters of the great river of Ava, diverging at a given point, form themselves into several streams, which increase in number towards the sea, and flowing right and left at acute angles, describe that figure, which from the days of Herodotus it has been the fashion to denominate a Delta. In Ava the apex of this Delta is twenty miles above the town of Sarawah. With this fixed point as a centre, and Cape Negrais, and the mouth of the Rangoon river as the extremities of radii, may be described the sector of a circle, the circumference of which is the sea-coast from Negrais to the Elephant Point. The Delta of Pegue and Bassein has not even yet been accurately surveyed. It is supposed however, that the largest branch of the Irawaddy called the Bogerota, is that, which flows into the sea near China Buckeer. The next in magnitude gives up its waters at Cape Negrais. Between the right bank of one of these, and the left of the other mainly lie the insulated, alluvial swamps, and intermediate streams, which have here as good a claim as at the *embouchures* of the Ganges to be called Sunderbunds. But as to the westward of the Gangetic Delta a stream distinct, and navigable detaches itself from the triangular mass with an air of superiority under the names of Bhagirathee, and Hooghly, so to the eastward of the general se-

paration of the waters of the master stream of Ava, one branch diverging at a larger angle than the rest forces itself into distinction, flowing along in perpetual sinuosities for thirty miles under the name of the Panlang creek or river, passing after an interval of near thirty more Rangoon the first trading town of the empire, and joining the ocean twenty-five miles below this, at a distance of twenty leagues from the nearest mouth of the Irawaddy. But from a point yet higher up strikes off another eccentric branch, yet more remarkable for its meanderings, which exceed those of the Goomtee or the Gogra in Hindoostan, and have gained for it the name of the Laing, or twisted branch. It has two mouths, one just above the town of Panlang, the other five miles above Rangoon, where it meets the Panlang branch at Pagoda point. Bassein stands seventy miles above Cape Negrais on the left bank of the great western branch. Lamina is twenty leagues higher up on the same. Donabyoo is seventy miles below Sarawah on the eastern branch. Promé seventy miles above it on the left bank of the undivided Irawaddy. This is the theatre of war.

On the 1st of February, Sir Archibald Campbell issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of the Burman empire. Herein he enumerated the just causes of war, which had brought the

British to Rangoon in the character of invaders. He reminded those, whom he addressed, of the successes of his troops, and of the losses, the disasters, disgraces, and sufferings of their own countrymen. The continuance of these calamities he ascribed to the obstinate infatuation of the Burman government. He announced, his resolution to advance to the capital in order to enforce international reparation, but that he should march with the determination to do all in his power to lessen the miseries of war. He declared that he sought no armed assistance from those, whom he called upon to listen to him, that his own army was more than sufficient to effect every object, which he held in view. He required only that the inhabitants ceasing to regard his soldiers as enemies, should bring to his camp the products of their industry. He guaranteed scrupulous payment, and pledged himself to protect the persons, the property, and the temples of the peaceable population of Pegue.

It was known to the British that Bandoola had concentrated a force, swelled by this time to a considerable amount, at Donabyoo. The Kee Woonghee, or first Woonghee of the empire commanded the several detachments intended to cover the left bank of the Irawaddy. One of these had taken post at Tantabain. It was th-

plan of Sir Archibald Campbell to assume two principal lines of advance, one up the stream of the Rangoon river, Panlang branch, and great Eastern branch of the Irawaddy, the other parallel to the prolongation of the left bank of this same branch ; but at some distance from it as far as Sarawah. At that point the two lines would become coincident. It seemed necessary as a preliminary measure to clear the Laing river. Lieut.-Colonel Godwin was detached against Tantabain.

This officer found the enemy, on the 6th of February posted two thousand strong in a position on the point of a little peninsula. Two sides of their work were extended to eleven hundred paces each. It was lined with thirty-six guns. The Lieut.-Colonel caused the Satellite armed ship towed by the steam vessel to enfilade one face of the defences. He paralyzed the Barbarians by her fire, and a shower of rockets launched from the deck of the Diana by Captain Graham's troop. The Burmans were amazed at the velocity, the dazzling light, the rapid succession, the fatal aim, and ominous hissing, of this new weapon. The Grenadiers of the 41st, transported by the boats to a point sheltered from fire, rushed upon the enemy in the moment of consternation. The

work was carried. The Barbarians left behind thirty-four out of thirty-six guns.

II.

All was ready for a combined advance. On the 12th February a salute of ordnance announced that Sir Archibald Campbell had at length quitted Rangoon to take the lead against the Barbarians. A small camp of preparation had been formed near Kumaroot. The troops ordered to move by water were embarked from the quays of Rangoon. The King's 38th, 41st, and 47th, three Native Battalions, the Body Guard, the Bengal Horse Artillery, and a portion of the Rocket Troop were united under the personal command of Sir A. Campbell, leaving to be transported by water, and to clear the passage of the Irawaddy under General Cotton, H. M.'s. 89th, the 1st Madras European Regiment, two hundred and fifty Native soldiers, and a sufficient artillery.

The 13th Light Infantry was to be employed upon a third line in an enterprise, which will shortly be adverted to. It was joined to a proportion of Native troops. Rangoon was secured by the presence of two thousand Sipahs, and by the accumulation of successive reinforcements of Europeans, for which transport could not be promptly provided.

The plan of a combined advance up the stream, and along the left bank of the Irawaddy abounded in promise of success. The Barbarian leader had no right to calculate on being enabled to resist the united efforts of the two columns with forces far weaker than those, with which he had attempted to recover Rangoon. It was incumbent on him however to make an effort to save the provinces of Pegue; and with this view he exercised a very sound discretion in posting his levies at Donabyoo. This was infinitely preferable to any position, which he could take up on the left bank, because it rendered the separation of the British forces unavoidable. For either their General must cause Donabyoo to be attacked by General Cotton's force alone, or he must himself effect the passage of the Irawaddy to co-operate with him, leaving in common prudence a detachment to observe the Barbarians on the left bank. If it were objected that Bandoola thus abandoned his communications with Prome, that wily Barbarian well knew that this was of little moment, for besides that this line was covered by his coadjutor, his own irregular bands unencumbered with baggage or equipage, would on their intrenchments being stormed, disperse, and escape through the forests beyond the reach of pursuit, ready to unite again upon a new point of defence. With disci-

plined troops and good officers he might have attempted a march against Sir Archibald Campbell near the base of the Delta, whilst that leader was yet out of communication with General Cotton. But this was a manœuvre far beyond the military experience and means of the Burmans. He acted wisely therefore in remaining on the defensive, and chose his ground skilfully as regarded its relative position to his enemy's lines of advance. Donabyoo is situated on a dead level. It occupies a plain cleared and ample. But there is forest within a thousand yards of the rear, and the Irawaddy a thousand yards in breadth to cover the front, of the line on which Bandoola had resolved to intrench his levies. But even thus posted the period of his resistance must have been short, had not his enemies generously afforded him two additional chances of success, *first by unaccountably overlooking the paramount necessity of combining against Donabyoo, and secondly by weakening their force to take a third line of advance.*

This third line of operation was to conduct Major Sale by water with the 13th, and a Native detachment upon Bassein. Hence it was expected that he might penetrate up the great Western branch of the Irawaddy, and landing, operate against the rear of Bandoola at Donabyoo. This plan was liable to objections of no

inferior order. It involved the evil of detaching a useful corps at the moment, when the leading object of the British General should have been to bring the Barbarians, who covered Prome by the lateral mode of defence to a decisive action, wherever they would accept battle. It held out no promise of counterbalancing advantage. For what was Bassein? In war a point of observation; no more. Its possession would not influence the main event. If its commercial value were contemplated, its cession was to be obtained by definitive success. But whilst troops are in the field it is a mischievous, though common error, to think of any thing but the military value of places, and things. Again if Bassein were considered as the road to Lamina, and thence to the reverse face of the field-works at Donabyoo, the project is still more at variance with all true rules of strategy. The very mention of such a circuit fills with amazement the admirer of correct combination. How was it possible to forget, the currents of the coast, the tides, the shoals, the untried rapids of the great Western branch, the tract from Bassein to Lamina perfectly known to the enemy, never trod by an European, the probable failure of means of transport by land, and want of provisions, all multiplying the chances against an opportune, and effective junction? Even in warring against

Barbarians it is rather hardy than wise to cast behind us the axioms of geometry, and the elementary principles of strategics. The lowest estimate of the powers of an enemy does not justify a departure from sound military rules. The force employed in the invasion of Ava had ample work before it in the reduction of Donabyoo, and the successive defeat of the two Burman chiefs, without diverging to its left to seek new difficulties. It was no time in the middle of February to add weight to the already terrible question—will the British be enabled to find at Prome a secure and tenable place of arms, provisions, shelter from the Monsoon, and the means of pursuing the route of conquest?

On the 17th of February the division under General Sir A. Campbell had reached Mophic. Here from within the walls of an old fort a detachment of the Kee Woonghee's troops under Maha Silwa made a first, and last shew of resistance. It retired on perceiving the completion of the dispositions to attack it. Sir Archibald pursued his march, not without severely feeling the deficiency of his means of transport, through the hamlets of Meoundagah and Kaikzagaing to the town of Laing. This he entered on the 22d.

Here the British General received the first

intimations of the successes of his second in command on the line of the Panlang river. From that moment he would seem to have entertained an opinion of the possibility of finishing the war in one campaign, and penetrating onwards to the capital without the necessity of a previous combination with the column on his second line of advance against the main forces, and Generalissimo of the Burmans. The foundation of this hope is developed in his public dispatch. "At Donabyoo the whole Burmese force still remains, with what intention I cannot understand, for by all the rules of modern warfare the position at Donabyoo is turned the instant I reach the Irawaddy at Sarawah or at Nagah."

It is a misfortune in war to be deceived by the sound of words. In the language of strategics a force is said to be *turned*, either when it is simply outfronted, or more effectually, when a body of its enemies have gained such a position that the prolongation of their line of perpendicular advance will cut the line of the communication of their opponent. In devising such a manœuvre, it is therefore especially important to aim it at the true direction of the retreat of an enemy. For as an obvious hazard attends all turning manœuvres a leader ought in every case to be sure before he attempts one

that the completion of his movement will involve his adversary in a clear, and undoubted compromise. Assuredly in one sense the British Commander might be said to have turned the Barbarians so soon as he had passed a point parallel to Donabyoo on the route to Prome. He had then manifestly interposed between them and that city; which they could no longer reach *by that route* without cutting their way through his division. But this circumstance of relative position could not practically affect the views of the Barbarians. Bandoola knew that his real line of retreat was the very shortest path, which his lightly armed and unincumbered levies could find through the forests behind them to any spot, which he might be pleased to designate as the next point of union. He felt confident therefore that the "intervention of a broad and rapid stream, and the want of pontoons" which the British leader lamented as preventing him from deriving "the full advantage his situation would otherwise have given him," would in fact preclude all advantage from it whatever. That which General Campbell declared to be Bandoola's turned flank, he himself persisted in considering his defended front covered by the great Irawaddy. Barbarian as he was he proved by his adoption, and perseverance in this plan of lateral defence

of the provinces, which he was appointed to guard, his just conception of some of the principles of an art, of which he probably knew not the name.

III.

But Bandoola was threatened by another danger. General Cotton left Rangoon in his miscellaneous Flotilla on the 16th of February. They, who have voyaged on the Bhagirathee, and Ganges may form an adequate notion of the difficulties of navigation, which he had to encounter in the Panlang creek, and the Irawaddy. To others it is necessary to explain, that, as in the season of rain the upward navigator, enjoying a favorable Monsoon wind, has to contend against an impetuous stream swollen by melted snow from the mountains, and the deluge of the period, so from November to May he finds a river diminished in size and force, but the prevalent wind against him, and a narrowed channel, spotted and studded with shoals, and sands, and islets overgrown with reeds. Arriving at Teesit on the 17th, General Cotton discovered the stockades captured by Colonel Fraser in October, 1824, repaired, and strengthened. The Barbarians skirmished with his advanced division of boats, but made no serious stand. His fleet anchored on the evening of the 18th

near Panlang. This town is spoken of in Burman chronicles as one of the most important of the Empire. It is now a collection of huts united to two or three of the houses of the Phoongees or priests.

Immediately above the town, which is on the left bank of the river, that branch of the Laing pours in, which from the twice-defended hamlet on its margin acquired amongst the British the name of the Tantabain creek. It is about three hundred yards in breadth. Three hundred yards again above this on the same bank the mouth presents itself of that branch of the Irrawaddy, which diverges from the main stream near Yangain-chain-yah. But of the waters, which reach this point through this channel and that of the Tantabain branch of the Laing river, a portion only flows on towards Rangoon. Another portion finds its way back again into one of the great branches of the Irrawaddy, and thence into the sea between the banks of a wider stream, the course of which is about South West, that of the river from Panlang to Rangoon being a little to the Southward of East.

The Burmans had taken advantage of the forked character of the streams near Panlang. Below the junction of the Tantabain creek they had constructed a strong field-work on either bank. These were their advanced works. The grand

stockade of Panlang stood at the large angle formed by the right bank of the Yangain-chain-yah branch, and the right bank of the stream, which carries off part of its waters back to the Irāwaddy. It occupied the salient point of the island of Panlang. Thus if the assailants succeeded in carrying the lower works of Youtheet, and Mighee; they could still only attack the main defence by crossing the Tantabain creek and the Yangain-chain-yah branch if they manœuvred by their right; and by effecting the passage of the South Western channel if they advanced by their left. All these works were of solid timber, and built in the best manner of the Burmans.

The heavier boats of the Flotilla had grounded below. Whilst every exertion was made to bring them up, General Cotton employed the interval in a detailed reconnoissance of the enemy's defences. He then threw up five hundred yards below the outer works, a battery of four mortars, and two six-pounders. No labors could extricate the Satellite from the shoal, on which she had struck. The steam vessel joined the Flotilla on the evening of the 19th. During this day the battery had thrown shot and shells with effect into the enemy's works. A column of troops had been landed on either bank. General Cotton caused the steam vessel

to anchor midway between the two stockades. He then placed himself at the head of the column of the right on the left bank. Both columns advanced. The resistance of the Burmans, whether they reserved themselves for the defence of the grand-work, or as at Tantabain were panic-stricken by the effect of the rockets from the steam vessel, did little credit to their resolution. They fired upon the British, and abandoned both holds.

General Cotton saw that terror was amongst them. He determined to seize the moment, at which victory never escapes the resolute. The Tantabain creek crossed his line of advance. It was not known whether it were now fordable or not. The General set the example by plunging waist-deep into the water. The column dashed after him. The boats of the Flotilla seconded this activity by pushing on to enable the troops to cross the broad channel of the Yangain-chain-yah branch. The column gaining under a heavy fire the right bank by this aid found success within its grasp. The enemy abandoned to them the great stockade of Panlang, which in the earlier stages of the war, might have cost the British an hundred men after a prolonged contest. The troops of the Kee Woonghee fled precipitately. In one hour and a half General Cotton found himself master, so

far as any military obstacle was concerned, of the approaches to the Irawaddy. He caused the grand stockade to be retrenched, and formed into a secure place of arms. The 18th Madras N. I. became its garrison. The smaller works of Youtheet and Mighee he reduced to ashes. He then caused his light division of boats to proceed in observation up the Yangain-chain-yah branch. It was known to him on the 25th that they had reached the Irawaddy, and anchored in command of the entrance. The passage was truly reported intricate, and difficult. It cost no slight exertion of skill and labor to get up in succession the heavier vessels. The mass of the Flotilla could not be brought into the great river before the 27th. On the 28th the troops saw full before them at the distance of ten miles the white Pagoda of Donabyoo. This was a sight to inspire them with the resolution to surmount all obstacles. Some of the heavier boats being yet in the rear it became necessary to take a position. At this time the enemy advanced a body of war boats. The vessels of the light division repelled, and threw them into confusion. A small body of the 89th then attacked, and drove in a Burman post of observation on the right bank. Two field-pieces were planted on the salient point of an island, distant one-third of the whole breadth of the river from its left

bank. Their fire swept the whole extent. The Flotilla was moored between the island, and the left bank, on the same line with the battery. The Barbarians insulted this position at night, but were driven back by a cannonade.

The last boat of the fleet rejoined on the 5th of March. On the evening of the 6th, General Cotton took up his second position in the Irrawaddy two miles below the grand camp of Donabyoo.

IV.

The principal stockade of Donabyoo was a parallelogram of one thousand yards by seven hundred. It was constructed on a bank washed in the monsoon, but elevating itself somewhat proudly in the dry season above the sandy bed of the river. From this circumstance and the height of its parapet it commanded the minor works. The lower of these was a square of two hundred yards described about the glittering, chunamed Pagoda, which is descried at the distance of many miles below and above. The third work of irregular form stood at the distance of four hundred yards from the Pagoda stockade, and of five hundred more from the grand work. All were close to the margin of the river, the breadth of which even in March exceeds seven hundred yards. But the outline of

the greatest work being thus extensive, it of course outfronts the other two. Thus a force advancing to attack any but the Southern faces of either is exposed to a fire from the Southern face of the great work at the distances of five hundred, and a thousand yards. The guns of the eastern faces of all three works swept the river to its left bank. All three were constructed of heavy beams of squared timber, all were platformed, and pierced for cannon; each had an exterior *fosse, trous-de-loup*, and a thick abbatis. The great work was defended by demi-lunes, the Pagoda work by a square bastion, the central work was a small parallelogram connected by a kind of stockaded covert way, with two irregular pentagons larger than itself.

The Barbarian force did not fall short of twelve thousand men. They were better armed than any former garrison, because, as the national danger pressed, the Government at Ava became more liberal in their supply of musquets from their arsenal. The troops had been improved by constant exercise in the practice of their artillery and jinjals. Donabyoo was amply provisioned. A numerous division of war-boats was moored under its defences. The *élite* of their crews had been sacrificed in the first campaign. But though they dared not come to close action with the boats of the Flotilla, they harrassed its

sailors by petty attacks, and might be expected to threaten the communications in case of a reverse.

The reduction of Donabyoo would have been an achievement not unworthy of the united exertions of the two divisions. General Cotton had sailed from Rangoon with seven hundred and fifty British infantry. His only native battalion garrisoned Panlang. His division was healthy. Only twenty-five Europeans were sick, twenty-five more guarded the Satellite, which had grounded inextricably below Panlang. The necessity for escorts in the boats laden with heavy ordnance, with ordnance stores, and Commissariat supplies for both divisions reduced the strength of the force nearly another hundred. Thus few more than six hundred bayonets were left to drive from Donabyoo, which had been laboriously intrenched for four months, twelve thousand Barbarians, headed by Menghee Maha Bandoola, now veritably in person, the most respectable warrior of his nation since the days of Aloungpra.

On reconnoitring Donabyoo the first *coup-d'œil* appears to have led General Cotton to sound and legitimate conclusions regarding the mode of attacking it. He saw that the larger commanded the smaller works. An island above the former would afford the British a po-

sition, the occupation of which would utterly compromise the Barbarians, if its seizure could be maintained by force of arms, and followed up by an attack upon their main work rapid, and irresistible. This plan offered the most tempting advantages. An assault by a column of British troops deliberately formed had never yet failed against the most formidable, and elaborate work of the Burmans, which had been previously battered by field-pieces. The odds of twelve thousand against six hundred were indeed appalling ; but it would have been perfectly in accordance with the character of the previous, and subsequent operations of the General, who now appeared before Donabyoo to have made such an attempt, and to have succeeded. His first, and best resolve was however in this instance mainly overborne by the forcible doubts expressed by Captain Alexander the active, judicious, and intrepid Naval Commander. This officer plausibly dwelt on the smallness of the force, on the fact that General Campbell's division relied entirely for supplies on the boats of this Flotilla, on the strength of the enemy's division of war-boats and the garrisons of their lower works ; and finally on the impossibility of keeping the river open below, whilst the General advanced to attack the great work from the Northward without employing on that service

alone one-half of the force. This last objection as being purely Naval, appears to have been decisive against the first project of General Cotton. In compliance with the views of a meritorious colleague he consented to abandon an opportunity of signaling those military qualities, which earned for him an enviable reputation in the subsequent affairs in Ava. A despatch from Laing dated 24th February had disclosed to him the expectation of Sir Archibald Campbell that the capture of Donabyoo would be completed by the division of the Irawaddy singly.

General Cotton now saw that he had to rely entirely on the resources of his own skill, and the efforts of an handful of soldiers to defeat the main force of the Barbarians, and open the great river ; an operation, on the success of which depended the existence of General Sir A. Campbell's division as a campaigning force. Under this conviction, and driven back from his first resolution by the objections, which have been detailed, he consented to do one of the worst things which can be done in war, to tame his spirit down to a middle measure. The fire of enterprise, which effects all by daring, and hoping the highest and the best, is lost in the descent to this class of manœuvres.

But this second plan, to which General Cot-

ton now turned as his alternative, secured in every event the line of the Irawaddy. He proposed to assume the position, which he had first taken up below Donabyoo as the base of his manœuvre, and to batter, and attack in succession the two smaller works. The presence of the Flotilla thrown across the river secured under this arrangement that important line of communication.

Early in the morning of the 9th, a body of five hundred men was landed one mile below the Pagoda stockade. It was divided into two columns of equal strength. The fire of two field-pieces, and a battery of rockets covered the advance of these. The troops rushed right and left upon the stockade under a fire, heavy and well-sustained, which had been poured upon them from the moment that they debouched within range. The assault was steady and determined; but many of the soldiers finding the narrow inlets of the work, by which alone they could force a passage, choked with their advancing comrades, wheeled round to the rear of the defences, and struggled to get in by the outlets of the rear-ward face. The Barbarians thus hemmed in could escape the vengeance of the bayonet only by leaping headlong from the parapet. Many thus precipitated themselves, and found already under the Northern face fresh

foes to intercept them. The slaughter became terrible. "The dead, the wounded, and the "panic-struck," says the Brigadier General in describing the scene, "fell in one common mass. "I can not estimate the loss of the enemy in "this affair at less than four hundred and fifty "men. Ours was about twenty killed, and "wounded "

V.

It had become necessary to pursue this faulty plan of operations. The General established a force in the Pagoda stockade, and prepared to attack the central work, with the knowledge that it was commanded by the larger one. Thus after two assaults he would at the best only find himself in the posture of a second lodgement. The fire of the field-pieces, the mortars, and the rockets was for some minutes directed against the field-work. A body of two hundred men was then sent forward to assault it. The compact order of this little column was somewhat deranged in the process of advancing along a narrow path. Within a few yards only of the parapet it was received by a sudden fire, which cut down the leading soldiers. The men were disconcerted, wavered, diverged from the true line of attack, and strove to shelter themselves under the sloping bank of the river. Captain

Rose, of the 89th, who has been seen the first in escalade at Kumaroot urged them by the encouragement of his voice, and example to quit this screen, and rush in a body upon the parapet manned by Barbarians before numerous, and intrepid, now wrought up to the highest pitch of confidence by the spectacle of the British held at bay on their glacis. Several soldiers obeyed the summons of their Captain, and advanced towards the defences. They were sacrificed as fast as they presented themselves. Captain Rose was severely wounded in the arm. He was urged to quit the field. "No," said he calmly, "I have said that I will never turn back from that work with life." Another ball struck him in the breast. "A meek man and a brave," was lost to this Army; but his intrepid pledge was redeemed.

آن نه من باشم که روزی جبهک بینی پشت من
وین منم کاند ریسان خاک و خون بینی سری

Captain Cannon, who emulated the meritorious efforts of his brother officer, was also mortally wounded. It became evident that the attempt was hopeless. Finally, a retreat was ordered. British soldiers were thus foiled. This moment was the acme of the reputation of Menghee Mahla Bandoola.

General Cotton was now convinced that the reduction of Donabyoo was an enterprise beyond the strength of his division. His arguments, as set forth in his public report are manly, forcible, and conclusive. He resolved to evacuate the captured work, which events had rendered useless to him, and to embark again his troops, and cannon. He spiked the captured guns, destroyed the jinjals and small arms taken from the enemy; and ordered to be transported back to the boats without precipitation his own artillery and stores. Although the enemy strongly reinforced the garrison of their central work, and opened a heavy fire on the Pagoda stockade the painful duties of retreat were accomplished without a casualty or loss of any kind. The Flotilla descended the stream, and resumed the position of Young-yong, from which it had advanced on the 6th. The General disdained to dissemble his difficulties or his reverse. He dispatched by a secret messenger across the plains of Pegue, a faithful statement of his efforts, and their issue.

VI.

The intelligence of this check came like a thunderbolt upon General Sir A. Campbell. It reached him on the 10th March at Uadeet, three marches in advance of Sarawah. His Head

Quarters had been fixed in the latter town from the 2d to the 8th. He had there heard the cannonade of the 7th, and giving unlucky credence to the reports of peasantry and of spies, had concluded that Donabyoo was in the hands of General Cotton. He therefore eagerly caused his division to debouch beyond Sarawah; and was pressing on in the full hope of arriving at the termination of the campaigning season within a few marches of the gates of the capital, when the secret dispatch of his second in command disclosed to him the fact, that the Barbarian leader triumphant in the success of his defensive plans yet stood between him and his supplies in the attitude of defiance. His resolution was taken in a moment. He caused his division to counter-march upon Sarawah.

It is now expedient to turn to the progress of the troops sent to manœuvre on the line of the great western branch of the Irawaddy. Major Sale's transports were convoyed by His Majesty's frigate *Larne*, and the H. C's. cruizer *Mercury*. The passage of his fleet round the circumference of the coast was tedious. It reached Pagoda point in great Negrais on the 24th of February. Major Wahab had arrived here in May, 1824, when all might have been effected, which was now worth attempting.

The enemy had constructed some works on

both the greater, and the lesser island. Their defenders were put to flight by the fire of the ships of war. Whilst the expedition was making its way with little opposition between the picturesque banks of the magnificent stream, the Burmans set fire to Bassein, and retreated towards Lamina. The fleet anchored off the smoking ruins on the 3d March. Major Sale having established his troops in the area of the grand Pagoda endeavored by assurances, and the distribution of proclamations to restore confidence in the minds of the alarmed inhabitants. Here the movements of this division ought to have terminated. A small force judiciously intrenched, and supported by a few gun-boats, would have sufficed for the purpose of observation. All that followed on this line was a waste of time, troops, and exertion. It was thought that the error of employing this force on an eccentric line might best have been repaired by passing through the lateral creeks into the great eastern branch, and thus joining General Cotton's division. This attempt would however not have been unattended with hazard and delay. Major Sale saw reason to consider the passage impracticable so late in the season. Single vessels afterwards accomplished it in May. But to advance through Lamina towards Donabyoo was to expose this detachment to be attacked, when in

march and out of communication with every other corps, by an overwhelming force of Barbarians. In this case they might have lost all but their honor. It was surely unsafe to trust so far to the weakness, and inexperience of an enemy.

The story of all three columns has now been brought to meet in the second week of March. On the 6th of that month General Cotton had reached Young-yong on his advance, on that day General Campbell was encamped at Sarawah, on the same day Major Sale took possession of Bassein. On the 12th Major Sale was yet at Bassein, General Cotton held the position, to which he had retired, near Young-yong, and General Campbell had again arrived at Sarawah in countermarch upon Donabyoo.

The enemy were emboldened to a high pitch of audacity by their temporary success. They extolled to the skies the valor of Kyouk-keng-bo, the Captain of the Burman Body Guards, who had commanded in the central stockade. They proclaimed that Bandoola in person was invincible. They insulted daily in small parties General Cotton's outposts. The period between the repulse of the 7th, and the arrival of a despatch from the main division was one of intense anxiety to the British.

Re-entering the considerable town of Sarawah on the 11th, General Sir A. Campbell resolved

from this point to gain the left bank of the Irrawaddy. He had no pontoons, and was cut off from his Flotilla. The river was even now six hundred yards in width. But events have never placed at the head of an army one, who held physical difficulties cheaper than this leader of the British, or could bring a more determined energy to bear against them. In Sarawah the General found a few canoes; he found timber also, which he caused to be compacted into rafts. The whole division was pleased with the hope of proving that this noble stream could not arrest its progress. The soldiers burnt with impatience to precipitate themselves upon the entrenchments of Donabyoo, to humble Bandoola, and silence the vaunts of the Barbarians.

The Horse Artillery, and a British battalion were ferried across, and took up a position on the right bank. The General saw with delight this first step accomplished; but he plied the work incessantly. Nevertheless it was found impossible to complete the traject of troops, stores and cannon before the 17th. A new labor presented itself. The route to Donabyoo along the margin of the river lay over an uncleared plain overgrown with dwarfish jungle, and gigantic reeds, and crossed by the uneven, treacherous beds of streams, which cease to flow at the close of the Monsoon. Head Quarters were fixed on the

18th at Henzada, on the 21st at Lezeik, both towns of consideration. On the 25th the division found itself encamped under the Northern face of Donabyoo.

VII.

Sir Archibald Campbell reconnoitred the fortified position. He came at once to the conclusion that it was too large to be securely invested by the force at his disposal. It will be difficult to refute this opinion. For supposing that General Cotton's division should have been posted to the Southward, and South-westward of the lesser works, its right rested on the Irawaddy, so as to render evasion in that direction hazardous, still it would have been necessary to have disposed General Campbell's weak battalions on a rectangle of at least five thousand yards, in order duly to secure them from the fire of the place. The troops thus aligned would have found an *appui* for their left on the Irawaddy; but must have intrenched their right. This disposition would have left no hands for the trenches; and the strength and importance of Donabyoo seemed to demand the labor of approaches.

General Campbell took post with his left on the Irawaddy, partially masking his force by a village, the advanced houses of which were five

hundred yards from the fort. He proceeded to communicate with General Cotton's division. By keeping close to the left bank the flotilla was enabled to pass the grand works with trifling loss, although every gun was opened upon them by the enemy. General Cotton disembarked, marched up the Eastward bank, and threw up batteries. Though the force could not afford a complete investment, it was resolved to give Bandoola the honors of a siege. Heavy guns, and mortars were landed, trenches opened, and the attack pressed with vigor. The Barbarians displayed the utmost insolence, and audacity. They kept the picquets constantly on the alert with sorties by night, and demonstrations by day. They ransacked their vocabulary for terms of contumely, and defiance. On the 28th March when every hand was busied in the trenches they caused a body of seventeen elephants each carrying several soldiers to advance against the right of the British. The spectacle was at once novel, and terrific, and recalled the associations of antiquity. A body of their infantry moved in the rear of this mass of ponderous animal power. Sir Archibald Campbell met this singular display by ordering the Body Guard to charge. The natural terrors, and antipathies of the horse render it difficult to cause cavalry to approach these gigantic

animals in a compact body. Nevertheless the Hindoostanee troopers advanced within pistol shot; and brought down with a steady aim the loftily mounted Burmans. The elephant valuable in Indian warfare for his strength, patience, and sagacity, is yet an indifferent belligerent. In front of Donabyoo the sublime quickly merged in the ridiculous. Terrified at the fire of the Suwars, and grown unmanageable from the loss of their practised drivers, the animals of this imposing array pressed back in unwieldy confusion within their works, sweeping with them the disordered foot as in the days of Pyrrhus.

VIII.

On the 1st of April, the rocket and mortar batteries opened from a parallel traced by the British at an acute angle with the right bank of a small stream, which runs into the Irawaddy within four hundred yards of the great work. A battery on the Eastern bank responded to the enemy's guns on the water's edge; another, constructed on the salient point of the island above, was destined to enfilade the Eastern face of the quadrangle. The breaching batteries were to open on the morrow. Up to this day Bandoola had proved himself a faithful supporter of the Golden throne. By constant exhortations, by promises of reward, by menaces, tortures,

and griesly executions, by the infernal device of chaining his Barbarians to the guns, he strove to fix the war under the walls of Donabyoo. But an event not foretold by the astrologers of Ava delivered Pegue in a moment from its intolerable oppressions, and paralysed the Burman garrison of Donabyoo.

Bandoola during the siege had visited night and day every quarter of the works to keep his soldiers to their duty. The opening of the batteries on the morning of the 1st, did not cause him to intermit this exercise of their fidelity. As he passed along the Northern face a shell, some affirm one of those attached to the rockets of Congreve, fell at his feet, and bursting lacerated beyond the hope of cure the extremities of the Woonghee. In a few moments Bandoola was no more.

The Burmans are fatalists of the most bigotted order. Panic seized the whole garrison now amounting to fifteen thousand armed men. The ferocity of his measures of conscription had rendered Bandoola an object of execration to the people of the provinces. But the soldiers revered him as the most worthy of command, and his influence at the court, the vast levies, which he had organized against the British, the audacity of his plans, his protracted defence, and fugitive success in March, had sanctified him

in their eyes as the champion of Burma. Every Burman saw in his fall the fatal omen of his own destruction.

This sensation of despondency was not diminished by the hissing of rockets, or the bounding, and bursting of shells all over the area of the entrenched quadrangle, or the crashing and splintering of the Northern defences. The disposition to abandon the fatal works of Donabyoo increased every moment. The surviving chiefs interposed their authority in vain.

The breaching batteries of the British opened before the dawn of day on the 2d. But as their first salvos shook the earth, a report came from the picquets on the right, that a body of the enemy was seen retiring towards the forest to the Westward. A forward reconnoissance proved that terror had prevailed. Donabyoo, filled with barbaric trophies, and heaped with stores of grain, was already silent and deserted.

Thus was accomplished in the first week of the last safe month for military operations in Pegue that, which juster calculations would have brought to pass at the least a fortnight sooner. This opinion derives ample support from a simple review of facts, and dates. The siege of Donabyoo garrisoned by fifteen thousand men consumed seven days. The place would not have held out longer defended by twelve thousand.

General Cotton was before it on the 6th of March. General Campbell was at Sarawah on the 2d. He might have reached Donabyoo on the 15th, even on the supposition that he did not select a shorter route by crossing lower down. Donabyoo then would have fallen on the 22d. Even ten days are of importance so late in the season. If it be objected that this calculation unfairly assumes the advantage of the fall of Bandoola, whose fatal bullet might, in the language of fatalism, have been moulded for the 1st April, but not for the 22d March, or an earlier day, it is reasonable to urge in reply that at all events Donabyoo could not have resisted the united divisions for a period of more than seven days. In truth sixty chances out of an hundred were in favor of its falling by assault on the fifth day after the trenches were opened. It may fairly be presumed therefore that a true combination would have saved half a month, to say nothing of the lives of brave men, and the mortification of a check.

The plan, which was acted upon, involved another disadvantage. It gave to the Burman force under the Kee-Woonghee an opportunity of striking a blow against General Cotton's division, or Major Sale's detachment singly, and at an advantage. These troops though easily beaten from the Delta had not retired many marches.

Fortunately the Kee-Woonghee though a sincere, and amiable man, was no soldier. It will hardly be disputed hereafter that the grand object of the British Commander ought to have been to have driven from his path Bandoola, and the main forces of the Barbarians, and that his whole force ought to have been directed against Donabyoo, not in junction, for that circumstances forbid; but in combination, concentrically, and by the shortest routes.

It is in the nature of erroneous views in war to lead from bad to worse. When Major Sale had reached Bassein, it was thought necessary that he should persist in moving on this exterior line of manœuvre, and penetrate by it to Donabyoo. Beyond Bassein his ships of war could not advance. But in such boats, as he could procure, he pressed on his little force to Lamina sixty miles higher, passing constantly up a narrowed stream between lofty banks covered with wood. The beautiful town of Lamina is five miles in extent. It is surrounded with all the charms of woodland scenery. The officers of this detachment evinced sentiments of affectionate regret, when they heard, some weeks after the fall of Donabyoo, that this spot had been devastated, and the town burnt to ashes by the Burmans. Lamina is distant at least forty miles from Donabyoo, that is four marches across

the jungly Delta. Major Sale's detachment left its boats without a single animal or any other means of transporting its cannon, or provisions. Heaven diverted the mind of Bandoolla from sending seven thousand men to attack it. The Kee-Woonghee was equally merciful. The want of carriage prevented this little body of men from tempting their fate by wandering on towards the westward face of Donabyoo. The personal character of their leader affords a strong presumptive proof that this movement was impracticable, as well as faulty in conception. There is not in the service of his king an officer less likely to succumb unwarrantably to a difficulty. The detachment returned in boats to Bassein, and thence in their ships by the coast again to Rangoon.

IX.

The fate of the campaign was decided, as it had been easy to foresee, under the walls of Donabyoo. Sir Archibald Campbell regaining his former line of route by recrossing the river at Sarawah prosecuted an unopposed advance. He entered Prome on the 25th April. General Cotton's division in rejoining him encountered no obstacles but the rocks, shallows, and rapids of the Irawaddy.

But the army had lost half a month. Prome

It was its place of arms for the ensuing Monsoon. A reconnoissance was pushed to Mecaday fifty miles beyond it. Prome may be considered the third town in the Empire. The commercial advantages of Rangoon seem to entitle it to rank second. Prome stands on a somewhat lofty margin of the river. A timber stockade encloses three or four narrow streets of huts, the wooden houses of the local Government, those of the priesthood, and numerous pagodas. Considerable intervening spaces are partially planted with trees. From the platforms of the work the inhabitants look forth across a stream of a thousand yards at the verdrous rocky heights, which guard the right bank. These are a portion of the chain of wooded hills, which extends in unbroken links from a point on the right bank forty miles below Prome to another one hundred and sixty above it. This line of two hundred miles is beautiful throughout. The eye of the voyager on the Irawaddy is perpetually feasted with the sight of hanging woods, which in this climate are never entirely deprived of their foliage. In the more abrupt bends of the river the rocks, which occasionally decorate the left bank also, seem to unite themselves amphitheatrically with those of the right. The spectator may fancy himself on a lake in a mountainous region. This, and sudden glimpses of Pagodas perched adventurously on

the summits of crags like the castles of the Rhine are the principal features of the picturesque in Ava. The site of Prome is salubrious, as well as beautiful. The town is a healthy place of residence even in the season of rain. The air of the breezy hills around it is yet more delicious.

A line of heights lower than those of the right bank extends along the left from Shwè-doung-myo ten miles below Prome. A few hundred yards southward of the latter these hills run off abruptly at a right angle shaping their course into the interior. On the summits of the mounds, and hillocks of this range the troops were cantoned. Roomy huts of mats, timber, and thatch were quickly thrown up for them. The officers built themselves small bungalows of the same materials. Freed from care, from wants, and sickness, they here spent their days nearly as agreeably as in the remoter stations of the Presidencies. Another Monsoon was before the Army; but how far different from the last! The defeat of Bandoola at Kokaing had restored its population to Rangoon. His death, and the dispersion of his bands at Donabyoo relieved the plains, and villages of Pegue from the second reign of terror. The British Army had acted on its march in the spirit of the benevolent proclamation of its leader. It had conciliated Pegue. From Rangoon to Yandabo the conduct

of the force was exemplary. Even the followers of the camp by far the most intractable portion of an armament in India, were never guilty of serious indiscipline. This opinion does not rest solely on British testimony. He, who should dispute its correctness, would find many thousands of Peguers to contradict him. The presence of General Sir A. Campbell's divisions were not only never felt as a calamity in Pegue, but regarded as a protection against the severities of the Burmans: In April 1826 their departure was bewailed in terms of clamorous regret, which no prudential arguments could restrain. The simple people of these provinces arrived at once at the secret of British superiority without the aid of metaphysics, or political economy. They said, "The *Inglee Rajahs* pay for every thing; and do not cut off our heads." This surprised and delighted them.

In a few weeks cattle and grain were abundant. The bazar was crowded with petty dealers, and the peasantry of the surrounding villages. The influence of Sarkies Manook, the Armenian merchant was exerted at this period very beneficially for the British Army. He had been many years a trader at Rangoon, spoke fluently the language of the country, had money due to him in all the principal cities, counted some princes of the blood Royal amongst his debtors, and

was well known to the nobles of Ava, the Woonns of provinces, and the Myo-thoo-gees of towns, Confidence in the British name quickly overspread the lower country. This enabled the departments of Political and Military Intelligence to gain prompt and correct information regarding the plans, and movements of the enemy.

There are five great gates in the stockade of Prome. Two in the water face ; one in each of the three faces, which look Northward, Southward, and Eastward. The Southward portal gives egress into the Rangoon road, the Northward into the route, which runs along the river bank to Meeaday. This line is cut at the distance of a quarter of a mile by the Nawaing river which flowing from the hills in the interior here joins the Irawaddy. Six miles from this point it is divided into two branches which have meandered through the flats to the North-Eastward of Prome. The level is tolerably well cleared and cultivated. But at intervals yet remain undisturbed thick groves of palmyra, of cocoa, of bamboo, of peepul, of tamarind, of mango. Seven miles from the town a rocky, wooded range rests its western extremity on the Irawaddy, and runs off Eastward until it wears away amongst the thickets of the Wattéegoung forest, the skirts of which may be reached by a direct route at the distance of twelve miles from

Prome. It was to be expected, that if the Burmans should try another cast for victory, they would hereafter avail themselves of this line of hill, and wood. The Nawaing would in this case separate the outposts of the two armies. But at this moment the Burmans had no large army. It was fortunate for them that the Monsoon had brought on the period of natural armistice.

The single road, which conducts to the Eastern gate of Prome, crossing like the rest the main ditch of the place passes at the foot of the insulated hill, on which stands the Pagoda of Shwè-tsan-dau. This principal monument of Prome is far inferior in size, and splendor, to that of Rangoon. But within its area are many curious specimens of carved work, and sculpture. Its site, and the neighbouring hills command a splendid prospect of the river, and its wooded banks. The platform on which the temple stands, is gained from the North, and from the West by sacred staircases. These as at Shwè-da-gong, are protected by a succession of sloping roofs, decorated with pinnacles in the taste of the Chinese.

From the Pagoda the route passes through an irregular suburb until it reaches at the distance of a mile and a half from the town, the point, whence diverge the two roads, which lead res-

pectively across the plains to the town of Issay-Myo, and to Zioup the principal ford of the Nawaing. This point of junction became one of importance in the operations of the final campaign. But now all was repose.

A Brigade composed of the Royal Regiment and the 28th Madras N. Infantry, under Brigadier McCreagh, had followed the march of the main division to Prome. Donabyoo was held by the Madras European Regiment under Lieut. Colonel Kelly. Brigadier Smelt commanded at Rangoon, Lieut. Colonel Smith at Martaban, Major Frith at Mergui. A detachment under Captain Fenwick observed Bassein.

The rains begun in May. The country was speedily inundated, although the Monsoon is reckoned milder in the upper and middle, than in the lower provinces. The road to Sarawah, and Laing became impassable. The communications depended on the flotilla, which completely commanded the Irawaddy. In its boats the 13th Light Infantry reached Prome by small detachments.

Not yet however had "the hopes of Ava vanished." Nor had the alarms subsided of the politicians of the British Presidencies, who beholding their armies upwards of three hundred miles from Rangoon connected with it only by the watery thread of the Irawaddy, trembled when they

heard in August that the Burman court, unawed by the death of Bandoola, had roused itself to fresh efforts, that Meng-mya-boo was already at Meeaday at the head of an armed force, and exerting his authority widely and successfully to obtain re-inforcements.

A prophecy of the Brahmins at Ava was much talked of in Prome about this period. They had said to their Royal master in juggling praise of the stability of his Empire that the Burman monarchy would never be endangered, until a vessel should ascend the Irawaddy swelled by the rains of the Monsoon, without the aid of sails or rowers. This they had pronounced; or it had been said for them. The steam vessel *Diana* was supposed to have fulfilled the terms of the prognostic.

Early in August, General Cotton by means of this same vessel, and some light boats of the Naval squadron, reconnoitred Meeaday. He found the enemy cantoned, and entrenched in force. The Burmans had evidently succeeded in raising another Army. Their guns opened upon the *Diana*. General Cotton made all the requisite observations, and then passed down the stream. The Burman officers on this occasion wrote a romantic, boasting, account to their government, in which they announced the repulse of the *magical ship*. The Golden ear had been

wofully abused with falsehood from the opening of the war. Truth was about to force its way to Ava.

X.

Meng-mya-boo, bastard brother to the King exerted a paramount influence at Meeaday. But he was not the ostensible commander. Military and political authority were openly combined in the Kee-Woonghee. With him was the Woon of the northern province of Lee-maing. On the 6th September the Secretary of that district accompanied by two subordinate Burman officers presented himself in a boat hoisting a white flag, before the advance of the flotilla, which guarded the river above Promc. Escorted to the presence of Sir. A. Campbell these delegates produced a letter from the Kee-Woonghee, which enlarged on his pacific views, and anxiety to terminate the war by negotiation.

Colonel Tidy, the Deputy Adjutant General of the Army, left Promc by water on the following day. He was accompanied by Lieutenant Smith of the Royal Navy. He reached Meeaday on the 12th. He was received with every mark of consideration in the Burman camp, and held several conferences with the Kee-Woonghee. He found this functionary a mild, dignified, and reasonable man. The Colonel,

on his part disembarrassed his negotiations of empty technicalities, and senseless forms. Conducting his mission with equal candor and prudence he concluded on the 17th an armistice of thirty days between the forces under Sir A. Campbell, and the Burman army opposed to them. Komma on the right bank of the Irawaddy was recognized as the Western, and Tounghò as the Eastern extremity of the conventional line of demarcation. Curiosity was at its height in the British camp to see how the Burmans hitherto chiefly known as warriors, would now acquit themselves as negotiators. The interviews of the Adjutant General with the Kee-Woonghee were repeated ; and dispatches passed between Promé, and Mecaday. Finally it was arranged that a grand conference should take place on the 1st October at Nyong-ben-zeik between the Commissioners of either state. This point was equi-distant from the Head Quarters of the two Commanders.

This congress was to be an armed one. The Burman ministers had represented that it would be inconsistent with their dignity to appear with an escort of fewer than one thousand men ; but they promised that of these half only should be musqueteers. They suggested the propriety of the attendants of the British not exceeding the same number ; and being men of

the same arms. These conditions were complied with by the latter by uniting picked detachments of the European, and native Battalions, with the whole of the Cavalry dismounted, and parties of Artillery-men. The deficiency of sabres had to be supplied by silently selecting other small bodies of infantry carrying side arms only. Thus was avoided the necessity of betraying the want of horse.

On the 22nd September the naval force received a new Commander in the person of Commodore Sir James Brisbane. It was a source of confidence to see on the waters of the Irrawaddy the flag-captain of the Queen Charlotte at the bombardment of Algiers.

All was bustle on the bosom of this river on the evening of the 29th September. The steam vessel was seen towing up with difficulty the Brig Emma, in which Sir A. Campbell, and his suite were embarked. The flotilla transporting the troops of the escort struggled painfully against the stream.

The whole *cortege* reached Nyoung-ben-zeik on the 30th. They found the forest cleared away within the area of a circle large enough for the encampments of the delegates of both nations. Towards its centre was erected a building on the model of the Lotoo, or Hall of Council at Ava. The troops of either state were far enough apart

to obviate the chances of unlucky collision. A separate dwelling had been erected for the accommodation of the Adjutant General, who had won the esteem of the Kee-Woonghee, and his colleagues.

The Burmans were true to their appointment. After some preliminary messages of ceremony Sir Archibald Campbell, accompanied by General Cotton, Commodore Sir James Brisbane, Captain Alexander, Brigadier McCreagh, the Quarter Master General, the personal staff and others of the principal officers of both services, repaired to the hall of the Lotoo. Colonel Tidy, and Lieutenant Smith were deputed to conduct the Burman Commissioners to the conference. Entering the principal apartment of their temporary residence, these officers beheld at one end of it in a recumbent posture six figures, which in the first moments of surprize they unfeignedly mistook for so many images of the national Divinity—so still, so curiously gilded, so motionless did they appear. These were the nobles in their state costumes of velvet loaded with golden foil. During the subsequent discussions, the Leemain-woon fainted under his ponderous disguise. These dresses of state are in very indifferent taste; less wisdom is displayed in their invention than in the regulation, which commands them to be seldom worn. They were dispensed

with in the ulterior meetings between Burman and British authorities.

The interview of the first day was complimentary. The political discussions were reserved for the second. But in fact the whole story of the conference of Nyoung-ben-zeik chiefly turns on ceremonial, and the developement of national character. The negotiations were a mere nullity. The Burmans were profuse in professions of pacific views. But these they followed up by the stale affectation of ignorance of the causes, which had brought the British to their country. They declared their readiness however to forget these aggressions, and permit their enemies to retire unmolested from the Burman soil. When in reply, Sir A. Campbell advanced the very moderate demands of his government, viz. the cession of a part only of that, which it had conquered, of Arracan, the islands, and the maritime provinces, and the payment of a crore of rupees; the Burmans at once declared that they must refer to the Court at Ava proposals of so momentous, and unexpected a character. This amounted to an avowal that they themselves were not plenipotentiaries. It was evident that such conferences could never lead to a peace. All however, was conducted to the end with mildness, and personal cordiality. The term of the armistice was extended to the 2d November, to give time for a

reference to Ava. This cessation of hostilities was not injurious on either side. The roads, which were to form the lines of operation, must necessarily remain impassable to the middle of the month, and the preparations of both parties had to be matured on points within the line of demarcation, of the one at Promé and Rangoon, of the other at Meeaday, and Ava.

The Woonghees displayed a sufficient degree of dignity of manner, of tact, facility of expression, and mental acuteness during the discussions. Their deportment and speeches equally became them so long as they were left within the pale of their own customs. But at the entertainment afterwards given by Sir A. Campbell they were affected by a very pardonable embarrassment, and suffered a very painful restraint. They could not contrive to dispose their limbs with comfort upon English chairs; the uses of the knife, the fork, the spoon were to them a cruel and tantalizing mystery. They partook with apparent relish, but with great moderation of English dishes. They drank sparingly, and with evident caution of wines, and liqueurs. Where so little business was done much time was left for inter-national prattle. The conversation turned on forms, manners, and dress. The Burmans examined with eager curiosity the insignia, with which the uniforms of several of the offi-

cers were decorated. They asked questions, which betrayed their ignorance of the relative situation of nations in the scale of wealth, population, and power. They comprehended accurately the origin of the British dominion in India. They knew that they were at war with a people, who were recent settlers in Hindoostan, and the foundations of whose antient empire were laid in a distant region. They were curious to learn some particulars regarding the monarch of England. They evidently thought their enemy a great people ; but of their own comparative insignificance their notions were imperfect.

The British Commissioners, and the troops returned to Prome on the 3d October. Those only, whose opinions received a strong tincture from their hopes, could see cause to expect a peace at this conjuncture. It was evident that their multiplied reverses had not yet humbled the Barbarians. To compel them to comprehend the real dangers of their empire it was necessary to march to the gates of the capital.

During the last days of October sinister reports reached the British Head Quarters. It was said that the messenger who carried the proposals of the English to Ava, had been subjected to the most cruel indignities by the Royal order. Other accounts stated that the Kee-Woonghee

had received positive instructions to violate the sanctity of the armistice, and advance to the attack of the British position. If such a mandate were issued to this officer he had at least integrity enough to disobey it, no ordinary proof of principle under a government so profligate. A division of war-boats did actually pass within the line of demarcation. Their crews landed, committed excesses, burnt a village, and plundered the inhabitants. The Kee-Woonghee formally disavowed the perpetrators of these acts. He asserted that they were the work of lawless bands beyond his control, which he called upon the British to join him in chastising. At Promé this proposal excited suspicions. It was thought that the Burmans were seeking to load the British with the odium of a wilful rupture of the armistice. Armed parties were said to be intrenching themselves at Young-doung on the right bank. The Royal Regiment was pushed up by water, and posted in observation at this point.

The armistice wore away, and no answer arrived from Meeaday. The Burmans seemed to be resolved to let expectation run off to the last sands. At length on the 1st, twelve hours before the expiry of the truce, the state paper of the Kee-Woonghee, and the Lee-maing Woon was given in. It contained a re-

petition of the proposal to permit the British to retire in peace from the land, which they had invaded. Their demand of territory and of treasure it repelled with an assumed air of dignified surprise. “Empty your hands” said the note “of what you have, and then if you ask it, we “will be on friendly terms with you.—But if “after the termination of the armistice you shew “any inclination to renew your demands for “your expenses, or any territory from us, you “are to consider our friendship at an end. This “is Burman custom.”

The British Army prepared for fresh labors. The honor of the state demanded a third campaign, and the dispersion of two more Barbarian armies.

BOOK V.

PROME—MELLOON.

The Argument. A new army levied by Prince Meng-mya-boo. The British advance from Promé and penetrate nearly thirty leagues into the middle provinces of Ava on a single line of operation. I. The Armistice expires. The Barbarians resolve to take the lead. They intrench themselves in force in front of Promé, and make dispositions for cutting the retreat of the British. Maha-Nemyo appointed to the command of the Burman armies. II. Check at Wattee-goung. III. Farther concentration of the enemy. Shan levies. IV. V. The British General assumes the initiative. He defeats the Barbarians at Tsenbike, (Dec. 1st.) and at Napadee. (Dec. 2d.) General Cotton routes the forces of the Tsa-dau-woon on the right bank. (Dec. 5th.) VI. The British march by two routes upon Meeaday. The enemy abandon it. General Campbell presses his advance upon Patanagoh. VII. The enemy renew their offers to negotiate. Second armistice. Treaty of Melloon. VIII. The term of the second truce expires. (Feb. 18th.) The Burman ministers fail to produce the ratification of the treaty. IX. X. The British carry Melloon by storm. (Feb. 19th.)

I.

ALL hope of present peace was demolished by the presentation of the Burman state paper on the 1st November. The armistice melted into thin air on the 2d. The last months of the monsoon had been remarkably mild. The rains had been wholly suspended at the latter end of October. Still the roads remained impracticable.

The Pioneers labored without intermission on the central route to the Nawaing.

It had been known in August that the enemy had formed a large intrenched camp at Melloon one hundred and fifty miles by the direct route from Prome, and on the right bank of the Irrawaddy. It was reasonable to conjecture that they would endeavor to defend first Meeaday, and then this second position. Experience gave the British cause to hope that if the Barbarians were briskly driven from these two by combined attacks, the wreck of their army would be unable to rally excepting under the walls of the capital. But the national vanity rejected with disdain the plan of a defensive campaign. It became daily more evident that the Court had made the most extensive preparations for offensive war. It was important to encourage this foolish confidence. The Agents of the Intelligence department were instructed to represent the British as anxious to abandon their ill-judged conquests, and retire upon Rangoon as soon as the roads of the Delta should become passable. Promptly conceiving their part these men conjured the chiefs not to lose the fast declining opportunity of intercepting the retreat of their enemies. The more violent of the war party became the dupe of these designing statements. Others of the leaders better understood the real

dangers of their armies, and government. But the orders of the court, which at the end of 1824 dictated the beleaguering of Rangoon, were now peremptory for the blockade of Prome.

The British General beheld with secret satisfaction the dispositions which daily developed themselves. He felt assured of his power to break through the Barbarian *cordon*, and to fall successively on different points of the extended line with signal advantage. It was delightful to find that enemy ready to give battle in the plains of the Nawaing, which he must otherwise have marched to seek at Meeaday.

Whilst planning the destruction of the invaders at Prome the Burman court was somewhat embarrassed in fixing the important point of a leader. The Kee-Woonghee was a man of mild character, and unmilitary habits. The princes of Tounghó, and Sarawaddy had been uniformly unsuccessful. Maha Silwa, who had prospered in Assam, was of manners too profligate to be entrusted with an important command. The monarch finally decided on calling from retirement to the perilous post of champion of his country, Maha-Nemyo, a veteran warrior, who after illustrating his prime by successes in Arracan and Cassay had many years since withdrawn under the pressure of age from public cares. This octogenarian chief obeyed the sum-

mons with the alacrity of youth, and placed himself at the head of the Barbarian forces preparing to take up the line of the Nawaing unawed by any presage of the bloody termination of a brief career.

The advance of the Burmans from Mecaday was, as usual, marked by terror and devastation. The peasantry of the districts, through which they passed, anxiously-crowded into the suburbs of Prome, as to a sanctuary, and huddled themselves in safety under the protection of the invaders. The impracticable character of the rocks on the right bank of the Irawaddy gives security to the left of a force sitting down in Prome. A few battalions posted within its stockade cannot easily be dislodged by Barbarians. All is secure in this quarter, and the garrison forms an advanced echelon threatening the flank of columns pressing on to attack the adjacent heights. The communication with these is preserved by the causeway, which runs to the foot of the temple of Shwè-tsandau. The heights themselves form a better position for a division covering the Upper than one protecting the Lower Provinces, because their Northern is less bold than their Southern slope. The line however is quite tenable if not prolonged too far. The right may be refused, and rested behind any one of the

many circular heights. Intrenchments, and a few heavy pieces, would at any time render the sight of barbarian masses advancing to attempt this alignment a very welcome spectacle to a British force.

But the Barbarians resolved first to inclose their enemy within a wide circumference. They prepared to seize Padoung-myo twelve miles below Prome on the right bank; and Shwè-doung-myo nearly opposite to it on the left. Hence they calculated on being enabled to intercept all supplies, and reinforcements from Rangoon. They would thus as it were close the channel of the Irawaddy.

The Royal Regiment had been withdrawn from its post of observation. A detachment of that corps was sent to cover the point of Padoung. Some gun-boats were attached to second its efforts. The Myo-thou-gee of the place was, like all respectable Peguers, well-disposed towards the British. He had given timely warning of the designs of the Burmans in this quarter.

Mean while their main forces threatened Prome in front. A corps estimated at six thousand had already stockaded itself in a central position in the forest of Wattee-goung. At the distance of seven miles from the British Head Quarters they were constructing with great ac-

tivity vast intrenchments amongst the rocks, which here guard both banks of the river. An advanced party penetrating suddenly into the plains to the North-Eastward of Prome surprised, and carried off the cattle of the Commissariat. The Body guard pursued, and overtook these marauders, and spilt the first blood by cutting down fifty of them.

Whilst the rains were clearing off, and matters again advancing to a crisis, the Military Commander was relieved from a portion of the political cares, of which he had been for many months the sole depository, by the arrival of a second and Civil Commissioner for the affairs of Pegue and Ava in the person of Mr. Thomas Campbell Robertson. This distinguished servant of the Company had recently held the post of Political Agent in Arracan, and accompanied to the termination of its enterprise the ill-fated division of General Morrison.

II.

The Burman forces continued to concentrate in front and rear of Prome. The command of forage for the considerable magazines of cattle formed in and about the town had become a point of importance. Sir Archibald Campbell conceived the plan of dislodging the enemy from their works at Wattee-goung, occupying them

with two Brigades of Native Infantry, and compelling the Burmans to respect the line of the Nawaing.

This was, next to the repulse at Kaiklo, the most infelicitous enterprise of the three campaigns. Brigadier McDowall, a distinguished officer of the Madras Army was directed to lead four Native Regiments, the 22d, the 28th, the 38th, the 43d to the attack of Wattee-goung. They were to move in three columns by three several routes across the plains of the Nawaing, time their marches by conjectural calculation, and attack the works at once in front, flank, and rear. They left Prome on the 15th November. They had not with them either ladders, or field artillery.

This plan appears to combine every conceivable element of failure. The plains in front of Prome had been imperfectly reconnoitred. They were known to be covered at intervals with thickets, and swamps. The roads were all deep, and partially inundated. Wattec-goung is distant, by one route, twenty-three miles from Prome. Under these circumstances the chances were ten to one against a true combination upon the point of attack. The best troops the world has ever seen could not, if compelled to act upon such a plain, fairly reckon on success. Four battalions moving across such a plain to

effect such an object, ought not for a moment to have lost sight of each other until they had arrived within cannon shot of the place, reconnoitred it, and disposed themselves deliberately upon a curvi-linear base from which the columns should have converged in their attack. When is the world to see the end of the error *of directing insulated bodies to concentrate upon a point, not already within the power of the party planning the combination?*

That, which might have been foreseen, came to pass. The columns were literally bewildered in the plains of the Nawaing. The 38th debouched to the Eastward of Wattee-goung. It found itself utterly disconnected from the rest of the force, and sufficiently employed in repelling the attacks of parties of the enemy's infantry, which engaged it at half musquet shot, and of their cavalry, which menaced it at a distance. The 22d likewise encountered Burman detachments, which retarded its advance. Arrived near the works, its only intelligence of the vicinity of the other corps was the sound of heavy firing. The direction of this in a short time clearly indicated a retreat. The 28th and 43d had marched conjointly. The enemy's skirmishers harrassed this column also. As it advanced, it was opposed by larger bodies. From the firing which was heard on the right and left,

the Commander saw reason to fear that the other columns had been taken in detail, and that his flanks and rear would be compromised. Success appeared doubtful. But the column without support, and disconcerted, still advanced to a point within four hundred yards of the enemy's works. A sweeping fire was poured upon it. Col. McDowall, in the act of reconnoitring, fell lifeless under this first volley. The troops felt themselves already vanquished by the error of their position. It was impossible to concert a single measure either of advance or retreat.

Finally all three columns retired, as they had advanced, each ignorant of the route, and actual circumstances of the others but weighed down by the most melancholy presentiments. The Barbarians sallied forth from their works, and boldly pursued. To cover the retreat of disheartened troops with *tirailleurs* is one of the most delicate efforts of the art. These Regiments suffered a heavy loss in recrossing the plains. During the day they had upwards of two hundred *hors de combat*. Of these a small number fell into the hands of the enemy. After a few miles had been traversed the most spirited exertions of men and officers could not prevent the march from partaking of the character of flight. Many wounded, and the

body of the Brigadier were unavoidably abandoned. The battalions were finally saved from yet heavier disaster only by a retreat as disordered as it was rapid. Though partially reformed near Prome they gained the town in the dusk of evening scattered, exhausted, and dejected.

The Burmans boasted loudly of this advantage, which signalized in their favor the renewal of the war. They affected to believe that they had caused the British a loss of two thousand men, besides a chief of distinction. On the other side men, who judge only by results, drew conclusions unfavourable to the troops engaged from the issue of this affair. It is not pretended that these Battalions endeavored by a very desperate valor to retrieve the natural consequences of the false manœuvres of the day ; but it cannot be too often repeated that the *élite* of an European army compelled by their instructions thus to disunite their strength and efforts could only have achieved success against all the chances, and probabilities of war. On the whole it is marvellous that the apologists, who saw in the first attack on Kemmendine a mere demonstration, and in the repulse of Kaiklo an event unworthy of commemoration, did not bethink them of designating as an expensive *ruse* the ill-devised affair of Wattee-goung.

III.

The vanity of the Barbarians had now once more dragged them full into the vortex of offensive operations. They had in the third week of November drawn, according to their own estimate, forty-nine thousand men around Prome. The British General longed for the crisis, towards which all things were hastening. He knew that there was no wisdom in despising his foe. At this period advantages might be derived from seeming to over-rate him. Without suspending for a moment his preparations for an advance upon the capital, he caused his whole front to be covered with intrenchments. A redoubt and battery of eighteen pounders, constructed in the suburbs of Prome, was prepared to sweep the plains from the river to the central road. At the point, where the route from the ford of Zioup unites with that from Issay-Myo a second work, surrounding a small Pagoda, secured the command of both. A continued line of breast work connected this with the *bund* of the lake, which covers the left and left centre of the heights, on which the troops were cantoned. Those green, sylvan heights were also covered with intrenchments. The Engineers pressed their work with such activity, and perseverance in this quarter, that it became the standing

jest to ask them “whether they meant to *appui* the right on Siam, and the Chinese Sea.” At length, these lines extended along seven miles of front. There were five thousand bayonets to defend them. This at least partook of the nature of a *ruse*.

Sir Archibald Campbell disembarassed his rear by causing a brigade under Lieut. Colonel Godwin to move upon Shwè-doung-myo. This officer made a rapid march. But the enemy avoided the conflict by precipitately abandoning the town. This happened on the 24th November. On the 20th, the 25th, and 26th, the Burmans attacked with a force, which ought to have overwhelmed it, the detachment, which held Padoung. Capt. Deane of the Royal Regiment landed guns from the boats, entrenched his position, and frustrated with the most creditable resolution every attempt to dislodge him. His determined resistance wearied out an enemy ten times the number of his little force. All was secure in this quarter. But the grand line of the Barbarians was by this time entrenched in the most formidable manner upon, and behind the Nawaing. Their extreme right lay in redoubts amongst the rocks of the right bank of the Irawaddy. On this bank commanded the Tsa-dau-woon, the same officer, who in 1824 had followed up his successes at Kaiklo by wreaking

a horrible vengeance on his prisoners. This personage held an office in the household of Royalty at Ava. His functions were connected with the banquets of the Monarch. In the British camp he was known by the familiar title of the “King’s Cook.”

The white Pagoda of Napadee is built on an elevated summit on the left bank of the river. The point juts into the stream, and thus stands full in view from Prome, and its cantonments. The base of the hill is thickly wooded. To this spot every telescope had been for weeks directed. Parties were seen every hour felling the forest trees on the sides of the mount. Occasionally war-boats dropping down engaged in a skirmish with the advanced boats of the flotilla. The vessels of the latter sometimes pushing on to reconnoitre, were cannonaded from the height, on which the Burmans had already unmasked a battery.

This was the enemy’s right. His centre was enclosed in seven stockades at Wattec-goung. His left was posted on the Nawaing at the hamlet of Tsenbike. Here Maha-Nemyo, who directed the operations of the whole line, had fixed his Head Quarters. The stockades of Tsenbike were filled with provincial levies from the North Eastern districts of the Empire conquered from the Chinese in the reign of Shenbooreng.

These Shan mountaineers are commonly taller than the Burmans, and of fairer complexions. They are equally robust, and active. But their value at this period consisted chiefly in their never before having been opposed to the British. They had marched under Maha-Nemyo in full confidence of victory.

Prome was now entrenched. Camp equipage and supplies of every kind had been poured into it by water. By the same route the army had been re-inforced with H. M's. 87th, an Irish Regiment of high reputation. All was organized for an advance. Prome like all towns long occupied by the English had now a public opinion. This opinion was divided. "Will the enemy attack or not?" This was the thesis. Circumstances seemed likely to superinduce a necessity for anticipating the true solution of this important problem. The Peguers loved the English; but they dreaded the vengeance of a Government perfectly satanic, under which they had groaned for years. In spite of recent experience they cherished exaggerated notions of its power. The intrenchments in front of the town had been thrown up chiefly by natives of Pegue. They had refused remuneration. "We are laboring," said they, "for the common safety." A considerable number of them had been hired as drivers for the Bengal Foot Artillery. A

sickly chill of dread came over these men when they found Promé environed by a Burman army. They abandoned their employments in dismay. The service was crippled by this desertion. The vicinity of such an imposing force prevented foraging. *The British had no cavalry.* It was now discovered that this arm might be useful even in a land of swamps and forests. Serious alarm was caused by the deficiency of subsistence for the large magazines of cattle, which were pent within the line of the Nawaing. The climate of Burma allows hardly six months for war. The capital was distant. It became doubtful whether it was any longer wise to wait until the Barbarians should make the first move.

Sir Archibald Campbell took his resolution. He determined to move first, to pivot on his left, which was strong, and to throw two divisions in a mass upon the Burman left. Then if he succeeded in crushing it, to attack their right in its turn, and burst open the passage of Irawaddy. His soldiers were impatient to try the mettle of the Shans.

The 1st Brigade consisted as before of the 13th, and 38th Regiments. It was now commanded by Lieut. Colonel Sale, the Major Sale of Kumaroot, of Rangoon, of Bassein. The 2d Brigade commanded by Lieut. Colonel El-

rington was composed of the King's 47th, and the 38th Madras Native Infantry. The 87th was strong enough to form in itself a half Brigade of respectable numbers. This was the first division. The second commanded by General Cotton brought into the field four Battalions ; two British, the 41st and 89th ; two Native, the 18th and 28th. This partition left four Native Regiments, the 12th, the 22d, the 30th, and the 43d, for the defence of Prome. The 26th, or Kemmendine Regiment was destined to amuse the enemy by a demonstration on the coast-road to Napadee in concert with the flotilla.

IV.

The two divisions took the field on the 1st of December the anniversary of the appearance of Bandoola in front of Rangoon. Long before dawn the rattling of wheels, the tramp of horses, and the hum of voices from numerous and noisy followers announced to the Peguers that war was resumed in earnest. The point of rendezvous was the redoubt at the junction of the roads from Issay-Myo, and the ford of Zioup.

The works at Tsenbike were said to defend both banks of the Nawaing. It was arranged therefore that the second division should advance up the left bank, whilst the first forded at

Zioup, and continued its march along the right. The movement was perfectly safe ; for the columns would be always within cannon-shot of each other, and being composed the one of Infantry and Artillery, and the other of all arms, were individually capable of giving battle to the whole corps of Shans in open field.

The columns began to debouch, General Cotton leading. A diverging line soon conducted him to some distance from General Campbell's division, which in its turn advanced. As the latter passed the ford a heavy cannonade in the direction of the river proved that Sir James Brisbane had exactly timed his co-operation. Every thing was proceeding according to previous calculation. But the progress of the first division was checked by a stream which its pioneers had to bridge with earth, and felled brushwood. The column had been marching three hours. In half an hour more, General Campbell debouched upon a plain of rice-fields, on which were visible the streamers floating from the funeral pagodas of Saigee. On his right the Nawaing, masked for some furlongs by thickets, now again flowed full in view. In an instant the sound of General Cotton's cannon struck the ear. The discharges followed each other rapidly. Then succeeded the thick rolling of musquetry. Fortune had conducted the second

division first to the encounter with the Shans. General Campbell saw that the Barbarians had but one chance of success. He would not leave them this. He caused Lieut. Colonel Elrington to countermarch the second Brigade, and replace it behind the ford of Zioup in readiness to defeat any hasty movement of the Burmans at Napadee against Prome. The rest of the column pressed onwards towards the Nawaing. The advanced guard arrived in time to open across the river a hasty fire upon the masses of the enemy, which they beheld hurrying from the field in all the dismay of incurable defeat.

General Cotton had followed the left bank of the Nawaing. His troops marched in perfect order. His van-guard, and flank patrols felt the way cautiously. The division was so disposed that on the first intelligence of the enemy, the Artillery had only to unlimber, and the columns to close, and commence to debouch. About noon the advance became engaged with the enemy. General Cotton flew to the front, and discerned darkly appearing through the palmyra groves three large works presenting an echelloned front resting on the Nawaing. He took the resolution of instantly attacking them with his whole division in junction. The guns of the Artillery were pushed boldly on, and directed steadily a few discharges. The 41st were to

lead the Infantry. General Cotton put himself at their head, and animated them with his voice, by his gestures, and example. The division rushed on impetuously after a leader, in whom they fully confided. The Shans earned with their blood the character of brave men. They fired with the steadiness of veteran troops. Two officers and thirty men of the 41st fell in a moment. The works were not worthy of the courage of these provincials. The timbers were imperfectly conjoined. The leading soldiers quickly tore down an opening for themselves and their General. In an instant the 41st were engaged hand to hand with the Shans. Then the column rushed like a torrent into the works. The Shans neither found nor sued for quarter. They fought until inevitable defeat rendered flight no longer shameful. Maha-Nemyo died at his post. He was bayonètted in the *mêlée* when the heat of conflict levelled all distinctions. His gilded palankeen fell into the hands of the British, who were rewarded with abundance of barbaric spoil. The stockades contained some hundreds of the active, shapely, ponies of Pegue. Many of them were decked with rich furniture. Full two-thirds of these little steeds were captured. The attack happening at noon, the numerous train of valuable elephants had been driven to pasture, and

thus escaped the victors. Three only were taken.

The first division halted in the plain on the right of the Nawaing, when it perceived that the affair was over. Shan prisoners were sent in every minute from the successful division to be interrogated at Head Quarters touching the numbers, loss, and line of retreat of the enemy. The captives were men of lofty stature, and of complexions remarkably fair for those of Orientals. The expression of their features, their air and gestures were wild, and uncouth, but without ferocity. In a few moments General Cotton, who had thrown himself hastily upon one of the captured steeds bedizened with Burman finery, forded the river, and galloped up to the first division with the narrative of his achievement. He had left Prome suffering from a lameness, the effect of an accident, which rendered the motion of his charger insupportable. Yet had he been the fifth man to enter the enemy's works.

The troops halted some hours in sight of the blazing stockades in high spirits at the success of their first movement. As day declined, the first division countermarched, and bivouacked at night at the ford of Zioup. The second division formed its bivouac near Tsenbike.

V.

On the morning of the 2nd General Campbell proceeded to follow up his blow. The enemy's left was shattered, demolished. His centre was too distant to cause any uneasiness. It remained to offer his right the option of fighting, or abandoning the line of the Irawaddy. At dawn the first division began to lead across the plains in the direction of the great river. In half an hour the head of the column plunged into a thick forest. At distant intervals only the tedium of the route was relieved by the sight of little glades of delicious verdure. Then again the woods closed over the heads and thickened around the path of the troops. At length they emerged upon a spacious plain.

The spectacle was beautiful. This was one of the finest days of an Indian December, clear, bright, and cool. The line of march lay directly transverse to the great Irawaddy, which rolled majestically along at the foot of rocks of varied outline wooded to the summit. In its channel rode the thirty vessels of the flotilla all prepared for action. Horses and men of the lengthened column glittered in the clear sunshine as issuing from behind the curtain of the forest they gradually spread themselves into the plain. All was bustle, and animation ; for

though the troops had been disappointed in their first hope of finding the enemy encamped on this level, yet there on the wooded heights to the right, and around the Pagoda hill of Napadee, there the Barbarians yet remained, untaught by the experience of yesterday, prepared to await another onset entrenched to the teeth.

Their telescopes shewed to the staff the hills bristled with guns, and palisades, and covered with moving figures. The dispositions were quickly made. The first division was pressing on left in front. As Brigades, and half brigades successively debouched, it was only necessary to cause them to close to head of column. A simple wheel of each mass to the right then presented to the enemy's alignment the heads of three columns of attack on a parallel base. The second division was still struggling through the forest. General Cotton was instructed to follow the movements of the left, prolong his line for some hundred yards, and then imitating the manœuvre of the preceding brigades to bring up the left shoulder, and to penetrate the woods, which would now lie before him, and outfront and turn the enemy's entire left. The second brigade was to attack their left and left centre. The 87th to penetrate their centre. The first brigade to march

upon the line of the river bank, and storm the Pagoda hill of Napadee. The Body Guard was halted in reserve.

The Naval, and Military Commanders were speedily in communication. It was arranged that the flotilla should aid the manœuvres of the Army by pressing up the Irawaddy, and menacing, and cannonading the enemy's right. Instantly every vessel was in motion. Animating cheers burst from the crews as they saw their flotilla successfully contending against the stream, by the aid of oars, of sails, of steam.

The pivot of the whole movement was the left. The first Brigade had to follow the long, glittering, sandy, line of the river bank. The Bengal Horse Artillery was advanced to gain a point, from which an effective cannonade might be opened on the Pagoda hill. It commenced its adventurous route over rocks, and deep beds of *nullus*. It was important to bring its guns speedily into battery. Its fire, and the movement of the fleet would arrest, and fix the attention of the enemy, whilst the three columns of the centre, and right gained ground through the thickly woven thickets, which lay before them. It was reasonable to expect to find masked defences in these woods. The Brigades were compelled to sound them cautiously by advanced parties. After much exer-

tion the Artillery was brought within a thousand yards of the hill of Napadee. An untoward incident occurred at the commencement of its task. A howitzer twice missed fire, doubtless from the defect of the powder in the chamber. Forgetting in the haste of the moment that the ignited fuse was rapidly burning, Captain Lumsden ordered the shell to be drawn forth. It burst in the hands of those who were examining it. A lascar was blown to atoms, an Artillery-man mutilated, and the Captain thrown scorched and contused to the ground. He sprang upon his feet in a moment, to the surprise of all around him, seated himself near the spot, and continued calmly to direct the exertions of his officers, and men. Balls and shells were seen to glance upon the glittering surface of the white Pagoda. The flotilla had arrived within cannon shot. The Burmaus had provided against its advance, and laid the whole of their immoveable artillery, most of which was of large calibre, to bear upon the river. The cannonade became lively. The vessels made the guns in their bows tell upon the position. Their crews of all countries displayed the best spirit.

The 87th, as it moved towards the enemy's line, found its right threatened by a work perched on the salient point of a hill, which com-

manded the valley, by which they were debouching. It was necessary to storm it. Lieutenant Trant, of the Quarter-Master General's department, placed himself at their head, and shewed them the way into the stockade without a check. This was the *coup d'essai* of the corps in Ava. Farther onwards a succession of works awaited them.

A few minutes afterwards the *fusillade* of the second Brigade was heard. The fire was protracted, ceased, was renewed again more briskly than before. It became evident that the Barbarians were disputing every inch of their formidable ranges of heights with Colonel Elrington. But there was no cause for uneasiness or precipitation. The menacing movement of General Cotton must finally compromise that point of the position. There was the weight of his whole division in the scale. If the British left were successful, the Burman left, though it should prolong its resistance to midnight, must give way in the morning.

The Pagoda hill of Napadee looked frowning and formidable from the post of the Bengal Horse Artillery. The approach to it along the water's edge was bristled like the back of the porcupine with pointed stakes. The gorges of the forest passes, which conducted upon its left, were closed with breast-works. The 87th

were already warmly engaged towards the right centre. This column gradually diverged in the midst of the thick wood somewhat from its projected route. Thus it was brought full upon some of the stoutest defences, which it would otherwise have turned. These troops, new to jungle warfare, expended some cartridges, which the more practised battalions would have reserved; but their spirit, impetuosity, and perseverance soon overcame all obstacles.

The unlucky intervention of a ridge of rocks rendered it impossible to fix within a shorter range the battery of the Horse Artillery. It was too distant to display to full advantage its excellent practice. Many shot from all its guns, but the twelve pounders, fell short. The rockets were now brought up. Flights were discharged alternately against the hill of Napadee, and the heights of the right bank. On the latter the enemy held redoubts, the fire of which might take in flank the first Brigade. The flotilla neared the Pagoda mount. The moment had arrived for striking the decisive blow.

The first Brigade advanced to the attack. The 38th led. Difficulties vanished as they moved on in remarkable order, and in all the confidence of remembered advantages. They turned the formidable abbatis by a slight inclination to their right. At the foot of the hill

they found a part of the 87th, who had already forced a passage through the strongest of the advanced defences. Colonel Sale halted his men to draw breath for the last effort. At that moment the crews of the flotilla carried away by a false, but pardonable, ardor quitted their boats, and sabre and pistol in hand, rushed tumultuously, and with loud huzzas towards the hill. Never was enthusiasm more uselessly lavished; for before they could reach the point of attack, every thing was gained. Already the hill of Napadee glittered with the armed files of the first Brigade. The defence of this post did little credit to the Barbarians. They abandoned it in consternation. Still the sailors followed with breathless haste the track of the column. The last jinjal shot, which was fired from the height, struck the thigh of Captain Dawson, the naval officer, who led the van of this lavish display of intrepidity, and lacerated the femoral artery. He bled to death in a few minutes. The style, in which he had laid on his gun-boat in the fire, had excited the admiration of both services. The death of Captain Alexander by fever had given him only a few weeks before this event the rank of Commander.

Success was no longer doubtful. The Barbarians, in the left centre, and left continued

indeed to dispute the ground with the second Brigade, until after sunset. Then the Brigade ceased to attack them, and they retired under the cover of night. But Napadee, the key of the position, was in the hands of the British, who found its slopes, and crest, furrowed with intrenchments, loaded with stores of grain, and strewed with dismounted guns, and the mangled bodies of the Barbarians. The crews of the flotilla had lost some time in their unnecessary act of soldièrship. They redeemed it by resuming their places in their vessels and pressing on rapidly after the boats of the Burmans. These were too numerous to be manned or moored without great loss of time. As fast as they were seized, they were sent adrift. Vessels of various sizes and shapes floating in hundreds down the stream carried to Prome the first intimation of the success of the British. For three hours the inhabitants of that town crowded upon its ramparts had listened to, and watched, with deep anxiety the roar, and flash of adverse artillery. They now perceived that their oppressors had fled. The troops had been marching from dawn. They were half dead with fatigue, and the thirst caused by a burning sun, when the affair was brought to a close. Yet they spent in their bivouacs a contented and joyous night. *The manœuvres of the 1st and*

2nd December, 1825, will hereafter be considered the most able, the best conceived, and combined, as well as the most successful of all those executed by General Sir Archibald Campbell in Ava.

On the morning of the 3rd all accounts agreed that consternation reigned amongst the Burmans. It was known that they had abandoned Wattee-goung ; it was said that they would not halt at Meeaday. The British prepared to follow them. But much had to be done before the army could hope to move on uninterruptedly. Its camp equipage was yet in Promé. In the department of Commissariat many arrangements had yet to be matured. It remained to clear the right bank of the enemy. They yet held in force their works in that quarter. On the morning of the 3rd a portion of the second division was embarked in the flotilla. The troops were carried high enough up the stream to gain in crossing a point above the principal work. A low island of sand runs along the opposite shore a few hundred yards above Napadee. Rocket, and howitzer batteries were established upon it. Their fire, and an equally well-directed flight of rockets from the steam vessel, which passed boldly under several of the detached works, seemed to decide the enemy. The whole line was abandoned soon after the troops landed.

But the Barbarians retiring from these works were reformed in a stockade about half a mile inland by the exertions of the Tsa-dau-woon. General Cotton traced their retreat, and marched rapidly against them. He allowed them not a moment to recover their self-possession. He pushed three columns in his quick, decisive way upon as many sides of the hold; he stormed it in a moment, losing only one man, and bayonetting three hundred. There was no more thought of a halt near Prome. "The King's Aid-de-camp," said the soldiers in their sallies of rude merriment on this occasion, "the King's Aid-de-camp has at length *basted* the King's cook."

VI.

The army lay encamped on the river side. On the 8th the second division marched once more to Zioup. The second kept its ground. Both thus stood upon the points, from which they were to direct their advance upon Meeaday, the second division by a road not far distant from the Irawaddy; the first by a route through the heart of the vast forests, which surround Wattee-goung. Head Quarters were fixed at the abandoned works, near the spot so inauspicious to the British, on the 10th. The sit of the 11th was marked by the com-

mencement of a tremendous fall of rain in every sense unseasonable. The tortuous road through the forest was crossed at every hundred yards by the sandy beds of *nullas*. There was reason to dread the swelling of these streams. The route was, at the best, practicable only by dint of excessive labor. If the rains had been prolonged, half of the horses of the Artillery, and the cattle of the Commissariat must have been lost. Providentially it ceased in forty-eight hours. Head Quarters were at Tsendoup in the woods on the 15th; and at Toung-ken-daing on the 17th. Here the column once more gained the open plains. At Taboo on the 18th, the troops saw before them another portion of the chain of heights on the right of the Irawaddy, which they were now nearly approaching after their lengthened circuit. They here restored their communications, with the second division, and with the flotilla, on board of which the Royal Regiment had been again embarked.

The divisions united on the 19th under the walls of Meeaday. It had been abandoned. Its site is elevated: the Irawaddy washes its westward, a *nulla* protects its southward front. But eastward is a height, the possession of which would speedily lead to the reduction of the town. The columns on their route, and the flotilla on its voyage had found intrenchments, which

must have cost twenty thousand men the continued labor of weeks, all abandoned. The smoke of their conflagration rose on every side for leagues.

Meeaday covered with Pagodas was a perfect charnel-house. Chôlera had caused dreadful ravages amongst the retreating Burmans. The stench of graves constructed in haste compelled the army to encamp in the adjacent plains. The Barbarian chiefs had adhered to their old system of terror. Mutilated bodies of the refractory peasants were found in numbers floating down the stream of the Irawaddy. Of many victims the arms had been amputated at the elbow, of many the legs had been sawn off at the knee joint. A line of crucifixes was seen in the valley below Meeaday. The crows and kites yet hovered over the skeletons, which hung upon them suspended by the hair of the head, the wrists, and ancles. The families of the wretched cultivators of the soil were compelled to embark in boats, and driven up the stream by bodies of the armed Barbarians with volleys of jinjals, and musquetry. The van-guard of the British often witnessed these scenes, which were protracted to the end of the war

A deficiency of cattle for slaughter rendered it necessary to halt the first division some days

Near Meeaday. Head Quarters were put in motion, together with the second on the 20th. The two Brigades of this division moved consecutively at the interval of a day's march. The enemy were evidently in full retreat upon Melloon. It was calculated that Head Quarters would reach Patanagoh opposite to the grand camp in eight marches. On the 22d, they were at Kowlan, on the 23d at Bol, on the 24th at Nan-pyoo-dau, on the 25th at Loongee, celebrated for its beauty in the history of Symes, on the 26th at Kodoung-wa, on the 27th amongst the elaborate temples of Mee-goung-yè. These halting places with names uncouth and barbarous were commonly marked only by a few huts, a large pagoda, or a cemetery. Wherever the route lay along the river side the eye was feasted with the spectacle of this noble stream, and the wooded boundary beyond it; but when the columns wound inland, it seemed as if they had come to subdue a land already devoted to desolation. Their approach to the villages was hailed only by the howling of mongrel dogs. A few decrepit peasants too infirm to follow the line of forced retreat had been left to perish by starvation. A few sufferers were making the last struggle against the pangs of cholera. The soil of the district was commonly sandy, and incapable of cultivation. The

land was covered for leagues with forest, which there seemed to be little temptation to clear away.

The court of Ava had always looked to Melloon as the point, beyond which under the most sinister circumstances, the march of British conquest could never extend. It believed this camp to be wholly inexpugnable. All the reports of its officers encouraged the same notion. Even the Kee-Woonghee had never ventured to breathe a doubt of its security. His dismay therefore, and that of his colleagues, was frightful, when they saw their disheartened legions pressed back upon this rallying point, so hastily, that no time remained to bring up the necessary reinforcements. It was of the last importance to gain the respite of a few days. Accordingly at Loongee a proposal was made to the British to renew the negotiations for peace. Sir Archibald Campbell felt that he could treat to more advantage at Patanagoh. It was not therefore until the second division had encamped at Mee-goung-ye, one short march from Melloon, that he dispatched the Adjutant General, and Lieut. Smith to the Burman Head Quarters. These officers found the Barbarians, in a state of alarm, which they strove in vain to conceal: but as the conference ended without the adoption of any reasonable

basis of negotiation, the second division resumed its march, and at nine in the morning of the 29th, the column debouched upon the Irawaddy at Patanagoh.

The advance of this force through forests, and deserted districts, had been painful. But this moment repaid it. The Barbarian camp was full in view separated from the army by a stream scarcely five hundred yards in breadth. The perpetual line of wooded hill formed the background of the picture. Below it was the grand quadrangle of Melloon inclosing in its area the huts of seven thousand troops, the residences of the chiefs, and picturesque masses of white, black, red, and gilded pagodas. The most striking of these stood at the South Eastern angle on the river bank. It was richly gilt from pinnacle to base. This was the cenotaph of Bandoola. This memorial of the best of their warriors was erected on the spot, on which the Burmans had promised themselves the glory of arresting the march of the British. The monument of Bandoola was to mark the grave of the success of the invaders. A fordable *nulla* covered the left face of the great work. A cluster of chunamed temples occupied the North Eastern angle. Beyond the little stream an unfinished redoubt was yet filled with busy artificers. But lower down the stream other intrenchments

caught the eye, the outline of which was partially hidden from view by the rocky heights, the undulations of which they followed. The whole area of the great work seemed alive with swarms of armed Barbarians hurrying to and fro, but as yet in silence. The British officers leapt from their horses, hastened down to the river bank, and began to survey at leisure through their telescopes this interesting spectacle. Here then was Melloon, where the sceptre of Barbarian power must be broken! Here were the last intrenchments, which barred the way to Ava!

A long line of boats, of war-gallies richly gilt, of barges with painted roofs, and of the humbler vessels of the retreating peasantry was stretched along the shore beneath the works. Suddenly the dissonant clang of numerous gongs struck upon the ear. The peal of the barbarian drums joined with this inharmonious toscin. The din of thousands of voices came across the waters. The whole camp was in uproar. In a moment the lengthened line of vessels was put in motion, slowly at first, then by degrees quickly, and more quickly. This was too rich a prize to be lost by inaction. Sir Archibald Campbell hastily posted his battalions, and moved up the left bank to seek a favorable point to intercept the retiring fleet. The Horse Artillery followed the movement of his

Staff. Less than a quarter of a mile above Patanagoh a wooded point juts out into the stream affording one of the most commanding views of the scenery of the stream. Here two guns, and two howitzers were planted. They begun to throw shrapnel, and round shot in the direction of the headmost boats. The terrified peasants rushed into the shoal water, and along the sands with dismal cries of terror. It was a cannonade of menace and alarm, not mischief. The General had ordered the guns to be elevated so as to project their frightful missiles over the heads of these unfortunates. But the terrific rebound of shot and shell upon the sand soon communicated the intended hint. A Peguer in British employ was directed to explain in a loud voice the purpose of the fire. The condition of its cessation was soon complied with. The huge mass of boats became stationary.

Officers galloped up from the rear to announce the approach of the flotilla. In a moment its boats were seen led by the steam vessel. The Commodore arriving below Melloon had comprehended at once the importance of passing it. "We must run the gauntlet," he said, with the feeling of the Nelson school "push on—we must pass the works of the Burnans." The flotilla advanced. The army in

astonishment waited to see the hostile storm of bullets poured on it from Melloon. Not a shot, not a voice; all was silent in the camp. The British vessels began to anchor unmolested beyond the Barbarian hold, and ahead of the boats, the capture of which thus seemed to be secured beyond accident.

The sight of two war-boats at the bows of the steam vessel, and subsequently of a white flag in a canoe, which pushed off from the opposite bank, led to the explanation of the mystery. Burman officers, arriving in the camp avowed with every appearance of sincerity the determination of the chiefs to conclude a peace on this spot, at whatever sacrifices their enemy might exact. This they said, had induced them to forego the advantage of firing on the flotilla. They even insinuated that the act of cannonading their boats was contrary to the understanding, which had existed at the termination of the conference of yesterday. This assumption was wholly unfounded. The declarations of the Adjutant General had been perfectly candid, and explicit. Thus with a deliberate perversion of fact veiled by a tattered mask of frankness commenced the second negotiations of the Burmans with the British.

VII.

The line of policy adopted at this crisis by the British Commissioners can only be accounted for on the supposition that the chance of a pacification appeared to them to be of such value to the state, which they represented, as to justify a departure from ordinary rules of diplomacy in order to secure it. The Barbarians had been beaten in three successive actions. In their panic they had retired beyond their proposed point of formation. No position could rally them. They had been hurried back in confusion upon their last place of arms. An armistice was necessary to save their capital. They had no right to hope that any negotiator would concede to them this invaluable favor without demanding an equivalent. The fair price of the concession was the evacuation of Melloon, the recognition of a line drawn through Sembewghewn as one of demarcation, within which the Burmans ought forthwith to have retired; and up to which the British should have advanced by restricted marches. If these conditions had been spurned, Melloon would have fallen twelve hours after the British columns had closed on Patanagoh, and the Burman monarch would have felt that the British were already at the gates of his capital.

The Burman ministers could no longer have concealed from their master the disasters which threatened to crush the Empire. If the sound measure of applying this effective test of the sincerity of the Burmans, and their real ability to conclude a peace, did in fact suggest itself to the mind of the first Commissioner, he may be supposed to have abandoned it from an indignant resolution not to permit that spirit of detraction, which ever haunts the footsteps of the bold, and the successful, to point to him as the obstacle to an arrangement, which might be thought beneficial to his country. *Liberal* principles prevailed; hostilities were unconditionally suspended. The Burmans must have been struck with amazement at the lavish generosity of their opponents. At all events they resolved to profit by it.

The negotiators met at two in the afternoon of the 30th December in a large boat moored in the middle of the stream of the Irawaddy. The conferences were resumed on the 31st and 1st. An active part was taken in them by Colaing Menghee, a personage who was represented to have received recent, particular, and confidential instructions from the Court. They terminated on the 2nd in a treaty, which gave the British all, which they had demanded; Arracan, the maritime conquests, and a crore of

rupees. Fifteen days were allowed for the ratification of this compact by the Burman monarch. The pacification was announced to the Army. Captain Snodgrass, and Lieut. Smith, Bengal Army, Assistants to the Commissioners took their departure for the Supreme Presidency to procure the reciprocal ratification.

In the camp it became a fashion to regard as a mark of a contracted mind any doubt of the sincerity of the Burmans, or the stability of pacific relations. "Our late enemies," it was said, "have acted with great fairness in this solemn transaction. They have pleaded with a candor, which may be even called affecting, the poverty and misfortunes of their Court as a reason why heavy pecuniary indemnities should not be exacted from them by a generous foe. It is now notorious that this plea is founded in fact, a reason the most cogent for the speedy termination of a contest by which the British can gain nothing. They have submitted with a good grace to indispensable sacrifices. They have contended against these concessions only to the point, which love of country justifies. There is no reason whatever to suspect them of Punic faith." These views were willingly adopted by many, who were naturally weary of a war protracted beyond all expectation, and the opening of which had been

calamitous. But all were not convinced by these reasonings. Some still thought that the hopes of Ava "had" not even yet "vanished," that its court would not after all consent to learn the difficult lesson of humility until the British Army should arrive under the walls of the capital. They remarked that the Burmans were still strengthening their position at Melloon. The noise of intrenching tools was distinctly heard in the night. The unfinished works evidently increased day after day. Reinforcements were known to have marched in since the 2nd. But prepossession was deaf as well as blind.

As the term passed away the minds and spirits of the force united since the 31st upon Patanagoh stagnated in inaction. The scarcity of good cheer somewhat contracted the channel of festivity. There was little of local interest in the woods, and pagodas of Patanagoh. Ennui was to be dispelled only by forming endless conjectures relative to the arrival of that ratification, which was to produce a change of scene; and by studying the characters of the Burman chiefs, who constantly visited the British camp. The most amusing of these was Maha Silwa. He was an original compounded of broad buffoonery, debauchery, and gasconade. He feasted, and drank *con amore* at the best tables in the camp, affected to ridi-

culc the Kee-Woonghee, and his colleagues, lauded his own sincerity, and attachment, to the British, and told bravadoing stories of his exploits in Assam. Amongst other pranks he offered to run two excellent ponies of the country against the best Arabs in the camp. The loser was to forfeit his steed. The race took place on the sands, which were soon to become the scene of graver follies. The little steeds acquitted themselves admirably, but were beaten. Maha Silwa surrendered them with a good grace. It was thought that he internally promised himself ample amends from the cellar of the winner.

VIII.

Time passed on slowly: but the 18th January must arrive at last. Doubts and suspicions had come before it. Should the calculations of the pacific party prove fallacious it would be painful to look back upon more than half a month lost out of a short season. The ratification was to be displayed in a full conference on board the vessel of congress. At eleven o'clock on the 18th the Commissioners and their diplomatic subordinates had assembled at the tent of the Military Commander. They were met by the numerous Staff, and all the officers of rank in full dress. It was intended to render the assemblage as imposing as possi-

ble. Boats were already prepared to convey the whole party to the conference, when the selfsame messenger, who had brought the first overtures to Prome, the Secretary of the province of Lee-maing, landed from Melloon to announce the sickness of Rajah Colaing Menghee. In an instant suspicion took possession of the most sanguine. This was no time to trifle. Mr. Mangles, the Secretary to the Commission, crossed over to Melloon to demand the frankest explanations. The Kee-Woonghee and his colleagues confessed that the ratification had not arrived from Ava. Neither had the British and American prisoners of war, and *detenus* been sent down according to stipulation. An inconsiderable portion of the treasure had reached Melloon. This the chiefs had the effrontery to offer as a pledge of their sincerity. They professed to be greatly surprised, and deeply mortified at this want of punctuality on the part of their Government. They entreated the British to attribute the delay to accident, to misconception, to any thing but a desire on the part of the Court of Ava to disturb the relations of amity, which they persisted in describing as definitively established. Finally they demanded the delay of some days to clear up the mystery, and give time for a reference to Prince Meng-mya-boo, who was stated to be at some distance from Melloon.

The imposture had become too gross for digestion. The demand of delay was answered by a proposal for the evacuation of Melloon, as the only tangible pledge of fair intentions. This was met by evasion. At length therefore Mr. Mangles returned to Patanagoh. General Sir Archibald Campbell must have felt the triumph of his opinions. He suffered however nothing to escape him, but expressions of his deep regret that his best efforts to obtain a peace for his Government had failed.

But to the Burmans it had become necessary to use a different language. "Tell the Kee-Woonghee," said the General, "that hostilities will recommence at midnight. Convey to him, and to his colleagues my advice, as their friend, that they hasten their preparations for departure ; for before sunset to-morrow my troops will be masters in Melloon."

The sun of the 18th descended beautifully behind the purple heights, which are piled up to the westward in rear of the camp of Melloon. For the last time the gongs and drums of the Barbarians were heard marking the watches of the night. The silence of the British camp was scarcely broken by the labors of the Engineers, who exactly at midnight began to carry down to the river bank their fascines, sand bags, and gabions.

IX.

In a former description the intrenched camp of Melloon has been contemplated as a picturesque object. As a military position it was defective. The left bank has here the command, especially near the point, on which stood the Pagoda of Patanagoh: and although the rearward faces of the intrenchments were perched on acclivities far higher than any on the opposing shore, yet the Eastern or river face described a line at the foot of a considerable slope. Thus from Patanagoh the interior angles of the great work were completely seen, and its northern and southern faces exposed to a murderous enfilade. This evil, would, according to the original plan of the Burmans, have been mitigated; because they would have held in force the left bank also. But the rapid march of disaster had allowed them no time to complete the works, which they had begun to trace there. As at Donabyoo, so at Melloon, it was vain to attack out-works or subsidiary intrenchments. Victory was to be decided in the great quadrangle. The troops were inferior to those at Donabyoo, and the Barbarians had now no leader, on whom they relied with half the confidence, which they had reposed in Bandoola, or even Maha-Nemyo. The presence too of their whole force united upon a single point at Pa-

tanagoh, from which they had calmly surveyed the enemy's works for three successive weeks, gave the British a manifest advantage. But besides this the Barbarian position had been compromised to a dangerous extent from the very moment that the flotilla had passed the left of their range of works. Thenceforth General Campbell had the power to cross the river above Patanagoh, and march upon the communications of the enemy.

When on the 29th of December an officer in common with others surveyed Melloon from the opposite pagodas, and meditating on the mode of attack, beheld the unexpected movement of the fleet; he thought he saw the forerunner of a brilliant advantage. It appeared to him that the Barbarians had placed in the hands of their enemies the assurance of a success unequalled during the war. The character of the expected action seemed to be entirely changed. It was no longer a question how to pass a defended river in the face of an enemy. It was now expedient to act upon a very different plan, which would leave to the Barbarians no alternative but evacuating Melloon without a shot or suffering a sanguinary discomfiture. The time had now arrived, when the Burmans were to find that the trick of evasion before the moment of assault, as successfully practised at Kemmen-

dine, and Donabyoo, could not be repeated for ever. The Northern face of the great work was now the true side of attack ; as it was evident that through the North-Western angle ran the oblique line, by which the enemy would endeavor to retreat. To mask the whole manœuvre it would have been necessary to have caused a brigade to form opposite to the lowest of all the outworks, that is to say, the pagoda redoubt farthest to the south. A division of boats should have been brought to this point. The fire of batteries, and these preparations would have attracted the attention of the Barbarians. The woods of Patanagoh concealing its only road to the north, would admirably have furthered the execution of this plan. The force would have broken up before day-light leaving its tents standing. It would have gained the right bank, by means of the fleet, a thousand yards above Melloon, instantly wheeled to its left, and advanced silently and rapidly in three columns of attack. The Brigade, which affected to menace the enemy's right would have sufficed to guard the left bank. It was said that reinforcements were encamped on the plains to the northward, upon which the force would now have debouched. It would have routed them. Each column would have had its own advance and rear-guard, fascines and ladders. Two co-

columns would have attacked contiguously adjacent points. The third would have chosen a route, which would have brought it upon the road leading upon the North-Western angle of the place. It would have seized the communications of the enemy. The opening roar of the batteries on the left bank would have been the signal for the assault. All that afterwards occurred; confirms the opinion that this plan at once daring, and in conformity with sound principles, would have produced grand results; especially if the small body of cavalry, which the British possessed, should have followed, and supported, the movement of the column of the right. The successful plan of the Major General was essentially different from this.

X.

When day broke on the 19th the left bank of the river was seen already lined with batteries. The Engineers had accomplished so much of their task in the night, that the bustle in the British camp did not appear lively enough to indicate any extraordinary exertion. A battery of eighteen-pounders and heavy mortars confronted the centre of the grand stockade. Another of lighter pieces had been prepared to batter the Pagoda work to the Southward. The guns and howitzers of the Horse Brigade were

in battery opposite to the left of the central work. By eleven o'clock twenty-eight mouths of fire were ready to open on Melloon. The whole strength of the Rocket Brigade was ranged near the right of the battery of the centre. At eleven Sir Archibald in person gave the word. The roar of the first salvo shook the ground, rent the air, reverberated amongst the rocks and woods behind Melloon, and died away in sullen echoes from the more distant hills. In an instant it was repeated. The deafening peals succeeded with a rapidity which suggested the image of unchecked vengeance falling in thunder upon the heads of these deceitful Barbarians. The British Officers on the left bank stooping and leaning forward, bent the eye anxiously to discern the effect upon the hostile camp. It was evident that the Artillerists had hit the range at once. Balls were seen to strike the work raising a cloud of dust and splinters, demolishing the defences, and ploughing up the area of the square. Shells lit sometimes a few paces from the parapet, behind which the garrison was crouching, bursting amongst their ranks, sometimes upon the huts of the troops, and marked points of the Pagodas. The rockets flew in the truest path. Many amongst the Barbarians, many shaped their course direct into the pavillions of the

chiefs. Partial fires were soon seen to break out at Melloon. Twice the line of the Barbarians, which manned the eastern face, gave way under the dreadful fire; twice they were rallied by their chiefs.

The storm of fire, of shells, and bullets continued without intermission for one hour, and a quarter. Fifteen minutes before one, the boats of the flotilla began to move from a point two hundred yards above the light battery. The first Brigade had been embarked on board the leading vessels. The flank companies of the 87th, the 41st, and 89th British, and strong native detachments found themselves afloat almost at the same moment on board of the remainder of the flotilla. General Cotton directed the movements of the troops last mentioned. Lieut. Colonels Godwin, Parlby, and Hunter Blair served under him as Brigadiers. This force was to gain the right bank a little above the great work and operate against its northern face now cruelly enfiladed by the guns of the Horse Brigade. As one of its columns was intended to intercept the retreat of the Burmans, the whole body ought to have been put in motion antecedently to the 1st Brigade, the movement of which should have been consecutive. But the attempt, which was made to render the advance of both simultaneous, ended in invert-

ing the order of their operation. The first Brigade came too soon, and the turning columns too late, in contact with the enemy.

All eyes were now fixed upon the progress of the 1st Brigade. Its boats began to fall rapidly down the stream. Colonel Sale was seen in the leading man-of-war's boat far a-head of the heavier vessels. The Brigade was to attack the South-Eastern angle of the great work, the abbatis of which was said to be defective. Thus it had to receive the fire of the whole Eastern front of fortification. The Burmans opened every musquet and jinjal upon it so soon as the first boat was on a line parallel to the stockade. The stream carried the British within half musquet shot of their numerous enemies, who relieved from the severity of the cannonade, which the intervention of the boats necessarily caused to be suspended, had now full leisure to direct their fire. It caused a sensation of nervous tremor amongst the unoccupied spectators on the right bank to see these two tried corps thus silently enduring the storm of Barbarian vengeance. A dense cloud of smoke from the Burman musquetry began to envelope the boats. Now and then, by the flash of a nine-pounder from one of the gun-vessels, she was seen to present her bows for an instant to the line, and direct a passing shot against the works.

But the moment of retribution was at hand. The head-most boat was seen to touch the sand. A body of troops sprung ashore. They formed themselves with the alacrity of practised *tirailleurs* under the slope of the bank. These were a part of the 38th. They began to answer, and check, the fire of the Burman bastion near them. The vessels followed as rapidly as possible. But all seemed too slow for the wishes of those, who looked upon the animating scene. They felt the inexpressible desire to urge on by the power, as it were of the imagination, to press forward, to impel to the point the head-most boats, which though dropping quickly, yet seemed to the eyes of impatience to lag. More soldiers leapt upon dry land with a cheer; others followed. The spectators looked for the leader of the Brigade. They did not yet know, that a ball had struck him between the shoulder and the breast, and that he lay swooning from the loss of blood in his boat. The numbers of the column speedily increased, it quickly assumed a shape, and was in motion. The advance ceased to fire; the mass of the 13th and 38th pressing on was in a moment at the foot of the works. Its soldiers began to spread, and seek for a gap or entrance with the ready tact produced by experience in such affairs. There was a pause of three seconds. then a move again. The British were

seen at once overleaping the works; the Burman fire ceased along the line. All was decided. The Barbarians began to rush in headlong flight across the great area; the British column to direct its course full upon the Pagodas, which marked the Head Quarters of the chiefs. The second column had landed, and was manœuvring upon the North-Western angle. The Burmans warned by the priority of the attack in front were already issuing from it in large bodies.

This was the conflict of Melloon. The British General had more than kept his word with the Barbarians. The chiefs had not fully profited by his considerate advice. They had neglected to secure their papers in their precipitate flight. In the pavillion of Meng-mya-boo, who had in truth remained in person at Melloon until the parapet was forced, was found in original the unratified treaty. With it were likewise discovered a series of documents, which threw a new, curious, and valuable light on the movements of the war party at Ava. The loss of the British had been trifling: Major Frith, of the 38th, who had landed in command of the 1st brigade, was pierced through the throat by a spear thrust through the works, as he sought for an entrance. But both he and Colonel Sale were again at the post of duty before the ter-

mination of the war. Soldiers think victory incomplete until they have pointed their jest, no matter how rude, against the losers. Henceforth the unratified compact of Melloon, was known in the camp, by the name of the *Kaleekama treaty of peace*.*

* Kaleekama, Burman, ကာလီကာမ, *lie, falsehood, liar*.

BOOK VI.

PAGAHM-MYO—YANDABO.

The Argument. The British overthrow the last Army of the Barbarians, who are compelled to conclude a peace to save their capital. I. Advance upon Waymazoop. Flank movement of Brigadier Shawe. The enemy's rear-guard under Mootoung-bo routed near Yè-nang-gyoung. II. Overtures of the Court of Ava by means of the American Missionary Price (January 31st.) The British continue to advance. They move on Pakang-yè and Sillay-Myo. III. IV. Sixteen thousand Barbarians collected for the defence of Pagahm-Myo under the Woondouk Yèyè-thoo-tsan, surnamed Naweng-bhóoreng. Affair of Pagahm (Feb. 9th.) and its consequences. V. The British march through Taroumyo to Yandabo. Successive negotiations terminate on the 24th February in a treaty of Peace and Amity. VI. VII. VIII. Three British Officers visit the court of Ava bearing presents to the Monarch. IX. The successful army is withdrawn upon Rangoon.

I.

It had become necessary to put the army once more in motion towards the capital. There was again a scarcity of cattle for consumption in the camp. For though the artifices of the Barbarians had enchained the British force in inaction for three weeks, the latter had not during that period ceased to eat, and the hope of peace had checked exertion to obtain fresh supplies. A

body of Burmans was said to have taken post at Tandwaing six marches eastward of Patanagoh, as if to menace the flank of the British. The interior was described as abounding in cattle and grain. The double temptation of aiding his Commissariat, and securing his right induced Sir Archibald Campbell to consent to detach Brigadier Shawe of the 87th, with the 2nd and 3rd Brigades of Infantry, a small body of Cavalry, and the twelve-pounders of the Horse Artillery. This flank movement did nothing towards hastening the favorable issue of the war beyond the acquisition of a few hundred head of cattle. But the valuable force thus diverted from its true object wasted its time in petty manœuvres, and harrassed by a wearying countermarch did not rejoin the Army until peace was already conquered.

The plan of the British to advance from Patanagoh upon Ava on a single line of operation appears to be in perfect conformity with the soundest rules of the art. But the boldness, and importance of the movement demanded the reserve of abstaining from all flank detachments, and of keeping the main forces constantly in junction, or ready to be united in order of battle against the Barbarians. More than this, as Burma afforded no fortified points of appui, prudence seemed peremptorily to require the

labor and expense of creating successive places of arms at calculated distances on this lengthened line. Intrenched posts at Meeaday, at Loonghee, at Patanagoh, and above it at Way-mazoop, at Pakang-yè, and on the site of the old fort of Sillay-myo, would have placed within the security of true calculations the advance to Pagahm-Myo. A few companies of resolute Sipahces would have held each of these posts, as had before been done at Kemmendine. A gun-boat stationed off each would have preserved the communications by water. It would not have been easy for the Burmans to have disconcerted this plan. For if they had appeared in force before any one of these intrenchments, an army advancing up the great stream would have had it in its power rapidly to have countermarched a force to deblockade it. The steam vessel would have communicated within the space of a few days with the most distant of the posts. No part of the line could have been menaced without information being promptly conveyed to Head Quarters. This plan would have excluded the disadvantages of disuniting two Brigades to manœuvre eccentrically. All would have been subsidiary to, and in graduated dependance on the main object of crushing the Barbarians at Pagahm-Myo, or under the walls of Ava.

Rain fell on the 21st of January and three succeeding days. Head Quarters moved from Patanagoh on the 25th. They were advanced to Mag-wè, to Mein-goung, to Span-zeik. The Horse Artillery, the Cavalry, and the 1st Brigade formed the leading column. A native van-guard felt the way before them, and covered the Pioneers, who were harrassed, but never outwearied by unceasing labors on the roads. The two Brigades of General Cotton's division fixed their Head Quarters successively one, and two marches in rear of those of the Major General, who moved in person with the first Brigade. This was the order of advance until the whole was united on the 3rd February upon Pakang-yè, after which, until the end of the campaign General Cotton's whole division moved consecutively after that of the Major General preserving the interval of one march.

The leading column quartered itself on the 29th January at Waymazoop amongst its temples, and sacerdotal buildings adorned on the outside with carved work, enriched within with Chinese pictures, with gilded idols, and lofty burnished columns. The sacred *tee* (umbrella) and all the processional insignia of the superstition of the land were found, and left in perfect order, as they had been arranged by the retreating priesthood. Vaulted chambers in the Pagodas

were piled with ornamented manuscripts in the Pali. The Major General halted on the 3rd in this fine position. He caused a reconnoissance to be pushed towards the rivulet of Yè-nan-gyoung, near which are the wells of Petroleum. A rear-guard of the Barbarians had retired day after day before the British advance. It was commanded by the chief Mootoung-bo, who seemed resolved to signalize himself in a cruel nation by acts of superlative atrocity. He chained, he crucified, he mutilated, he shot to death, he disembowelled the wretched peasantry within his grasp with persevering barbarity. Lieutenant Trant conducted the reconnoissance of the 30th. Thirty troopers of the Body Guard led by their Subadar-Major Qazee Wulee Moohummud formed his escort. He soon arrived at the deserted bivouac of the Burman rear. Further on he found himself in the presence of four hundred of their irregular infantry. The plains were cut with ravines. The Barbarians fancied themselves secure against the efforts of horse. They challenged the cavalry to advance with shouts of defiance, contumelies, and insulting gestures. This was tempting a little too audaciously the quick spirit of an officer, who in these campaigns adorned with a brilliant courage the first evidences of a fine genius. He formed his men in an instant, precipitated himself at

their head amongst the Barbarians, broke, and overthrew them. Sabre and pistol avenged the sufferings of the Burman peasant. Mootoungbo was cut down in the charge. The trooper Moosahib tore from the neck of this sanguinary partizan a compass decorated with a portrait of Vasco di Gama, a moveable probably imported into this distant region in the days of Portuguese intercourse.

II.

The Major General had moved later than usual on the 31st. He reached a little after the hour of noon his halting place a few miles beyond *Petroleum creek*. The apparition of white faces, and European habits in a boat, which had evidently come with the stream, excited some surprise in the camp. When in 1824, the news of the descent of the British reached Ava the Burman monarch had caused to be thrown into prison, together with three British residents, two American Missionaries, who were prosecuting their pious aim in that Pagan city. The Burmans refused to recognize that, which they might be pardoned for not understanding, the distinction between the United States, and the United Kingdoms. They treated it as a subterfuge of the Americans. A new light however broke in upon them in the course of

the conferences of Nyoung-ben-zeik. From that period they begun to treat the fellow-countrymen of Washington, first with somewhat more humanity, and at length, with something like consideration. In the disasters of the Empire the Monarch, who seemed to wish to detach himself from his evil counsellors without possessing energy enough to decide on their dismissal, turned his thoughts towards the Americans as fitting instruments of pacific mediation. One of them Doctor Jonathan Price, who had graduated in the academies of his native land successively in medicine, and theology, now presented himself at the British Head Quarters. It was curious to see a very staunch republican thus converted into the representative of the Burman despotism. He was accompanied by Assistant Surgeon Sandford of the Royal Regiment, on his parole. That officer had been surprised, and made prisoner together with Lieutenant Bennett of the same corps, whilst both were proceeding for the recovery of health to Promc, at the time, at which Padoung was threatened by part of the forces of the Tsadau-woon. Three British soldiers had also been sent down as peace-offerings. They were stragglers intercepted in the woods of Pegue.

Doctor Jonathan Price acquitted himself with great prudence and sagacity in his first

essay in diplomacy. He acted upon the approved principle of asking a great many more questions, than he answered. At this very first interview however he related with sufficient minuteness the particulars of the celebrated scene in the Lotoo, when the Monarch decreed, and Bandoola confirmed with an oath the annexation of the territory of Bengal to the Burman dominions. It was quite evident from his admissions that the consternation of the Burman armies and leaders had at length communicated itself to its court and sovereign. The British Commissioners were not disposed to avail themselves of this change to rise in their demands. They adhered to the *ultimatum* of Melloon. Its terms briefly committed to paper were delivered to the new negotiator, who pledged himself to present them to the Monarch in person. Armed with this proof of British moderation Doctor Jonathan Price re-embarked at night for Ava.

The leading column climbed painfully on the 1st February the steep ascents and rude defiles in the district around the oil-wells. It halted at the village of Peng-Kyoung. It encamped on the 2nd at Kyou-yè on the river bank; on the 3rd it reached Pakang-yè opposite to Sembewghewn surprised at beholding a succession of excellent positions abandoned to it by the ene-

my. The narrative of the pestilence, which was thinning the ranks of General Morrison's division had reached Prome in August, 1825. Before the opening of the third campaign it was known that the British Army which had invaded Arracan in March, had already ceased to exist. The army of Rangoon was not therefore assailed by any feeling of amazement, when looking across from Pakang-yè it saw no friendly files advancing to co-operate in the valley of the Irawaddy. It knew that on its own energies depended under Providence the honorable termination of the war. The power of the sun sensibly increased at the beginning of February. Its fervours parched up the scanty vegetation of a district naturally arid, imperfectly cleared, and indolently cultivated. The cattle of the Army suffered severely from the scarcity of forage. The mortality amongst the horses had long since rendered it necessary to mount a portion of the tall troopers of the Boddy Guard on the ponies of the country. The chargers of officers were put in requisition to remount others, and to drag the guns of the invincible Horse Brigade. But this was the only difficulty, which pressed upon the Army in its advance from Prome. The troops were sufficiently supplied with coarse rations rendered palatable by exertion and hope; they were heal-

thy, and in the highest spirits. Head Quarters left Pakang-yè after two days' halt. They awaited thus long in vain the junction of the Brigades under Colonel Shawe. On the 6th, the Major General was at the town, and ruined fort of Sillay-myo, on the 7th at Scenghoo. Thus the army found itself only two short marches from Pagahm-myo.

III.

The ancient sanctity of Pagahm-myo, which might once have been called the Burman Benares, its importance as the fifth city of the empire, its rumored localities, all led to the belief that the Barbarians would defend it. The reports of spies, of peasants, of prisoners, and deserters, soon converted conjecture into certainty. The fugitives from Melloon had partly rallied behind the covering corps of Moo-toung-bo. Pagahm in its days of splendor had been surrounded with a brick wall of respectable strength. It had become ruinous in the lapse of time; but as danger approached it had been repaired, and strengthened. An interest was imparted to the expected contest by the appearance of a new Barbarian commander. After the rout of Melloon the Burman Yèyè-thoo-tsan, a man, who had formerly served in a low situation about the person of Maha Ban-

doola, had the address to persuade the monarch, whose resolves were ever the sport of every breath of ignorant counsel, that the disasters, which could no longer be concealed from him, were to be entirely attributed to the incapacity of former leaders. He ridiculed the imbecility, which had consented to neutralize Burman courage by imprisoning it in paltry field-works. He confidently asserted that the British must be worsted if their weakened battalions were boldly attacked by great masses in open field. He pledged himself, if the command of a sufficient force were intrusted to him, to rid the monarch by a day of grand manœuvres of this menacing army of revolted tributaries. His representations prevailed. The best of the Barbarian foot, which had been reserved for the defence of the capital were caused to advance to take part in the anticipated victory of Pagahm. A more numerous body of Cassay horse was united to them, than had ever before been confronted with the British. The new leader did not wait for the sanction of success to assume a new and imposing title. He adopted the surname of "Naweng-bhooreng," literally "Lord or Prince of sunset." This bordered closely enough on the ludicrous. But it happened that the interpreters in translating the first statements regarding the new leader, his origin, pretensi-

ons, recent appointment, vaunts, force, and objects, rendered somewhat freely the Burman adjunct, and announced him as the "Prince of Darkness." Hence the transition was easy to the powers, and regions of darkness. The times were unfavorable to minute criticism. Long before leisure could be found to correct the first error the rumor of the camp had unalterably fixed upon the Burman chief the awful by-name of the "King of Hell."

. When on the 8th, the first column took up its ground near the small Pagodas of Yassay, an officer of the personal staff of the Major General was fired upon by the advanced picquet of the Barbarians, which retired leisurely before the 43rd Madras Native Infantry. Bodies of troops directed to feel their way upon the main road, found that they could not advance more than three miles from the camp without bringing on an action with the soldiers of the "King of Hell." The officers of the Quarter-Master General's department reported that the enemy occupied a position, the right of which rested on the river. The left was masked by thickets of the prickly jujube, which overspreads for leagues the country between Patanagoh and Pagahm. It was conjectured that their centre was behind the Loganunda Pagoda, a vast and mis-shapen mo-

numment, discernible at the distance of a mile and a half from the British encampment. A very strong advance of the Barbarians was posted near it, which vigilantly guarded the approach by the main route. These officers added that they saw no traces of field-works. All indicated a determination to put the possession of Pagahm, and the fate of the capital to the hazard of a conflict in open field.

The Major General having fully informed himself of all circumstances placed the 43rd in observation on a gentle eminence crowned with a few pagodas, and one mile and a half in advance of the camp. He then sent instructions to General Cotton, whose division was united at Scenghoo to close upon the force at Yassay by a night march. From the post of the 43rd on the river's bank the enemy's parties were seen through the telescope anxiously watching the movements of the British. They made however throughout the day no demonstration towards their front. At night the British enjoyed within their camp repose unbroken by dreams of the "King of Hell."

General Cotton effected his junction three hours after day-light. The Barbarians were estimated at sixteen thousand warriors. It was necessary to leave the 28th Madras Native Infantry in position to guard the baggage, and

unwieldy resources of Commissariat, with which the march of an Indian army is encumbered. This arrangement left to take part in the action the following numbers :

Artillery, 116

Cavalry, 33

European Infantry.

H. M. 13th Light Infantry, 216

38th Regiment, 281

41st ditto, 249

89th ditto, 148 — 894

43rd Madras Native Infantry, 251

Total combatants to be opposed to six- —

teen thousand Barbarians, 1294

This was the force, which at nine on the morning of the 9th advanced on the main road to Pagahm in the highest spirits to bring to action the legions of the “ King of Hell.”

The disposition of the Major General was exceedingly simple. To preserve the *appui* of the Irawaddy the 43rd Native Infantry were to advance along its margin. Their movement was somewhat retarded at the outset by a casual misconception. This was of the less importance as they were in fact the pivot of the manœuvre. A van-guard of all arms was composed of two companies of the 13th, the troopers of the Body Guard, and the excellent Horse Artillery. The force could debouch upon the enemy's position

only by following the great road. It was determined that as soon as the advance should become engaged, the 13th and 89th under the Major General should attack the enemy's left wing, and the 38th and 41st under General Cotton their right. The 13th and 38th thus became columns of direction, the movements of which were to be followed by the 89th and 41st respectively.

The British advanced along a narrow road thickly hedged in on either side with the tree called by the natives of Hindoostan *ber*,* by the English jujube, and by philosophers *Zizyphus jujuba*. It bears a fruit resembling the plumb, and varying equally in size. It is in some countries a dwarfish bush; but in this district of Burma rises to the height of ten or twelve feet, and is commonly defended with thorns. The small force of the British raised clouds of dust in passing over the sandy soil. The Burmans fired the first shot. The advance of their right opened a random *fusillade* out of distance at the head of the column of the 43rd, and then retired. The van-guard of the British, in a moment after, became engaged with the advance of the Barbarian centre, posted at the base of Loganunda. It drove it in. But as the column under the Major General reached

* *बिर, बदर, ber.*

the foot of the monument, the enemy shewed considerable forces in its front, and on its right. As the British moved on the Barbarians rushed forward to meet them. They presented themselves with wild, frantic, gestures, and hideous shouts. The whole of the 13th were extended *en tirailleur* to resist this sudden onset. The Horse Artillery got into action. The Body Guard supported at the canter. These three corps now formed the true van-guard of the British. The 13th dashed amongst the Burmans in extended files. They overthrew them. The thickets were soon strewed with their bodies. The Barbarians were hotly pursued, thundered upon by the guns of the Horse Artillery, and cut down by the Suwars wherever they could be overtaken.

The rest of the force in seconding this manœuvre found it difficult to debouch. It was impossible to escape very rapidly from the narrow mouth of the single defile, into which the troops were closely wedged together with the carriages of their Foot Artillery, their rockets, and tumbrils. The heat was excessive, and two of the battalions were harrassed by the night march. All this was not sufficiently borne in mind in following up the first advantage. The companies of the thirteenth, spread along a considerable line, became engaged with formidable masses of

the enemy before they could receive any support from the corps of the main body. The Barbarian General took advantage of this with a laudable adroitness. He promptly moved up large bodies of Horse and Foot to the aid of his worsted advance, he caused a mass to debouch from his extreme left menacing the right flank of the British, and another to press down from his centre to cut off their van-guard from the road. The ground was a succession of hillocks planted with the jujube. Many of the little summits were covered with the ruins of Pagodas ; others with monuments less worn by time. Thus the adverse lines were hardly aware how closely they approached each other. A noisy fire was supported along either front. The 13th were very widely extended. The Major General accompanied by the principal officers of his staff was in the very centre of the attack of the van-guard. His person must have been distinctly seen by the Barbarians. Large bodies advanced within a few yards of him. Their shouts seemed already to announce a victory. The situation of the Major General was for many minutes critical. He had with him only fourteen men of the 13th, sixteen Suwars of the Body Guard, and two field-pieces of the Horse Artillery. But these guns threw grape and round shot rapidly and truly amongst the ene-

my. Their quick discharges disconcerted them, and the firm countenance of the troopers, and infantry soldiers filled them with uncertainty. They could not in a moment make up their minds to one of those decisive movements by which battles are won. The opportunity, which might have saved their capital, escaped them. Their masses began to take up the ground, from which they had first moved, but remained there steadily and in great force. A heavy firing was at this instant heard on the left. The Major General retired before the enemy's advance, which pressed after him. The Hindoostanee troopers displayed a memorable coolness. They waved their sabres proudly to the shouting Barbarians, turned their backs only for a moment, then rapidly fronted and resumed their attitude of defiance, riding down the boldest of the Burmans, who ventured close to them. Constantly calling to the Infantry, which they covered, to quicken their pace, but never quickening their own, thus retiring, and fronting in succession they finally gained a little Pagoda mount, on which the Major General had taken his stand.

Sir Archibald Campbell then caused the 13th to be recalled, and concentrated by sound of bugle. The guns and howitzers armed the *plateau* of the mount. Its ruinous brick-work

supplied an irregular rampart. The enemy stood formed in immense force directly in front of the hill, their foot backed by squadrons of the Cassay horse. They still shewed a disposition to turn the British by both flanks. The Major General surveyed them for a few minutes through his telescope. He then said calmly as the troops reformed, "I have here the 13th and the Body Guard. The whole Burman Army shall not drive me from this hill." Nevertheless some anxious moments had to be passed in this little position. There was yet no intelligence of the movements of the left. The enemy's detached parties of either arm yet inundated the vallies and thickets to the right and left. Some even penetrated to the rear. But at length the 89th arrived, and was seen to take up its position in support. All was secure in this quarter, which had been so seriously menaced. The British prepared again to attack the troops of the "King of Hell." But they perceived, that he had already sensibly diminished his force in their front. A staff officer, who had succeeded in communicating with General Cotton, brought news, which accounted for this retrograde.

IV.

The right flank of the Burmans, and their communications with Pagahm, were already in

jeopardy. When General Cotton debouched beyond the Loganunda Pagoda, he was opposed as the Major General had been by advanced bodies of the Barbarians. The 38th routed them, and followed closely the line of their retreat. The Burmans at length threw themselves into a field-work near the bank of the river. Nearly the same thing happened which had before taken place at the out-works of Donabyoo. The 38th wheeled round the work under the fire of its defenders, entered it by the rear-ward opening, and began to make a carnage of all within. The Barbarians thus screwed into their own place of defence leapt in terror over its Western parapet. Hundreds rushed headlong down the lofty and almost vertical bank into the waters of the Irawaddy. "The King of Hell" was compelled to abandon his first position, and retire on Pagahm. As soon as the success of the left was announced to General Campbell, he put his column in motion. The statements of prisoners indicated an obstinate defence in Pagahm. It was thought that only half the day's work was achieved. In half an hour more the lines of manœuvre taken by all the columns of battalions, except the 43rd, converged upon a single point in the Eastern wall of the city. The 13th was the most advanced. The main road descended into a

ravine. Beyond this a village, and Pagodas intervened, and screened the walls of Pagahm. The enemy were posted here in force. When the firing commenced, the Horse Artillery were dispatched at full speed to the right to enfilade the village, and take every successive position of the enemy rapidly in flank. But the leading companies of the 13th, had already descended into the valley. The enemy's balls began to strike the huts and trees around them. It was in vain to dally here exposed to a fire from behind walls. The Regiment formed in line quickly but with the steadiness of a field-day. It advanced at the charge with a loud huzza, and in redoubled time. The levies of the "King of Hell" had not a chance remaining. They were driven before the onset of this Regiment from position to position, from Pagoda to Pagoda, from eminence to eminence, back upon, over, within, and again beyond their walls; then from walled inclosure to inclosure, finally into their boats on the Irawaddy, or along the route to the capital, as panic urged them. All their standards were captured. The Major General and his staff entering with the remaining columns by the Eastern gate of Pagahm were amazed at the thickness of the walls, and the solidity of the quadrangles of masonry, which inclosed Pagodas of the second order.

Good troops ought not to have been driven from such without the aid of heavy Artillery.

The Burman fugitives crowded almost to sinking the boats, in which they were now busily escaping to the right bank. A few balls and shrapnels were thrown after them. But the affair was at an end. Pagahm was in the hands of the British, who began to quarter themselves in the spacious dwellings of the priests. The sound of the last cannon-shot had scarcely ceased to echo amongst the Pagodas, when the Major General thus conveyed his sentiments to his troops in general orders. “ Providence has once more blessed with success the British arms in this country ; and in the decisive defeat of the imposing force posted under, and within the walls of Pagahm-myo, the Major General recognises a fresh display of the military virtues which have characterized his troops from the commencement of the war. Early on this day, the enemy departing from the cautious system of defence, behind field-works and entrenchments, which forms his usual device of war, and relying on his great numerical superiority, and singular advantages of ground, ventured on a succession of bold manœuvres on the flanks, and front of the British columns. This false confidence has been rebuked by a re-

“verse, severe, signal, and disastrous. His troops
“of either arm were repelled at every point,
“and his masses driven in confusion within his-
“city. The storm of Pagahm, which followed,
“exhibited the same features of intrepidity, and
“self devotion. The frequency of these acts of
“spirited soldiership on the part of his troops
“renders it difficult for the Major General to
“vary the terms of his praise ; but he offers to
“every officer and soldier engaged this day, the
“tribute of his thanks, at once with the affection
“of a commander, and the cordiality of a com-
“rade.”

On the morning after their success the troops
enjoyed the pleasure of witnessing its first hap-
py consequences. The sceptre of terror was
broken. A crowd of boats were seen doubling
the point, which brought them into that reach
of the river, on which Pagahm is built. The
countless mass darkened the waters of the Ira-
waddy. These were vessels crowded, and load-
ed with the families and household effects of the
peasantry, released from the cruel grasp of the
chiefs by the dispersion of their army. These
fugitives moored their boats below the British
flotilla in all the transports of sudden deliver-
ance.

“Numberless as the Pagodas of Pagahm” is
a national proverb of the Burmans. He who

wanders in its suburbs, or in the vast area within its walls is indeed struck with amazement at the succession of these monuments, of hundreds utterly ruinous, hundreds gradually crumbling, hundreds fresh and perfect. But this sensation of barren wonderment is the only one, which Pagahm excites. There is little to admire, nothing to venerate, nothing to exalt the notion of the taste and invention of this people, which the traveller might have already formed in Rangoon or in Prome. The finest monument is a temple of Gautuma, truly the omnipresent in Burma, near the southern boundary of the city. This is not like Shwè-da-gong, or Shwè-tsan-dau a solid mass. It contains a vast vaulted chamber, transversely to which run two others in the manner of a cross. The light enters through perforations in the roof. It is a dim, solemn light, by which is seen at the end of the main chamber the gigantic gilded idol, with round terrific eyeballs, under a burnished canopy. This stately awning is fringed with bells, which shaken by the currents of air, that pass through the apertures above, tinkle perpetually. The low murmuring echo of their sound, of that of the breeze, which agitates them, and of the footsteps of the devotee, are well calculated to produce a feeling of awe in the breast of the idolater, who comes hither to adore the object of his senseless worship.

The Army had not at Rangoon, at Prome, or at Patanagoh run any risks by following up its victories too rapidly. It had now a specific motive for delay. It remained five days in Pagahm. On the evening of the 14th, it was again honored with the presence of Doctor Jonathan Price. He came with the air of one seeking to know how the British felt after their recent triumph. He was perhaps surprized to find that the Commissioners faithful to their first views, now only demanded that, which they had recognised as the just basis of a pacification, antecedently to the discomfiture of the "King of Hell." The counter-proposal of which the missionary was the bearer, looked more like an attempt to bribe away the leaders of a barbarian incursion, than a serious measure in international negotiation. He was authorized to offer certain lak'hs of rupees and the prisoners. On the payment, and emancipation of these the British were to quit the dominions of the King of Ava, without obtaining any further indemnities or securities. The first Commissioner drily referred the diplomatist to the ultimatum of the 31st January. When the conference was at an end the missionary expressed a wish to see the British camp. This desire was gratified without reserve. The soldiers of all arms, the park of Artillery, all were shewn to

nim. He might, if he had wished it, have counted the files of the first or noted the calibre of the latter. A force, which has beaten its enemy fighting in the proportion of one to thirteen has no longer any secrets of this kind. Having completed this military survey the negotiator set out for Ava, yet confident of his ultimate success in bringing about the conclusion of a stable peace. It was now indeed sufficiently evident that if the "hopes of Ava" had not yet "wholly vanished;" they were tremulous, and evanescent, and crossed with saucier doubts than had often been permitted to reach the "Golden footstool." Thus ended the second mission of Doctor Jonathan Price.

The Army learnt in Pagahm the melancholy fate of its enemy the "King of Hell." Escaping from the luckless field he hastened to Ava, and without hesitation presented himself before the Monarch. But rapidly as he had moved, the news of his defeat had preceded him. The "King of Hell" shewed at once that he did not come to disguise the truth. He avowed his defeat; but declared himself ready again to encounter the British. He told the King that his courtiers had deceived him regarding the quality of these foes. Finally he demanded fifty thousand men, and promised with that number to cut in pieces the rebels before they could ap-

proach the capital. The violence of the storm of barbarian fury raised by this harangue was only to be abated by blood. The Monarch ordered the wretched Woondouk to be carried to instant execution. The ministers of vengeance dashed the victim with his face downward upon the pavement of the palace, they stamped, and spit upon him; dragged him forth by the hair, trailed him through the streets covered with dust and blood, cut open his body, and tore forth the recking vitals, and completed their cruelty by causing elephants to trample into pieces his mangled, and quivering frame.

V.

Head Quarters moved from Pagahm on the 16th. The first march lay through dreary groves of palmyra. But on the 17th the column suddenly found itself on fine cultivated flats; which are inclosed between the river and a range of hills first seen to the Eastward a few miles from Pagahm. These continue to run parallel to the watery line at the distance of fourteen or fifteen miles until at last they cut in upon it, and wear away on its bank seven leagues to the southward of the capital. At Yebbay on the 18th a war-boat transported again to the British camp the person of Doctor Jonathan Price. He brought with him several of the prisoners, and

a part of the twenty-five lak'hs which had been demanded as an earnest of the stipulated crore. Every thing seemed to announce that the haughty, and intractable court was at length brought to reason. But, as the British had before suffered by their simple reliance on Burman faith, the Major General would not now consent to suspend his march, until the American mediator should have it in his power to bring to Headquarters, the whole of the prisoners and treasure, and Burman negotiators armed with clear, and undoubted credentials and powers. On the 29th the camp was formed at Toun-g-daing, on the 21st at Goung-gwè, on the 22nd two miles in advance of Tiroup-myo, at the confluence of the Kiayn-dyaing and the Irawaddy. On the morning of the 23rd the column traversed the little village of Yandabo. The troops had scarcely pitched their tents on the rich and extensive plains beyond it, when the song of war-boatmen was heard again. White faces were distinguished at the head and stern of the approaching vessels. The great pacificator Doctor Jonathan Price once more stepped ashore commencing the fourth epoch in his diplomatic history. Prisoners, treasure, and Burman negotiators had arrived under his conduct. It was evident that "the hopes of Ava" had finally "vanished."

The prisoners of war now restored to liberty were Lieut. Bennett of the *Royals*, captured as before stated, and some of the Native officers and Sipahes taken at Wattee-goung, and Ramoo. Many of the captives of Captain Noton's detachment had been sent to Bhanmo on the frontiers of China, and could not be delivered up until some weeks afterwards. Assistant Surgeon Sandford had been set at liberty at the period of the conference at Pagahm. Of persons detained in Ava on the breaking out of the war, the Burmans now liberated Doctor Judson, an American missionary of distinguished piety, his lady the authoress of "Letters on Ava," Mr. Gouger, a merchant of Calcutta, Laird, a trading adventurer at Rangoon, and Sarkies Arrakiel cousin and co-partner of the Armenian Sarkies Manook. No reclamation was made in favor of Rogers, an English refugee from the Supreme Presidency, or the Spaniard Diego Lanciego, the only Europeans, who remained in the capital. Their own interests were consulted by this silence. The release of innocent and worthy men from a horrid thralldom was amongst the purest sources of exultation of the British Army. The secrets of the state prison of Ava are of the most harrowing description. The missionary Judson had been compelled to witness in this crowded and noisome dungeon tortures and exe-

cutions the horror of which was aggravated by every device of inventive cruelty. It is a relief to reflect that these tales of terror do not belong to the history of the "Three Campaigns."

The first conference took place on the 23rd. The negotiators on the part of Ava were the Atwenwoon Mengee Maha Menlah, treasurer of the Empire, and the Woonghec of Lee-Kaing. The features of the Atwenwoon were strikingly irregular and uncouth ; but his physiognomy yet promised all the subtilty and presence of mind, which characterized his conduct during the negotiations. His manners were rendered pleasing by a shew of frank courtesy ; which he managed to keep up without ever losing sight of the interests of his nation. He was in truth the Burman negotiator ; his colleague was a mere cipher. Doctor Jonathan Price had now more distinctly assumed the flattering character of mediator as well as that of joint interpreter with Doctor Judson. Both were great proficient in the language of the Burmans. The ministers of Ava produced by way of credentials a decree of the Monarch commanding them to "cause war to cease." It was beautifully traced on common paper of English manufacture enclosed in a case of ivory, which was again enveloped in crimson velvet embroidered, and fringed with gold. The basis of the pacifica-

tion had previously received the sanction of the Monarch. This act was permitted to preclude the necessity of a subsequent ratification on his part, and contracted within very narrow limits the labors of negotiation. The principal difficulty consisted in fixing the boundaries of the cessions in Arracan, and to the eastward of the Salween river. Between four and five in the evening of the 24th, signatures were formally affixed to the treaty of Peace and Amity. A salute of ordnance announced the attestation of this solemn compact.

Those, who praise the moderation of the British in forbearing to advance upon the capital of their humbled enemy, and in requiring such light indemnities for past aggressions, should distinctly found their commendations on moral and political grounds. They must not seek support for these opinions in any supposed hazards attending the military position of the force which conquered this peace. According to every principle of war the Army of the Major General had at Yandabo subdued Ava; it had rendered its own Government under heaven the arbiter of the destinies of that state. Head Quarters were within five marches of the capital, which would have fallen within ten days after its siege had been formed. There was ample time to have established places of arms

on the line of advance before the beginning of May. Reinforcements of Artillery, and Infantry were already in march upon Prome. Troops of all arms reached Rangoon a few days after. Entrenched positions would have been taken up without diminishing the main force. At Ava the troops would have found good quarters, flour, rice and bullocks. The task of the Commissariat at Rangoon would have been narrowed to the supply of arrack and rum by water, the only indispensable portion of a British soldier's ration, which the country did not produce. The Court was already in the most dreadful state of apprehension. Several times the Monarch and his consort had fancied that they heard the cannonade of the British, had rushed in dismay to the gates of the palace, and given orders for flight. The Court would have retired to Mont-zo-bo, the ancient capital, to which its treasures had been already transported. It would have treated with the British during the ensuing Monsoon, who might then deliberately have dictated the terms most agreeable to their own Government. The Army would have fared better, and been quite as secure as the year before at Prome. The possession of Tounghò would have given the British unbounded influence in Pegue. They might, if it had become desirable, have brought

ten thousand armed Peguers into the field. At Yandabo the losing party had not a single card remaining in their hand. The valid reasons for granting facile terms to the Burmans at Yandabo are beyond the scope of the argument of this memoir exactly because they are entirely political, not military.

A verbal convention followed the treaty, wherein the Burmans covenanted to furnish boats, and boatmen for the transport of the British to Rangoon. Further to prevent unlucky collusion, it was agreed that no Burman force should pass the line of Melloon until the British had reached Prome, nor beyond Prome until the latter had passed Donabyoo, nor advance lower than Donabyoo until they had evacuated Rangoon.

VI.

During the conferences hints had been given by the Burmans backed by very broad suggestions on the part of Doctor Price that the Burman Court would consider itself dealt with in a haughty, and imperious way if the Oriental custom of offering presents were neglected by the British on so important an occasion. The invaders had come to Ava to conquer, not to purchase a peace. They were therefore ill-prepared with offerings worthy of the acceptance

of Majesty. But on the whole it seemed wiser to offer such gifts as were within reach, leaving the nature of the crisis to suggest an excuse for their inadequacy, than to depart ungraciously from an accustomed form. Some handsome Arab Horses were selected. These are of high price in a country, wherein no animal of the species is bred exceeding fifty-two inches in height. Some curious fire-arms of British manufacture and a few baubles, costly, if not elegant, were added. Three officers were deputed to convey these presents to Ava, and to lay them at the foot of the throne with the expression of the respectful congratulation of the Commissioners on the auspicious event of the pacification. Captain Lumsden, of the Bengal Horse Artillery, the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General of the force, and Assistant Surgeon Knox, of the Madras Army, were nominated for the performance of this duty. The last of these had made great progress in the acquirement of the Burman language. In addition to his aid these delegates had to expect that of Doctor Jonathan Price, and of the merchant Sarkies Arrakiel as interpreters.

The Burman negotiators had expressed a wish to be themselves the bearers of the first intelligence of the peace to Ava. They had proposed to announce at the same time the ap-

proach of the delegates with presents. The British officers therefore did not embark in the war-boats prepared for them before the morning of the 26th. A violent south-westerly breeze had blown up the river during the three or four preceding days. It was now succeeded by a calm. But the picked rowers of the Burman war-boats are not exceeded by the men of any nation in dexterity, and the power of enduring fatigue. The British officers reasonably expected to see the capital by returning daylight on the 27th. Their progress during the day was considerable, but on awaking next morning they were surprised to find that they had not yet reached Yapadaing, only half way to Ava. Several times during the night the song of the boatmen had seemed to them to be chaunted drowsily, and the splash of the oars to be faint and restricted. They began to suspect some artifice. At the hour of breakfast they received a visit from the Maha Silwa. He introduced himself with characteristic familiarity, affecting to reprimand the boatmen for their slow progress. He then told with an unabashed front the story of his flight from Melloon. He partook with a voracity perfectly amazing of all that was set before him, and then suddenly pausing, coolly said, "The food of the *Inglee Rajahs* is good: " but it has one fault, it will never fill a man's ..

“belly.” After a studied eulogium on the virtues of brandy the Barbarian took his leave, telling the British officers that they would reach Yapadaing at noon. It was however near four o’clock when the war-boats approached a landing place, on which was seen posted with an air of ceremony the Maha Silwa, decked in a pair of new and tasteful trowsers of crimson silk. He came to invite the delegates to land. The officers perceived that the moment they set foot on shore, the war-crews were hurried off to the opposite bank. It was evident that their progress to Ava was intentionally delayed. It remained only to penetrate the motives of this line of conduct. Remonstrances were abstained from as vain; to all enquiries one civil but unsatisfactory reply was given, that “thus it had been ordered, thus it must be; that the British could not proceed immediately.” They were invited to rest after their journey, conducted with great marks of attention to a temporary building, and seated on an elevated platform spread with carpets. Presents of fish, and fruit, and every requisite for the table were quickly set before them. In half an hour they were visited by the Atwenwoon. He was profuse in his expressions of civility, and seemed anxious to make the stay of these officers at Yapadaing agreeable to them; but no explanations could be extracted from him.

At length about seven Doctor Price arrived, and unravelled the mystery. The Court had been thrown into consternation by the proposal of a visit from officers of the invading army. The Monarch betrayed marks of agitation, the Queen-consort had fainted, or seemed to faint. According to the representations of the Doctor, the Barbarians were utterly at a loss to comprehend the generosity of their conquerors. When they saw them at Yandabo neither exacting more than they had demanded at Melloon, nor indulging in menaces of vengeance, they began to suspect them of the basest dissimulation. They dreaded lest having received the treasure, for which they had stipulated, they should yet advance upon the capital. Whilst thus doubtful of British sincerity, the mention of the proposed visit was said to have raised their apprehensions to the highest pitch. They thought that the British officers, had come to observe and spy, and make reports, which would serve to guide the future movements of the Army. The Doctor was now therefore on his way to Yandabo to submit his perplexities to the Commissioners. The British delegates awaiting the event, slept tranquilly at Yapadaing. Doctor Price moved rapidly. He reached Yandabo, had an interview with the Commissioners, passed again up to Ava, triumphed over the objections

of the Court, and in one hour after noon on the 28th was again at Yapadaing. He announced that the court had seen reason to repudiate its first injurious suspicions. All difficulties were at an end; the British officers resumed their voyage. Still they perceived that their able boatmen did not do their best. It was evident that it was held inexpedient to permit foreigners to enter the capital by day-light. In fact though they passed Kyouk-ta-loung towards sunset, it was not until near midnight that first the appearance of blazing lights, and then of a vast collection of boats of every size moored along the bank convinced these officers that they were near the capital. The night was cold, and the darkness perfectly impenetrable. The British could not obtain a glimpse of any object on the shore. The city, if this were indeed the city, was wrapt in silence. Neither house, nor inhabitants, could be discerned on the river bank. Still the boats pressed onwards in the thickest shades of night. The officers became impatient; they saw a light near them, and heard the murmurs of many voices. They commanded their boatmen to rest on their oars, and springing ashore made their way to a low guard-house a few paces off. Burman officers on duty quickly explained to them that a deputation was waiting to receive them on the ghat of the Mycet-Ngè or little river, which washes the

northern face of Ava. They returned to their boats. In a quarter of an hour they were at the mouth of the smaller stream, and passing up it soon saw by the light of numerous Chinese lanterns the figures of Doctor Price, and thirty or forty Burmans in dresses, which marked them as men of distinction. A cordial reception followed. Caparisoned horses were in waiting; but as the chiefs were not mounted, the British preferred to advance on foot to the gate of the city. Escorted by the Burmans, whose array was regulated by the Than-dau-zin, or master of court ceremonial, they soon found themselves at the foot of an embattled wall. A ponderous gate cased with iron was slowly opened. It gave entrance into a broad, and clean street of wooden houses uniformly built. All around was silent as the grave. Doctor Price whispered that the Monarch still continued in a state of alarm. Since he had resolved on receiving the delegates his anxiety had assumed new features. He was every moment impatiently demanding whether the officers had arrived. He seemed to hurry on towards the intended reception, with a childish eagerness to get it over. He had even given an order to cause the British to be brought before him the very moment they reached the capital. This had been over-ruled by the Doctor as in-

formal. The delegates proceeded slowly past the dungeon, which had been the scene of so much suffering to this Missionary, and his comrades in captivity. He pointed out to them with a shudder the fatal grating so often sprinkled with the blood of victims. A turn brought the party to the house of the Burman Mounghé-loo, Myo-woon of the Northern division of the city, in which the British were to be lodged. This officer was represented to be a man of mild manners, and kind disposition, and to have behaved with great humanity towards the British and American prisoners. His features and demeanor confirmed this favorable testimony. Ascending a stair-case the British found in a spacious room a table already spread with a plentiful repast, intended to be served according to the highest notion framed by Burmans of the English style. If neither sumptuous nor elegant it was at least abundant. The dishes were numerous, wines and liquors were produced in profusion. The guests were noisy, and voracious, the host endeavored to support his character by talking louder, and more tediously than all the rest. He overwhelmed the British with his attentions, protestations, and urgent entreaties to partake heartily of his good cheer. A crowd of attendants and spectators surrounded the table all dumb with

amazement at the unusual costumes of the English. They were in their hearts happy to escape in an hour from this scene of confused and barbarous festivity. Their own travelling beds were spread in an adjoining apartment.

They were awakened on the morning of the 1st of March by a sound which they at first mistook for the din of distant Artillery. It was the sullen beating of the enormous drums, which are suspended between two lofty columns in the square of the palace. It sounded like the voice of barbarian despotism reminding its slaves of the first duty of obedience with fear and trembling. Nine had been fixed as the hour of presentation. But soon after daylight the house of Moungh-shwè-loo was invested by a crowd of all classes full of impatience to catch a glimpse of the strangers. Subordinate officers wearing conical caps and carrying long staves of bamboo, were exerting themselves unsparingly to keep the avenues clear. But in spite of all their efforts numbers of men, women, and children made their way even into the sleeping room of the British to gaze and wonder at their white faces, and novel dresses. At eight the Than-lau-zin numerously attended arrived to fix with precision the rules of the ceremonial. He commenced his task with the most scrupulous exactness.

He committed to paper the names, rank, age, country, and employments of the delegates. He reduced into a formula a statement of the specific purpose, for which they had arrived. Then begun the expected scene of discussion. He decided that the three British officers could only enter the palace attended by three, two, and one person respectively. Other such points were settled. At length all were ready to move towards the abode of Royalty. The Burmans formed themselves in procession behind the delegates. The Than-dau-zin conducted Captain Lumsden towards the door of the mansion, which opened onto a platform. The court yard below, and street beyond were thronged by an anxious and wondering, but strictly decorous multitude. On the appearance of the British officers the whole space resounded with the exclamation of "Kyet-toung-bo ! Kyet-toung-bo !" literally cockfeather-chieftain, the name by which, in allusion to the plume in their hats the Barbarians commonly designated the officers of the British staff ; and which others restricted emphatically to the British Commander alone. In the midst of this sustained murmur of interest, a Burman ascending the stair-case whispered the Than-dau-zin, who immediately turning round to the British announced that the Monarch of Ava had retired to rest. Whatever the dele-

gates thought of this ill-bred trifling they dissembled their feelings. One of them replied, that "their own protracted voyage had rendered them by no means averse to a similar indulgence. They wished the Monarch sound and peaceful slumbers." They then retired to await the termination of this period of repose.

At four, the Than-dau-zin returning announced that the Monarch had risen from his couch. The Burmans now renewed with their characteristic subtlety, prolixity, and disingenuousness, the discussions relative to the ceremonial forms of presentation. There are two principles, either of which a European delegate may propose to take as the basis of his conduct at an Oriental court, to conform entirely to the usages established there, or to persevere in adhering to those of his own. In choosing between these alternatives he will be influenced by a consideration of the relative position of the two powers. He will consider whether the preformance of the required ceremonies is too great a price to pay for the advantages of a reception. He will ask himself how far his own court is in a condition to cause its prejudices to be respected in the centre of a foreign capital. He will thus reflect on the subject if left to his own conclusions. But he will, when practicable, arm himself with previous instructions from those whom he re-

presents. Thus fully bearing in mind the visits to the Court of Ava of Symes, Cox, and Canning, as well as the more recent disquisitions under the walls of Peking, these officers had before they left Yandabo demanded from the Commissioners an explicit rule for their guidance. It may be thought by some that the commanding position of the British forces rendered this a favorable moment to insist upon the abolition of all irksome forms, and to establish the precedent of a British delegate being permitted to present himself before the Monarch of Ava, under precisely the same circumstances of dress, attendance, and personal demeanor, as would be expected from him at the court of an European Sovereign. The Commissioners however were of a different opinion. They directed the officers employed to conform to the usage of divesting themselves of shoes or boots in the Royal presence, and discretionally to accommodate themselves throughout to Burman ceremonies at court, so far as an adhesion to them had been sanctioned by precedent. The officers came therefore to these discussions perfectly free from embarrassment or responsibility.

The Burmans began by reminding the British that it was a mark of disrespect to appear before the Sovereign with covered feet. This was said with great civility of manner. The Bri-

tish at once replied, "We shall pull off our boots at the foot of the great stair-case of the palace." "It is also," said the Burmans, "contrary to the law of the land to enter the court of the palace carrying any weapon or instrument of death." "War has ceased," said the British, "we shall leave our sabres in the house of Moun-shwè-loo." "But," said the Than-dau-zin, "it is customary to bow thrice when the opening gate displays to view the Royal palace; thrice to the throne, and thrice to the Sovereign; when he seats himself upon it." "All this we shall perform. We are not ignorant of the respect due to a great Monarch." The Burmans appeared first surprised, and then gratified at this compliance, and then after the manner of their nation began to think of building some advantage upon it. The Than-dau-zin intimated that Ambassadors had been permitted to retain their shoes up to the great stair-case. "But," said he, "these officers are not Ambassadors. Strict etiquette demands that *they* should put them off at the third gate of the palace." The British saw at once which way the course of argument was tending; they perceived that a single concession would be followed by interminable demands. They replied "that the Burman ministers must from the first have known the definite limits of the nation's

“ al ceremonial ; that they could not therefore
“ escape from the dilemma of confessing that
“ either they had at first demanded less, or now
“ proceeded to exact more than the dignity of their
“ Royal Master required.” Much discussion followed, the Burmans explained, prevaricated, and evaded. Finally the British felt the necessity of decision. They calmly intimated “ that if the
“ concession of this point was held to be the absolute condition of the reception of the friends
“ of the Commissioners, then thankful for the
“ kindness, which they had already experienced,
“ the British officers had only further to request
“ that boats might speedily be prepared for their
“ return to Yandabo.” The effect was produced ; the Burmans had not foreseen the possibility of any men risking the honor of appearing in the Golden presence merely to preserve their consistency. The point was abandoned. The interpreter delivered the final reply in these remarkable words, “ You are the conquerors of the land ; “ the custom is as we have last stated ; but you “ must please yourselves in this matter.” It can hardly be doubted therefore that if the instructions of the Commissioners had dictated the most rigorous adherence to British customs, it would not have been difficult to have carried them into effect.

— The procession was reformed. The Burman lictors cleared the way. The British officers de-

scended into the street. Two of them wore a military full dress. Captain Lumsden the plumed helmet, and laced jacket of the Horse Artillery; his colleague the feathered hat, and embroidered coat of his department. These costumes which no citizen would have turned his head to notice in the precincts of St. James or the Tuileries excited a tumult of surprise amongst the populace of this remote capital. They gave vent to their amazement in exclamations and vehement gestures. Still their conduct was governed by decorum, and apparent friendliness of disposition. They crowded anxiously, but never pressed rudely, upon the procession. Their remarks, though uttered with the accent of extreme excitement were made in a suppressed tone, which bespoke the dread of giving offence. The British were now in the street, by which they had approached the house of Moung-shwè-loo; they saw that the Royal palace was inclosed within a vast quadrangular wall of brick, fenced in at the distance of a few feet by a stockade of perpendicular timbers. They passed round its North-Western angle, and continued their progress along a street formed on one side by the palace wall, and on the other by a row of wooden, painted houses, very neatly and commodiously constructed. The procession entered the long and lofty hall of the Young-dau situat-

ed nearly opposite to the Northern gate of the palace. Here the British, and the principal Burmans seated themselves fronting the palace, and awaited nearly an hour the completion of the preparation within. A few ill-armed guards, and several P'hoongees (inferior priests) were stationed near the closed gate. The gilded spire of the Royal edifice was seen above the wall.

VII.

At length the moment of presentation had arrived ; the British arose. The first portal was opened by an invisible hand, as they advanced. An oblong court was seen, in which guards were drawn up. A second gate expanded. Another and larger court presented itself, in which on the right and left were built the Royal stables for horses and elephants. The leaves of a third portal rushed apart. Then the full splendor of the golden palace stood unveiled. Its front was a gallery of fifty yards in length supported by burnished columns. A central stair-case gave entrance to this outer hall, which screened the interior. Between four and five thousand guards were drawn up in the court. They were habited in the war jackets of dark, glazed, cloth so familiar to the English. They were seated on the ground, formed with intervals between files, three deep, the ranks at open

order, and in curved lines, which swept up the great avenue, and round the great building. The British observed with surprise that bayonets were fixed on the whole of their muskets, which is seldom seen in Oriental armies. Three several parks of Artillery were displayed. They consisted of forty-five pieces of various date, and calibre. The gilded roof of the palace glittered in the rays of the setting sun, and yet more brightly glittered the carved and gilded spire, which rises above the throne, and at the sight of which every Burman reverentially bows. Its pinnacle appeared to be about two hundred feet above the pavement of the court. On the left was seen the Lotoo or Council hall, open on all sides, and supported by crimson columns with gilded pedestals and capitals. Beneath the outer gallery of the palace were posted a numerous band of musicians. Theirs was the tasteless harmony heard all over the East made up of the beating of drums, the clangor of cymbals, the shrieking of pipes, and the drowsy thrumming of a kind of guitar. This music continued to sound whilst the British arriving at the foot of the central stair-case turned to the right instead of ascending it, and having passed along the front of the building found themselves at the bottom of a smaller flight of steps at its Western ex-

tremity. Quickly laying aside their boots they ascended it, and entered the grand gallery. This was supported by a double row of columns. Its floor was of *chunam* brilliantly white. The interior walls, the columns, and the roof were all richly gilt. A new swell of instrumental music burst upon the ear mingled with chorusses of boyish and feminine voices: the singers were concealed. At either end of the gallery a dancing girl richly attired, and loaded with ornaments was displaying her fascinations. The delegates traversed the wing of the building, and found themselves near the head of the central stair-case. Transverse to the outer chamber from this point ran another row of columns. The vista between them terminated in the Golden throne. It was a platform raised ten feet from the ground. Its gilded front was embellished with tasteful carved work, and it was railed in with gilded balustrades. The elevated area seemed spacious enough to contain conveniently seven or eight persons; but it was now unoccupied, and closed in behind by sliding doors of gilded trellis-work. The dim light seen through this glittering screen gave a sharp edge to curiosity. Between the pillars on the right side of the throne were ranged in long array the Ministers of state, and the principal Wools of the Em-

pire. All were habited in plain white muslin dresses ; all sat on the floor, which was covered with small, but tasteful carpets. The princes of the blood, and relatives of the Queen were in the centre of this line. They were all coarse-featured men, with an unpleasing expression of countenance. The heir-apparent, a youth of twelve years, sat alone on the left of the throne opposite to the princes. He was dressed in a vest and *patzo* of gay colors. The British, and the whole suite, which had accompanied them, were posted at the bottom of the hall directly fronting the throne.

In a few minutes the music ceased. A few spearmen richly clothed were seen to assemble between the balustrade and the throne. It had been doubted whether the Monarch could receive *upon the throne* any foreigners except Ambassadors. The strangers at first therefore thought that they saw in these guards below it the van-guard of Royalty. But they were soon undeceived. A few Brahmins in grotesque habits entered, and turning their faces towards the throne began to chaunt in rather pleasing tones a hymn of praise. In this the honorific monosyllable, *Praw*, sacred, which in Burma is applied to the temples of the gods, and the king of men, frequently struck the ear. On its recurrence every Burman forehead was prostrat-

ed on the pavement. The song ceased. A long pause, and the most solemn silence followed. The Burmans bent their bodies to the ground. The whole assembly seemed spell-bound with servile awe. The fluttering of some of the sacred birds among the gilded rafters was the only sign of animation in the scene. In the midst of this senseless torpor, the gilded pannels behind the throne, flew open as if by volition with a thrilling crash. Then low as every forehead had been dropt before, each seemed to sink deeper, and to grow into the pavement. The words "Praw ! Praw !" were lowly murmured. Then again a death-like silence. The British sitting erect looked forward towards the throne. Beyond the line of the enclosure now withdrawn they saw only vacant space bounded by the gilded pannels of an inner chamber. But in a moment a figure appeared gradually rising as from the earth. In a moment more it had mounted the platform. Its light footstep was heard on the pavement in the absence of every other sound. This was the Majesty of Ava !

The Monarch advanced. He was of middle stature, though owing to the elevated plane, on which he moved, he at the first glance appeared taller. His head was bound with a plain, and slight fillet of white. His hair, and beard were sandy, he wore no moustaches. He had on

a vest of white muslin, and a *patzo* of variegated silk, in which bright red was the predominating color. Around his neck was the golden *tsalo* of twenty-four small chains, a large jewel appended to it rested on his breast. His legs were bare, his feet shod with scarlet sandals. He moved with a stately gait towards the front of the throne, his body held remarkably upright, his right hand grasping a golden sheathed sword carried obliquely across his person. Suddenly he stopped, bent both knees mechanically, and sunk at once onto a cushion, sitting with folded legs. The dexterity of the movement looked like the result of practice. He sat thus gazing before him without the slightest movement. Even his eyes did not move. His lips were compressed like those of one subduing internal agitation. His features, which were neither handsome nor unpleasing wore the studied calm of resolute effort. A physiognomist would at once have pronounced him a barbarian ruler of mild disposition, but the sport of gusts of passion. When he took his seat, a slave crept forward, and placing by him a golden beetle-box shaped like the Hentha, the national emblem, withdrew. The British officers thrice bent their heads respectfully to Majesty on the throne.

A Burman functionary then arose, and read aloud in a chanting tone from one of the fol-

ed books of blackened paper, which are in Ava called *parabike*. The interpreter explained in a low tone, that he was rehearsing the names, and rank of the British, and the circumstances of their arrival. The portable part of the presents had been previously arranged before the strangers. The Monarch at this moment placed his hand on the box near him. A voice was instantly heard from the top of the hall, its words were repeated at the bottom, and the interpreter turning to Captain Lumsden, said, "The King demands to know what is your request?" The Captain replied by adverting to the recent pacification. "Peace," he said, "having been happily restored, the British Commissioners have sent these officers to Ava to offer respectful congratulations in their name on this auspicious event, and to proffer for the Royal acceptance presents of little value, except as they may serve for testimonials of their sincere desire to maintain the stability of the pacific relations founded on the solemn treaty recently concluded." In like manner as the Royal interrogation had been conveyed, a rejoinder was now delivered. "The Monarch," it was said, "had expressed his gratification at the presence of the British officers at his court. He had accepted of the presents. He had ordered presents to be made in requital to the Com-

“missioners, to the delegates, and to the persons
 “of their suite. He had commanded refresh-
 “ments to be placed before the officers. He had
 “ordered them to be invested with the badges of
 “the title of Rajah.” Trays were then brought
 in containing Burman sweetmeats, confections,
 garlick, pickled tea, the nut and leaf of betel, and
 water of icy coldness in golden cups. Next ap-
 peared other trays, on each of which were laid a
 folded piece of silk, and a ruby of considerable
 size set in a ring. A tray was set apart for each of
 the Commissioners, for each of the three British
 officers present, and for each of the interpreters.
 Some trifling specimens of Burman manufacture
 were afterwards added, and gratifications distri-
 buted amongst the servants of the delegates. Af-
 ter the exchange of presents a Burman officer
 came forward, and bound successively upon the
 forehead of each of the British a fillet of gold leaf,
 on which was inscribed in Burman characters
 an honorary title. The distinctive appellation
 given to each of the Military strangers run thus
 in Burman သိတ ရာဇာ ဂျော့လူ Thee-yi Raja
 gyau thoo; literally “The valorous, renowned
 “Rajah.” This title rather complimentary than
 euphonous, was proclaimed aloud by the Than-
 dau-zin after the investiture of each individual.

The pageant drew to a close. In a few mi-
 nutes the Monarch sprung suddenly upon his

fect, with remarkable agility, faced about, stalked with much dignity to the head of the concealed stair-case, fronted, gazed steadily for a few seconds upon the scene, then faced about again ; and as he descended in the midst of the same reverential silence, which had marked his appearance, the pannels closed again with a mystic sound, and shut the lessening figure from the view. The Royal pantomime was at an end. The princes, and the heir-apparent rose from their seats, and came near to gaze at the British. Many of the nobles were lavish in their attentions to men, who had become before their eyes the objects of Royal favor. Then the assembly broke up without further ceremony, and the British returned to the house of their host. The Monarch remained nearly fifteen minutes on the throne. Once in spite of his studied immobility of countenance he was seen to raise his eyes, and indulge in a long stare of uncontrollable curiosity at the three individuals of that Army, which had placed his crown in jeopardy.

VIII.

— On the morning of the 2nd, MOUNG-SHWÈ-LOO reported the substance of a conversation he had held with the Monarch. His Majesty had been pleased to make gracious enquiries after the

health of the delegates. He had demanded to know whether every attention was paid to their comfort in his capital, and whether they seemed satisfied with their reception. Finally he was desirous of learning, when it was their intention to depart. The hint was perfectly intelligible. It was plain that he could not entirely divest himself of suspicions. A previous request of the British to be conducted through the principal streets, bazars, and temples of Ava had been met by earnest dissuasions. The British resolved to leave this vast, and remote city, which they had no longer any hope of exploring.

They spent the 2nd in examining and purchasing, such as pleased them, of various articles of Burman manufacture. There were presented for their inspection the lacquered boxes of every size, and pattern, the varied silks of Pegue, rubies, garnets, cups of gold and silver, and curious weapons. The more precious articles were however produced in small number, and with evident caution. The Burmans were fearful of tempting the cupidity of the conqueror. They asserted that all valuables had been sent away to Montzobo.

From the house, in which the British dwelt, they could perceive that the Royal residence was surrounded by a vast quadrangular wall.

Besides the palace, and its spire they could discern the tops of numerous dwellings said to be inhabited by the twenty-four wives of the Monarch. Seven of these had shared the Royal bed. Their houses were distinguished by a little wooden structure on the roof. Kings of Ava may be said to have during their life-time no name. A distinctive title is indeed given to each heir-apparent at his birth. But it remains a profound secret to all but the members of the Royal house. If he succeeds to the throne, it is divulged at his death. As the Emperors of Rome bore the title of Augustus so the Monarch of Ava is called by his subjects Sheng-bhooreng after the brother of Aloung-praw.

The British arose to depart before day-light on the 3rd. They expected to have left Ava, as they had reached it, in darkness. But the methodical caution of the Burmans defeated itself. The Than-dau-zin, who was charged with the superintendence of their departure lost so much precious time in taking inventories of the moveables of the British, and other petty arrangements, that it was broad day-light before the strangers quitted the hospitable mansion of Moung-shwè-loo. As they passed down the streets they perceived that the great wall which defended Ava, was about fifteen feet in height. It was constructed of brick-work apparently

new, and strong, but not more than four feet thick. Earth had been thrown up against it, with a slope towards the city, to the thickness of four feet more. The crest of the wall was battlemented. It had no embrasures, but cannon were secured in the intervals of the battlements. These could only have been served by men stationed upon platforms. The *enceinte* appeared to be a great quadrangle, each face being broken into curtains and square bastions. Of these the Northern is washed by the “Myeet-gnè or little river,” the course of which is nearly Westerly. The “little river” falls into the Irawaddy at the North-western angle of the great wall of the capital. The great stream therefore defends its Western face. There is an interval of twenty yards between the foot of the wall, and the wet ditch of the place.

The delegates left the town as they had entered it by the Northern gate. They reached the bank of the Myeet-gnè. The Shwè-poung-daugèe, or gilded barge of the Monarch lay moored half way across. The war-boats were put in motion. The British passed rapidly down to the point of confluence, surveying at their ease the Northern wall. A redoubt had been thrown up at the salient angle formed by the right bank of the Myeet-gnè, and the left bank of the Irawaddy. It had been lined with can-

non that very morning, the artificers were yet busily employed upon it. From this point the view was superb. Tsa-gaing on the right bank of the great river is inclosed by a wall as high as that of Ava, and like it strengthened with square bastions. Stately forest trees spread their magnificent branches above it. The hills, which bound the prospect on that side, bear on their conical summits pagodas of glittering white. The river spreads itself into a noble sheet between the two embattled walls. Spire and pinnacle peer above that of the city. The houses of Ava are built of wood; the only structures of more durable materials are a few magazines, and the dwellings of the adventurer Lanciego, and the Missionary Price; the former in the city itself, the latter in the suburb of Tsa-gaing. Both being chunamed form conspicuous objects on either bank. But the wooden buildings are remarkably well constructed, and the streets wide, and cleanly, to a degree which may astonish those, who have been used to see in other Eastern capitals houses of a more costly character crowded into narrow lanes choked with filth. All that the strangers saw of Ava wore a look of amplitude, and neatness. The air was remarkably pure, and the countenances of the inhabitants clear though dark, and strikingly healthful. The war-boats reached

the British Head Quarters an hour after night-fall on the 3rd.

IX.

Peace having been conquered the British had prepared to retire upon Rangoon. They were to hold that town until the second instalment of twenty-five lak'hs should have been paid. The Burmans manifested their usual obliquity of conduct in the matter of supplying boats, and boatmen ; they promised, evaded, equivocated, and delayed. Colaing Menghee even ventured to assume a higher tone. He opposed the measure as derogatory to the national character. "It is disgraceful," he said, "that Burmans should be made instrumental in sending home their enemies." It became necessary to threaten to put the Army in motion towards the capital. Then this silly boaster was intimidated ; he remembered Melloon. The boats and boat-men were supplied.

Meanwhile gratifying intelligence had been received from the East of Pegue, where events had at first worn a sinister aspect. A Brigade had been formed in December within the walls of the ancient capital. It was commanded by Lieut. Colonel Pepper of the Madras Army. Its object was to possess itself of Tounghò. Thus the hold of the British upon Pegue would

be firmly rivetted. Col. Pepper marched against the town of Shwè-gyaing and established himself there. The enemy fled : but, when the Lieut. Colonel was about to resume his route, he learnt that the Burmans had entrenched themselves in a position at Tsee-toung threatening his right, and communications. He detached against them Lieut. Colonel Conry of the 1st Madras European Regiment with part of the 3rd and 34th Madras Native Infantry. The troops were repulsed, and their commander killed. The news of this reverse reached Head Quarters at Pagahm. But before they were moved from Yandabo the British had the satisfaction to learn that Colonel Pepper had finally adopted the measure, which just principles appear to have demanded from the first. Leaving a force to guard the walls of Shwè-gyaing, he moved in person with his main body on Tsee-toung, and carried it by storm. Tounghò was at his mercy. The news of the treaty alone prevented him from entering it. Every generous spirit in the Army rejoiced in this definitive success of a brave officer, who has since paid the debt of nature.

On the 7th March the 1st brigade was embarked at Yandabo in boats of every size, and form, and began to pursue its course down the Irawaddy. The Major General, the Civil Commissioner, and a portion of the Staff sailed in

the gun-boats of the Flotilla on the 8th. On the same morning Lieut. Col. Hunter Blair marched towards Prome in command of a brigade formed of H. M.'s. 87th, and the Native corps at Head Quarters. The remaining British battalions were successively embarked in the frail craft of the Burman government. They had some difficulties to encounter. The rowers were not of the best description, the river in the dry season abounds with shoals dangerous, as well as troublesome, many of the boats were crank or cumbrous, and the hulls of others as little to be depended on as the national faith, of those who had provided them. The banks were infested with predatory bands, who attempted to plunder every vessel, which accident separated from the fleet. But the troops first embarked reached Prome in a week, and Rangoon in a fortnight. As fast as half battalions arrived they went on board the transports in the river. In the last week of March a considerable portion of the victorious force was already on its way to either presidency.

The Major General was at Rangoon on the 24th. His Adjutant General bearing the treaty of Yandabo had sailed on the 18th in His Majesty's sloop Alligator, together with the Military Secretary, who had returned after carrying to Calcutta the unratified compact of

Melloon. . Thus it was possible that a part of the successful troops might reach the Supreme Presidency before the treaty, which they had wrung from their enemies. Imperfect rumours would probably precede them both. The Major General deemed it wisest to anticipate surmise and misconception by repairing in person to the seat of Government. The *Enterprize*, the first vessel, which had communicated between the mouths of the Thames and of the Hooghly by means of steam, was then at Rangoon. The Major General had taken leave of his army at Yandabo in an order of the day plain, and unpretending, but soldier-like, and affectionate. He embarked in the *Enterprize* with Mr. Robertson on the 26th. She completed the traject in eight days, reaching Calcutta three days before the *Alligator*. Thus the leader of its successful army conveyed to the Supreme Government the earliest tidings of the termination of its first war against the Barbarians of Ava.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

Extract of a Letter to R. D. Mangles, Esq. Secretary to the British Commissioners for the Affairs of Ava and Pegue; dated Camp Yaudabo, the 4th of March, 1826.

SIR,

WE do ourselves the honor to detail to you for the information of the Commissioners the circumstances of the visit of ceremony, which under their instructions we have had the honor of making at the capital and Court of the monarch of Ava on the occasion of the ratification of a treaty of Peace, and Amity.

It will be in their recollection that the Burman negotiators left our camp soon after the formal attestation of this solemn compact under salutes of ordnance on the evening of the 24th ultimo.

(The rest of this document quoted verbatim in No. 2.)

(Signed) T. LUMSDEN,

Capt. Bengal Horse Artillery.

H. HAVELOCK,

Lieut. Dy. Asst. Adj. General.

J. KNOX,

Assist. Surgeon, Madras Army.

No. II.

*Extract of a Letter to the Adjutant General H. M's.
forces in India, dated Fort William, June 5th, 1826.*

SIR,

In obedience to the commands conveyed to me, I do myself the honor to address to you for the information of His Excellency General the Right Honorable Lord Combermere, Commander-in-Chief, the detailed statement of facts, which his Lordship has done me the honor to cause to be required from me touching the late visit to Ava. On the return to Yandabo of the officers directed to proceed to the capital they sent in to the Commissioners for the affairs of Ava and Pegue, through their Secretary, a report of proceedings authenticated by their several signatures. A copy of this document happens to have remained in my possession, and as it was drawn up at a period, when the whole of the circumstances of the visit were fresh in the recollection of the three officers employed, it appears to me that I shall best meet the wishes of his Lordship by embodying the whole of it in this letter, prefacing it by a few necessary remarks on the origin of this mission, and subjoining some additional explanations on the topics of enquiry particularly adverted to in your letter addressed to me by His Lordship's command.

On the evening preceding that, on which the treaty of Peace was signed, Major General Sir Archibald Campbell privately communicated to me the probability of one or more of the officers of the Army being sent to Ava on a complimentary visit to the Monarch. He intimated to me also, that if the measure should

be definitively determined on, his choice would fall upon me, provided the service were agreeable to me. He further signified that the duty to be performed would be simply that of appearing before the King of Ava with the presents, which the Commissioners proposed to send in token of their sincere desire to secure the stability of the pacific relations recently restored. The task thus proposed to me I readily engaged to attempt, with acknowledgements for the distinction implied in this selection. In the course of the next day, the Major General stated to me that the contemplated measure had been finally adopted, and that I should find myself associated on this occasion with Captain Lumsden, Bengal Horse Artillery, and Assistant Surgeon Knox of the Madras Army. At half past five in the evening the ratification of the treaty took place under salutes of ordnance. The Burman ministers became spectators of the evolutions of part of the troops. The Major General caused me to be presented to them as one of the officers charged with the mission to the capital. They soon after prepared to leave the British camp for their own at Yapadaing.

The matter of ceremonial observance as detailed and debated in the histories of two British diplomats, had from the first moment of the Major General's proposal, occurred to me as one, on which it would be most desirable to come to a definite conclusion as early as possible. Captain Lumsden, to whom, as senior officer I opened the subject informed me that the Major General had instructed him to comply with the custom of laying aside boots or shoes on appearing in the Royal presence, and had intimated his wish in

general terms that the British officers should discretionally accommodate themselves to recognised Burman usages in matters of Court ceremony, so far as an adhesion to them had been sanctioned by the precedent of former British delegates. The details, which follow, are drawn from the document, to which I have already alluded.

“ The Burman negotiators left our camp soon after
“ the formal attestation of the pacific compact on the
“ 24th instant. As a wish however had been expressed that time should be allowed to announce the
“ approach of the British officers previously to their
“ actual arrival, our own embarkation in the war-
“ boats destined for our transport was delayed until
“ three o'clock (A. M.) on the 26th. Incidental delays
“ detained us until five. The Southerly wind which
“ had blown with violence for some days, had given
“ place to a dead calm. Deprived of this advantage
“ we calculated on a passage, somewhat more pro-
“ tracted than had been originally promised us ; but
“ when in vessels so well adapted to stemming the
“ stream, and with rowers so numerous, dexterous,
“ practised, and indefatigable, a whole day and night
“ had passed, and we found ourselves yet distant from
“ Yapadaing, nearly midway between Yandabo, and
“ Ava, we could not help suspecting that our progress
“ was intentionally delayed. In fact we did not reach
“ the Burman camp near that town until four P. M.
“ on the 27th, where our suspicions were by no means
“ removed by a courteous, but very urgent invitation
“ from the chiefs to land, and halt some hours for refreshment. This distrust was augmented when we
“ perceived that the crews of our boats were promptly

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“removed on our stepping ashore. The Atwenwoon
“however, who had taken such an active part in the
“recent conferences, received us with marked atten-
“tion and civility.

“The arrival of Doctor Price, the American mis-
“sionary, at seven in the evening developed to us the
“real state of affairs. He avowed to us that he had
“experienced difficulties, which he could not at once
“overcome, on opening his proposal for our reception
“at the Court of Ava. Since the period of our depar-
“ture from camp, he had been honored with an audi-
“ence of the Monarch, whose mind was agitated with
“distrust on the subject of our visit. Doctor Price
“had returned rapidly to Yandabo, stated his perplex-
“ities to the Commissioners, received their instruc-
“tions thereupon, and was now on his way once more
“to the Court in the hope of ultimately triumphing
“over its objections. It was certainly with feelings
“of considerable satisfaction that on his return at
“noon on the 28th, we learnt that the King of Ava
“had seen cause to repudiate his first injurious reso-
“lutions, and had definitively determined to receive
“the strangers in a manner befitting the delegates of
“the representatives of the British power in that king-
“dom.

“Yapadaing is about twenty-four English miles
“from Ava. We reached the capital in darkness a
“few minutes only before midnight. Conducted with
“every mark of respect by a numerous deputation of
“the officers of state from the landing place through
“the northern gate of the city under the walls of the
“palace to the house of the Commandant of the North-
“ern division of Ava, we were there entertained in

“a style of cordial hospitality. Nine o'clock in the morning of the 1st March was fixed for our state reception at the palace.

“At eleven all preliminary forms had been adjusted, and the head of the procession was already about to descend from our dwelling into the street, when its progress was arrested by the abrupt announcement that the Monarch had retired to sleep. Respectfully intimating that our own prolonged voyage had rendered us by no means averse to a similar indulgence, we returned to await the termination of this period of repose. A little after three we were informed that the hour of presentation had arrived. A discussion here arose on a point of ceremony often before canvassed at this Court. The ministers had in the morning stipulated that we should part with our swords on leaving our house, that the aggregate number of our attendants should be six, and that we should divest ourselves of our boots or shoes at the foot of the Royal stair-case. All these points of etiquette we cheerfully conceded. It was now further demanded that we should move with uncovered feet from the third gate of the palace. Hereupon we deemed it right to make a stand, urging the obvious objection, that though we were ready to conform to all established usages of the court, we were not prepared to follow up perpetual advances with interminable concessions; that the Burman ministers must from the first have fully known the definite limits of the national ceremonial, and could not therefore escape from the dilemma of having either at first demanded less, or having now proceeded to exact more than the dignity of

“their Royal Master required. Our remark being met
“by evasive circumlocution we at once declared that
“if the concession of this point was to be the ab-
“solute condition of the reception of the friends of the
“Commissioners, thankful for the kindness, we had
“had already experienced, we had only further to re-
“quest that boats might speedily be prepared for our
“return to Yandabo. The point was upon this aban-
“doned, and the ultimate rejoinder of the Burman
“Ministers was according to the interpretation of
“Doctor Price couched in the following remarkable
“terms, “You are the conquerors of the land. The
“custom is such as we have last declared. But you
“must please yourselves in this matter.”

“Followed by a concourse of spectators, numer-
“ous, and animated by an anxious curiosity, but
“governed by all the restraints of respect, and de-
“corum, we were escorted to the hall of justice, there
“to await for nearly an hour the completion of the
“preparations within the precincts of the palace. A
“few minutes after five its first portal was opened.
“Three others expanding in succession displayed
“to us the interior Court of this abode of Royalty oc-
“cupied by not fewer than four thousand guards re-
“gularly armed, with a park of Artillery of upwards
“of forty pieces. A detailed description of the gor-
“geous, and imposing spectacle within the walls of
“the palace during the scene of presentation, which
“followed, would be foreign to the character and
“compass of an official communication. It seems
“enough to relate that the monarch of Ava seated on
“his throne of state, surrounded by the ensigns of
“Royalty, environed by the princes of the Royal

“ house and lineage, and attended by the high Minis-
“ ters and Chief officers of the realm, received with
“ every mark of gracious consideration our congratu-
“ lations in the name of the Commissioners on the pa-
“ cification happily concluded between the two states,
“ accepted of their presents, directed suitable returns
“ to be made, and in conclusion caused the British of-
“ ficers intrusted with this charge, to be invested with
“ the insignia of titles of honorary distinction. It is
“ known that the Court of Ava is peculiarly jealous
“ on the point of ceremonial observance, but we have
“ reason to believe that the individuals, who this day
“ presented themselves at the foot of the throne, were
“ welcomed with all those marks of favor and consi-
“ deration, which were bestowed on former occasions
“ upon the accredited Agents, Envoys, and Ambassa-
“ dors of the Supreme Government of India. On the
“ breaking up of the Durbar, we returned to our former
“ quarters, and awaited the dispositions of the Sove-
“ reign regarding the time, and manner of our return.

“ Previously to our presentation it had come to
“ our knowledge that six prisoners of war taken at
“ Ramoo were yet in confinement within the walls of
“ Ava. Though without instructions on the subject
“ our sense of duty as British officers strongly urg-
“ ed us to remonstrate against so manifest, and un-
“ feeling a contravention of an article of the Treaty.
“ We regret to be compelled to report that the Bur-
“ man Ministers ill consulted the true dignity of their
“ Royal Master by the series of evasions, which these
“ remonstrances called forth. Finally however our re-
“ clamation was successful. The prisoners were sent
“ to us on the evening of the 21.

“ On the morning of the 3d all was prepared for our
“ departure. We had reached this capital in dark-
“ ness, and during our stay the most jealous precau-
“ tions had been adopted to prevent our passing the
“ inclosures of our dwelling. Delays in our embarka-
“ tion inseparable from the minute, methodical charac-
“ ter of state arrangements in Ava detained us near
“ the Northern gate until nearly eight o'clock, and as
“ our war-boats, swept along the small river, which
“ washes this side, and thence past the point of con-
“ fluence down the channel of the great Irawaddy, we
“ obtained a view of this large capital, its walls, de-
“ fences, and localities fully satisfactory to our curiosi-
“ ty as strangers as well as soldiers. Two hours after
“ sunset we reached the British Head Quarters.”

From this narrative his Excellency will learn that the ceremonial stipulations of the Burman officers extended to two points of court etiquette, the pulling off the exterior covering of the feet at the bottom of the stair-case of the palace, and the laying aside our sabres before leaving our dwellings. The first of these observances had been specifically enjoined by the Major General, the second arose out of the representations of Doctor Price confirmed by those of others of the best informed of the lately released *détenus*, that the wearing or carrying any warlike weapon within the precincts of the Court was forbidden by the laws of Ava, and might do violence to the feelings, and cause alarm in the breast of the Monarch, and of his courtiers. On this statement the British officers preferred the alternative of appearing altogether without swords when engaged in a pacific and peculiar duty to divesting themselves of them at the palace gate.

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As regards obeisances, Doctor Price had intimated the propriety of our bowing or saluting in the direction of the spire of the building on the opening of the gate, which displayed to view the Royal palace, again on arriving in front of the throne, and again on the appearance of the Monarch upon the throne. These bows or salutes were executed by Captain Lumsden, and myself precisely in the manner sanctioned respectively by our military regulations, and social usages in Europe, and consisted in bringing the hand slowly up to the helmet, or hat, and once by myself, in taking off the hat in the open air, and in the self-same inclination of the head, in the hall of audience, which constitutes our national notion of a respectful bow, whether in the presence of a Monarch, or to an individual of less exalted rank in cultivated society, when the object of respect happens to be beyond the pale of very familiar intercourse, or acquaintance. The repetition of such salutations as I have described arose several times during the conference from the spontaneous action of our own feelings, on such obvious occasions as the offer of refreshments, the interchange of presents, and the investiture with the badges of titular distinction; the recurrence of bows being indeed considerably multiplied in a court, where the formalities are chiefly confined to the language of gesticulation. Whenever this occurred however the erect position of the bodies of the British officers on inclining the head, contrasted with the deep prostration of the foreheads of the Burman nobles on the pavement, presented a very marked distinction between English manners, and those of Ava. I hardly know whether I ought to include under the head of

ceremony or of obeisance, or of either, the fact, which I must not however omit to notice, of our being seated on the carpeted pavement of a hall which contained not one single article of furniture adapted to sitting or reclining, and wherein the ministers, the nobles, the princes, and the heir-apparent disposed their persons in the very same way on the floor, and above all the Monarch himself sat upon a small carpet or cushion on the platform of the elevated throne.

It remains for me to reply to the question of respectful reception. I have already noticed the want of candor in all discussions on the part of the Burman officers, and the means of jealous *surveillance*, which they adopted to prevent our obtaining a view of the city, and which in fact amounted to personal confinement within the inclosures of a single dwelling, I might also add something of the deficiency of polish at their entertainments, and on all occasions of personal intercourse, though perhaps not without some imputation of unfairness, where kindness and hospitality seemed to be the reigning motives. All these things are undoubtedly more or less offensive to the feelings of a British officer. To counterbalance them however I must not fail distinctly to enumerate a series of very decided indications of consideration and respect extending throughout every class in the empire—of respect in the populace, which carefully avoided every species of offence, and annoyance, though actuated by a curiosity perfectly tumultuous—the officers and ministers, who entertained us courteously, and hospitably at the halting place of Yapa-daing, who attended in numbers, and with marked assiduity our debarkation, and embarkation, and were

most attentive to all our wants within the city of Ava—in the Princes, and the heir to the throne, whose deportment in the audience chamber bore the character of condescension, and politeness,—lastly, of respect for the national character as evinced by the King of Ava, who contrary to general expectation gave to officers, who merely appeared as the friends of the British Commissioners, a state reception seated on his throne, a privilege seldom or never, as far as can be collected from history or report, extended to any foreigners, excepting Ambassadors or others fortified with regular credentials—respect as further displayed in his general expression of welcome during the presentation followed up by repeated enquiries after our health, and suitable entertainment, on the succeeding day, and up to the moment of our departure.

* * * * *

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

H. HAVELOCK,

Lieut. 13th Lt. Inf., late D. A. A. General in A. a.

No. III.

Summary of the loss in all grades of Major General Sir Archibald Campbell's Army in killed in action, and deaths by disease from May, 1824, to the close of the war.

Field Officers 5, Captains 22, Subalterns 36, Surgeons and Assistant Surgeons 4, Conductors 2, Sp^l Assistant Surgeons 4, Serjeants 148, Drummers and Trumpeters 49, Rank and File 2952. Total Europeans 3222. Native Officers 34, Havildars 92, Drummers

and Fifers 17, Rank and File 1304, Dooly Bearers, &c. 319. Total Natives 1766. Grand total 4988. Horses 399.

No. IV.

Extract from General Orders by Major General Sir A. Campbell, K. C. B. Head Quarters, Camp, Yandabo, 5th March, 1826.

The happy termination in this encampment of the contest in behalf of the national honor reminds the Major General of the near approach of the period of his separation from this force, the officers and soldiers of which will shortly he trusts return to enjoy an unbroken portion of repose after their prolonged labors, happy he doubts not in the society of those most dear to them, from whom they have been now little short of two years separated.

The Army that has deserved so well of the state, which it serves, cannot fail to have endeared itself to its General. He will part from it, whenever the moment arrives, with an impression of satisfaction deep and indelible as regards its conduct as a body; and he can assure every individual in its ranks, with a perfect sincerity, that it will hereafter be a source of pride and gratification to him to be enabled to promote in any way the happiness and interests of any soldier or officer, who has served under him in Ava.

He will not formally reiterate these sentiments, but he requests the officers and crews of H. M.'s Navy, and the Honorable Company's flotilla to accept of the expression of them as applying to the slightest diminution or reserve.



